

THE RELATION OF KARL BARTH'S UNDERSTANDING OF REVELATION TO THAT OF SØREN KIERKEGAARD

Seung-Goo Lee

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil
at the
University of St Andrews



1986

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A Dissertation
submitted to
The University of St. Andrews.

For
The Degree
of
Master of Philosophy

By
Seung-Goo Lee

June, 1985.
St. Andrews.



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CERTIFICATION

I certify that Seung-Goo Lee has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution of the University Court, 1981, No.2, and therefore, is qualified to submit this thesis in application for the Degree of Master of Philosophy.

M.Daphne Hampson

supervisor

DECLARATION

I was admitted under Ordinance 350 (General No.12) and Resolution of the University Court, 1981, No.2 as a full-time candidate for the degree of M.Phil. on 1st October, 1984.

I hereby declare that the following thesis which is submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Divinity, is based upon the result of research carried out by myself, that it is my composition, that it has not previously been presented for a higher degree. The research was carried out in the University of St. Andrews under the supervision of Dr.M.Daphne Hampson.

Seung-Goo Lee

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am grateful to Dr.M.Daphne Hampson who supervised this study with passion and endurance. Without her passionate supervision which demanded a lot of time and endless endurance, the finishing of this study would not have been possible. And I am also grateful to Professor D.W.D.Shaw and Dr.George B.Hall, who also endured my poor English as a foreign student. I would be terribly remiss if I were not to mention help provided by my friends Stephen Ayeling, Karim E.Shoukry, and Gabriel Mutunggi, who helped me to write this dissertation in better English. Finally, I would like to share the joy of finishing my first English study with my mother, my wife, and a baby who comes into this world with this study.

ABBREVIATIONS

AR: On Authority and Revelation.

CA: The Concept of Anxiety.

CD: Church Dogmatics.

CUP: Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

FSE: For Self-Examination.

JFU: Judge for Yourself.

Journals: The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, Dru edition.

PF: Philosophical Fragments.

"Romans": The Epistle to the Romans, the second edition(1922).

SJT: Scottish Journal of Theology.

SKJP: Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers.

SUD: Sickness unto Death.

TC: Training in Christianity.

WL: Works of Love.

Cf. Footnote numbers will be given in [].

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to consider the relation between Karl Barth's understanding and that of Søren Kierkegaard. This study defended the thesis, that even though the later Barth's position was closer to Kierkegaard than was that of the early Barth, the later Barth's position was still different from that of Kierkegaard.

To show that this is the case, an attempt was made to analyze Barth's early position and his later position on revelation in their relation to Kierkegaard. Firstly, I examined the early Barth's understanding of revelation through an analysis of The Epistle of the Romans (second edition of 1922) with special reference to its relation to Kierkegaard. In this consideration, I took three salient concepts which were central to the early Barth's understanding of revelation and are relevant to Kierkegaard: Moment, History and Paradox. Through the analysis of these three concepts, I showed that even though the early Barth and Kierkegaard used the same terminology, the meaning which they gave to these terms was different from one another. Accordingly, their understandings of revelation were also different from one another.

I then turned my attention to the later Barth, especially after the publication of the first volume of the Church Dogmatics in 1932, for the purpose of drawing out the later Barth's understanding of revelation. In this consideration, I argued that even though the later Barth recognized the historicity and

temporality of revelation and seemed to emphasize the incarnation, the historicity and the incarnation which the later Barth recognized, were different from Kierkegaard's understanding of the historicity of revelation and of the incarnation. The differences between their concepts of the historicity and temporality, made for the difference between their understandings of revelation.

In the third chapter, I attempted to explore Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation. Throughout this chapter, I was especially concerned with the three characteristics which Kierkegaard wanted to emphasize in his understanding of revelation: the paradoxicality of revelation, revelation as the absolute fact, and the historicity of revelation. I thus concluded that even though the later Barth's view of revelation was close to that of Kierkegaard, even the later Barth has a different understanding of revelation from that of Kierkegaard. At the back of their understanding of revelation there was a different thought-structure.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to consider the relation between Karl Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Søren Kierkegaard. What I am trying to consider is not the formal relation between them, but the real relation. By formal relation I mean the way in which Barth thinks of his relation to Kierkegaard. As far as the formal relation is concerned, the best way to consider it, is to study and analyze Barth's own statements about his relation to Kierkegaard. Although Barth little discusses his relation to Kierkegaard, there are some places where he speaks of his relation to Kierkegaard.[1] Barth asserts that although he learned from Kierkegaard, he had to learn other things from other teachers at a later stage. That is to say, Barth thinks that he goes beyond Kierkegaard.

However, this study of the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard starts from a suspicion about Barth's own assertion concerning this relation. What I am trying to show in this study is that Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation is different from the early Barth's understanding of revelation which is expressed in the second edition of The Epistle to the Romans; and that Barth's later understanding of revelation which, according to Barth, moves beyond Kierkegaard, is in fact closer to Kierkegaard. However, despite this similarity between the later Barth's position and that of Kierkegaard on revelation, there is a considerable difference between their understandings of revelation, for Barth does not overcome an absolute dualism in his thought-structure.

For the purpose of clarification of my thesis of this study, I will

1. Cf. e.g., Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, tr. E. Hoskyns (London; Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 4, 11; Selbstdarstellung (1964); "A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille," Canadian Journal of Theology 11 (1965), pp. 3-7.

consider briefly several approaches to the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard which have been put forth in Barth and Kierkegaardian scholarship up to now.

Even though most of the students who study Barth comment briefly on the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard, there are some students who are especially interested in this relationship. If we may classify the various positions on this relation, we can say that there are three major approaches: (1) that the early Barth is closer to Kierkegaard than the later Barth; (2) that Barth always has a close relation to Kierkegaard; and (3) that the later Barth is closer to Kierkegaard than the early Barth. The position which I shall defend in this study is closest to the third position. However, unlike most people who hold position 3, I want to emphasize the fact that the position of the later Barth is still not the same as that of Kierkegaard. Here I shall describe the three positions briefly and make it clear how my position differs from these three positions.

Considering the first of these positions, we shall look at the situation in which this position occurs. In a sense, the discussion of this problem of the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard is closely related to the debate as to whether or not Kierkegaard was the most significant influence upon the revision of The Epistle to the Romans. According to Thomas F. Torrance: "Theologically and philosophically it was undoubtedly Kierkegaard who had the greatest impact upon him[Barth], far greater than the actual mentioning of his [Kierkegaard's] name, in the Romans." [2] Among the scholars who emphasize the influence of Kierkegaard on the second edition of the Romans, the one who is most notable is the French scholar Jean Rillet who says that Barth's Romans, in the second

2. Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology: 1910-1931 (London: SCM, 1962), p.44.

edition, is perhaps more, at times, a Kierkegaardian epistle to the Christians than a Pauline Epistle.[3] Some have argued, on the contrary, that F. Overbeck had a more fundamental influence upon the second edition of the Romans. [4] What is important at this point, however, is not whether Kierkegaard is the most important influence on the 1922 "Romans" or not, but that most of those who participate in this argument as to whether Kierkegaard is the most influence on the 1922 "Romans" or not, also hold the view that the early Barth is closer to Kierkegaard than the later Barth. This first view, that Barth was influenced by Kierkegaard, but that Barth passed beyond Kierkegaard in his later theology, is the most generally held view of the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard. Herbert Hartwell, in his book The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction, says the following: "...we do not need to discuss either philosophical concepts and ideas of Kant and Plato, which Barth used in Romans..., or Kierkegaard's paradoxical and existential way of thinking, which exerted a strong influence upon the formation of Barth's early theology and can quite clearly be traced in Romans. In his later theology, especially in his Church Dogmatics, Barth has not only given up this latter mode of thought, but on many important aspects of

3. Cf. Jean Rillet, "Le Christologie de Soren Kierkegaard," Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, XXX(1942), p.230. cited in William Walter Wells III, The Influence of Kierkegaard on the Theology of Karl Barth, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Syracuse University, 1970), p.171. n.18.

4. Cf. James D. Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology, p.104: "Perhaps what has led to the overrating of the inference [to the second edition to the Romans] has been the highly visible effect of Kierkegaard's dialectic and terminology on the language and general forms of expression in the 1922 "Romans". That they vanished from Barth's writing almost as suddenly as they entered has rarely been noted. Actually, in the revolutionizing of Barth's thinking in 1920, Overbeck had more responsibility than Kierkegaard, but this passed unnoticed, since so few persons know anything about Overbeck or take the trouble to compare the 1919 "Romans" with the 1922 "Romans". For the views that emphasize the influence of Overbeck. cf. Henri Bouillard, Karl Barth, I(Paris, 1957), p.107. cited in Come; A.B. Come, An Introduction to Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers (London: SCM, 1963), p.40; Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), p.37; Peter H. Monsma, Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation (Somerville: Somerset Press, 1937), p.88.

his teaching has developed a view which is fundamentally different from that of Kierkegaard." [5] We can call this view position 1 on the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard. Even though this position is the most common, it seems to me that it does not consider the following two points seriously. In the first instance, it does not seriously consider the problem of whether Barth uses Kierkegaardian terms with the meaning which Kierkegaard gives to these terms. Usually it is simply presupposed that Barth uses Kierkegaardian terminology giving terms the meaning which Kierkegaard gives to them. Secondly, position 1 does not consider the problem of whether Barth's later theology, even though it does not have many Kierkegaardian terms, is closer to that of Kierkegaard in its contents or subject-matter than is his early theology.

We come now to consider position 2. Some scholars think that even after Barth's public break with Kierkegaard, Barth, in fact, does not overcome Kierkegaard's influence. In fact this position is the anti-thesis to position 1. Those who examine the contents of the Church Dogmatics critically raise the question as to whether Barth does really move beyond Kierkegaard and answer this negatively. H.R. Mackintosh who at an early date was chiefly responsible for encouraging students to study Barth in Scotland, for example, speaks about the change of Barth's theology as follows: "When Barth discarded 'existentialism,' it was evidently with the sense that as a temporary intellectual apparatus it had been dangerous and wholly inadequate. We cannot say that similarly he has gone beyond dialectical or paradoxical thinking. True, the word 'dialectic' has

5. Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1964), pp. 11f. As we have mentioned above, those who participate in the argument as to whether Kierkegaard is the most important influence on the "Romans" or not, have a similar view to H. Hartwell, Cf. James D. Smart, op. cit., pp. 104, 224 and Thomas Torrance, op. cit., pp. 45, 139-141. Paul Sponheim also expressed a similar view in his Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975, second edition), pp. 277-280, 284 n. 49. See also Donald G. Bloesch, Jesus is Victor! Karl Barth's Doctrine of Salvation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976), pp. 128f..

no place in the index of his last great work, the first volume of his revised Dogmatics. But this appears to be less because its usefulness has wholly vanished than because it bade fair to become a new fashion, practised indiscriminately." [6] Besides H.R. Mackintosh, there are several scholars who think that, in fact, the later Barth's position also reflects the influence of Kierkegaard. [7] The major thesis of those who hold position 2 is that though Barth no longer makes the fact clear that he is influenced by Kierkegaard, even in his later theology there remain significant similarities between the content of his theological position and that of Kierkegaard.

There is also the third view of the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard which can be called position 3. Alastair McKinnon who is a knowledgeable Kierkegaardian scholar [8] asserts that many scholars (including Barth) misinterpreted Kierkegaard and he calls this misinterpreted Kierkegaard 'phantom Kierkegaard.' According to McKinnon, the early Barth's position is the same as this misinterpreted Kierkegaard (phantom Kierkegaard), and the later Barth has the same position as that of the real Kierkegaard. McKinnon draws this conclusion through a consideration of the concept of Paradox in the works of Kierkegaard and Barth. But he says this does not mean that the later Barth is aware that he is closer to Kierkegaard than he was in early period. Even though Barth asserts that he no longer uses the term paradox, and tries to show faith to be rational, this very fact itself shows that the later Barth has the same view as the real Kierkegaard. For, according to McKinnon's interpretation of

6. H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London and Glasgow: James and Nisbet, 1937), p. 256.

7. Cf. Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth, trans. Dominic M. Maruca (Westminster: Newman, 1962), esp. p. 217; J. Heywood Thomas, "The Christology of Kierkegaard and Karl Barth," Hibbert Journal LIII (1954-1955), p. 281; William Walters Wells, III, The Influence of Kierkegaard on the Theology of Karl Barth; Mark Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, pp. 17f., 362. n. 22; Cornelius Van Til, The New Modernism (London: James Clarke, 1946), pp. 212-224, 364-379. See also Peter Monsma, op.cit., p. 146.

Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard is not an irrational thinker in any sense of the word.[9] In this respect, N.H.Søe who considers firstly the similarities and differences between the early Barth(1922) and Kierkegaard, and secondly those between the later Barth and Kierkegaard and concludes that "he (the later Barth) reaches approximately the same conclusions as does S.K. in Philosophical Fragments", can also be classified as one who holds position 3 on the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard. For, mentioning Barth's address "A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille"[10], Søe also says that although the later Barth's conclusion is the same as that of Kierkegaard, "it does not seem to signify a rediscovery of SK or a more positive assessment of him." [11] However, when we consider critically both Kierkegaard's writings and the later Barth's theology, we cannot help raising the question of whether we can say that the position of the later Barth is identical or similar (in the real sense) to that of Kierkegaard. It is impossible, as we shall argue in this study, to interpret Kierkegaard and the later Barth in such a way. For even though the later Barth, contrary to his earlier view, asserts that God's revelation takes place in time

8. The reason why I say that A. McKinnon is a knowledgeable Kierkegaardian scholar is not only because of his deep understanding of Kierkegaard, but also his special methodology in studying Kierkegaard, that is, the application of statistical method to Kierkegaard's authorship using a computer. Cf. A. McKinnon (ed.), Kierkegaard: Resources and Results (Waterloo: Wilgrid Lauvien University Press, 1982); "Kierkegaard: Paradox and Irrationalism," Journal of existentialism VII (1967), pp.401-16; "Believing the Paradox," Harvard Theological Review LXI (1968), pp.633-36; "Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited," International Philosophical Quarterly IX (1969), pp.165-76; "Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy," American philosophical quarterly VI (1969), pp.116-127; "Theological Focus in Kierkegaard's Samlede Vaerker," Science of Religion IV (1974-1975), pp.58-62.

9. Cf. A. McKinnon, "Barth's Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further Light," Canadian Journal of Theology XIII (1967), pp.31-39. For McKinnon's interpretation of Kierkegaard's Paradox, see "Kierkegaard: Paradox and Irrationalism," op. cit., pp.401-16; "Believing the Paradox," op. cit., pp.633-36; "Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited," op. cit., 165-76.

10. See p.1..note 1.

11. N.H.Søe, "Karl Barth," in The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard. Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana vol.8 (Copenhagen: C.A.Reitzel, 1981), p.231.

and history, his concepts of time and history are slightly different from those of Kierkegaard.

Up to now we have considered three positions on the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard. What we have discovered in this consideration is that the scholars who have their particular position on this relation base that position on their own understanding of Kierkegaard and their view of the relation between the early Barth and the later Barth. The best way, therefore, to consider this problem of the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard is a consideration based on two important questions: "How to interpret Kierkegaard?" and "What is the relation between the early Barth and the later Barth?"

Therefore, I shall pursue this problem of the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard on the basis of these two questions. Of course, the specific purpose of this study is to discover the real relation between their understandings of revelation. However, the relation between their understandings of revelation is a problem which is closely related to the problem of the general relation between their thought. Hence, our study on the relation between their understandings of revelation can also shed light on the problem of the general relation between Barth and Kierkegaard.

This study on the relation between their understandings of revelation, therefore, will defend the following position on the relation between Barth and Kierkegaard; namely that even though the later Barth is closer to Kierkegaard than the early Barth, the later Barth's position is still different from that of Kierkegaard.

To show that this is the case, we shall attempt to analyze Barth's early position and his later position on revelation in their relation to Kierkegaard. Firstly, we shall examine the early Barth's understanding of revelation through an analysis of The Epistle to the Romans (1922) with special reference to its relation to Kierkegaard. We shall then turn our attention to the later Barth, especially after the publication of the first volume of the Church Dogmatics in 1932, for the purpose of drawing out the later Barth's understanding of revelation which, according to Barth, abandons the use of Kierkegaardian ideas and terminology. In the first stage of our examination, the consideration of The Romans, we shall take some salient concepts which are central to the early Barth's understanding of revelation and are relevant to Kierkegaard: Moment, History, and Paradox. Through the analysis of these three concepts, we shall show that even though Barth and Kierkegaard use the same terminology, the meaning which they give to these terms is different from one another. Accordingly, their understandings of revelation are also different from one another. It is this point which we shall show to be the case in the first chapter of our study. Revelation, according to the early Barth, takes place in the eternal Moment which does not belong to the flux of time, whereas, according to Kierkegaard, it is in time. Revelation therefore for Barth is beyond time and history, whereas, for Kierkegaard, it is given by "God in time" and takes an historical form. Revelation is Paradox for both of them. However, whereas, for Barth, revelation is Paradox because it is not in time and history, for Kierkegaard it is Paradox because it is in time and history.

In the second chapter, we shall examine the later Barth's understanding of revelation in relation to Kierkegaard. In this chapter we shall argue that even though the later Barth recognizes the historicity and temporality of revelation and seems to emphasize the incarnation, the historicity and the incarnation

which the later Barth recognizes, are different from Kierkegaard's understanding of historicity of revelation and of the incarnation. The differences between their concepts of the historicity and temporality, it seems to me, makes for the difference between their understandings of revelation.

In the third chapter I shall attempt to draw out Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation for the purpose of clarification of my thesis. Throughout this chapter we shall be especially concerned with the three characteristics which Kierkegaard wants to emphasize in his understanding of revelation: the paradoxicality of revelation, revelation as the absolute fact, and the historicity of revelation. We shall thus conclude that even though the later Barth's view of revelation is closer to that of Kierkegaard, the later Barth also has a different understanding of revelation from that of Kierkegaard. At the back of their understanding of revelation there is a different thought-structure.

CHAPTER I

Karl Barth on Revelation in "The Epistle to the Romans"

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Barth's understanding of revelation in the second edition of "The Epistle to the Romans" [1], in particular in its relation to Kierkegaard. Through this examination I hope to show that there is a considerable difference between their understandings of revelation, even though Barth affirms clearly that he is influenced by Kierkegaard. In order to look at Barth on revelation with particular reference to Kierkegaard, I shall take three terms which are central to Barth's understanding of revelation and are relevant to Kierkegaard: Moment, History, and Paradox. The three subdivisions of this chapter will consist respectively of a consideration of these three terms. The general points which I shall try to make in this chapter are that even though Barth uses these terms which have a relation to Kierkegaard, Barth's usage of these terms is different from that of Kierkegaard; that, therefore, even though both of them call revelation 'paradox' and relate revelation to moment, their understandings of revelation are different from each other. What I shall show is that (1) Barth thinks that the Moment in which revelation takes place is the 'eternal Moment' or the 'timeless Moment'; and that, therefore, (2) according to Barth, revelation has nothing to do with history, or it takes place in its own realm of history (Urgeschichte); and that (3) Barth's use of Paradox is closely related to these two points. That is to say, since revelation which reveals God and God's realm takes place or touches our world only in the eternal Moment, without touching

1. Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, E.T. from the sixth edition (1928), by E.C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933). The second edition, a thorough revision of the first, was published in 1922 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag) and has been the basis for subsequent reprints. I shall use this English edition in this study, and hereafter citations from this book will be given in this form: "Romans", page number.

it, revelation has a relation to paradox. These are the points which I shall try to argue in this chapter.

1

Our first task is to discuss Barth's understanding of Moment in the "Romans". For Barth, the Moment plays a very important role in his understanding of revelation, because Barth asserts that revelation takes place in the Moment. What does Barth mean by Moment? I shall show in this section that, for Barth, the Moment is the eternal Moment and, therefore, the timeless Moment. To show this, I shall examine first that Barth does not differentiate between the times of Resurrection, of Judgment, and of faith, for, according to Barth, all of these take place in the Moment, which does not belong to time and history; secondly, that Barth tries to relate the Moment of revelation to the "secret of time" which, according to Barth, is beyond time and the realm of history; and thirdly, that Barth has a timeless eschatology which explains all things in relation to a timeless Moment.

First, then let us consider Barth's lack of discrimination between the times of Resurrection, of Judgment, and of Faith. According to Barth, all of these take place in the Moment. Yet, for Barth, there is no differentiation between the times of these events. For, Barth thinks of the eternal or the timeless Moment when he uses the term "Moment". It is this point that we shall consider in the next few paragraphs.

Let us start from the Moment of the Resurrection. In a sense, for Barth, Resurrection is the ground of revelation. For, according to Barth, Resurrection is "the revelation" ("Romans", p.30, passim). If there is no Resurrection, there is no revelation at all. In the Resurrection, Jesus is disclosed as Christ, God

appears, and we can apprehend God in Christ. And in the Resurrection the Kingdom of God has dawned, "the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of flesh" ("Romans," p.30). But this Resurrection cannot stand side by side with other events in history and time. According to Barth, Resurrection is a special event. So he qualifies the passage which we have just quoted by saying: "But [the new world] touches it [the old world] as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it" ("Romans," p.30). If in the Resurrection the new world touches our world directly, then, according to Barth, the new world cannot be the new world in the real sense. Accordingly, if Resurrection takes place in time, it cannot be an event which belongs to the new world. For, in the thought of Barth, if the Resurrection were in time and history, it would belong to the past. What is in time and history, according to Barth, cannot be absolute, whatever it may be. Therefore, if in the Moment of the Resurrection God's world touches our world, then God's world touches our world without touching it.[1] If it is not the case, even God's world, by touching our world, becomes a relative one (Cf. "Romans," pp.9, 115). In this respect, Barth says that Resurrection is not an event in time and history. Thus the Moment, in which Resurrection takes place, cannot be a moment in time. Resurrection and the Moment in which the Resurrection takes place, for Barth, are not concepts to which the we can apply the time concept at all.

However, according to Barth, the Resurrection is not the only event which

1. James Smart argues that "the tangent was really meant to do more than merely touch the circle, for where it touches, 'our world ceases to be historical, temporal, objective, and directly visible.' In short, Urgeschichte becomes reality in time. The world of God breaks into time and in the strength of the inbreaking the man who by faith is under grace 'stands already in the "Urgeschichte" and End history [where] God is all in all.' The Divided Mind of Modern Theology: Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, 1908-1933 (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), p.115. But Smart's reasoning itself betrays that what happens in Resurrection is not in time and history. Barth himself, in his later days, criticized his early view on this problem. Cf. Church Dogmatics I/2, p.50; II/1, p.634. See also section 2 of this chapter.

belongs to such a special category. As the Resurrection takes place in the Moment which does not belong to time, God's Judgment also happens in the Moment. For Barth, God's Judgment implies not only God's negation, but also God's affirmation. Yet, there is no difference of times, that is to say, the moment of God's negation is the Moment of God's affirmation [2]. God negates our world, affirming it, and God affirms the world, negating it. Both of these, negation and affirmation, take place in the Moment. In one place Barth says: "We have nothing of which to boast, nothing past and future, nothing before or after the Moment ... when the last trumpet shall sound and men stand naked before God, and when, in their darkness, they shall be clothed upon with the righteousness of God. And so, in the presence of Jesus, all that men are and have and do is perceived to be complete unreality, unless, bowed under the negation of God, they await His divine affirmation. All that men are and have and do is in itself naught but the righteousness of man, and in the sight of God and men, remains illusion, unless, under the judgment of God, it ceases to be the righteousness of man" ("Romans," p.109).

If we see this passage without considering the context in which Barth speaks, then we may think that Barth is speaking of the time of the Last Judgment. In a sense, Barth does, in fact, speak of the Last Judgment here. Can we, then, interpret this passage in relation to Barth's view of the Resurrection: that what happened in the Resurrection in principle to Christ, will be applied to all men at the end of time? Just as Jesus died and was resurrected [was negated and was affirmed by God], we shall be judged and shall be clothed with the righteousness of God at the end of the flux of time: Is

2. Cf. Bouillard, Karl Barth I (Paris: Aubier, 1957), p.26: "KRISIS is equivalent to Aufhebung in Hegelian sense of the term The negation is a situation; the suppression is accomplished. The 'Yes' is in the 'No.' One constantly risks misunderstanding Barth's thought in forgetting this." cited in Wells, op. cit., p.187. note 71.

this a right interpretation of this passage?

To answer this question, let us once again quote a passage in which Barth speaks of God's negation and affirmation: "Confronted by Jesus, men must die, they must die daily, save in so far as they stand under the 'NO' and the 'YES' of God, and are passing from atonement to redemption, from the cross to Resurrection" ("Romans," p.108). We can see that this passage is a passage about the moment of our faith.

We have, then, three different events in which God's negation and affirmation take place: the events of Resurrection, of Judgement, and of our Faith. But Barth, in his "Romans," does not say that these three events take place in time at all. Here is the importance of Barth's "Moment". According to Barth, all of these take place only in the "Moment" which is not in time. This is why Barth can discriminate between the times of these events.

Why does the Moment not belong to time? We find the reason why Barth thinks this from the following passage:

"The 'Moment' of the movement of men by God is beyond men, it cannot be enclosed in a system or a method or a 'way'. It rests in the good pleasure of God, and its occasion is to be sought and found only in Him." ("Romans," p.110)

Now we can give the reason why the Moment has, for Barth, nothing to do with time. This is because, for Barth, this Moment is the Moment in which God acts. In the above quotation we find Barth's concept of the Moment. In the Moment, according to this passage, there is nothing but God Himself, and man surrenders himself and all that he is to God. The Moment rests only in the good pleasure of God. Yet, for Barth at this time, God as the Primal Origin of all, is the Eternal who is beyond time. Consequently, the Moment as well is not in time.

Barth, therefore, calls the Moment 'the eternal Moment' or, 'the Absolute Moment.' ("Romans," pp.497,530). The Moment belongs not to time, nor to man, but to God; it "has no before no after" ("Romans," p.137). In a word, it is not a moment in time ("Romans," pp.109,497). For this Moment is not in the flux of time, but in God's hands; the Moment is not even a moment in the flux of time, but the Moment of God who is eternal. Hence, in relation to this Moment there is no difference of times. The Moment of faith is the Moment of the Last Judgment, and the reverse is also true. For, we can say once more, the Moment is not a moment in time. In the realm of eternity there is no differentiation between times. God's negation and God's affirmation take place in the eternal Moment which has no differentiation between times. And this Moment, for Barth, is the Moment of revelation. This point, that revelation takes place only in the Moment, will be discussed later. What is important here is that since revelation, Resurrection, judgment, and even our faith, take place and are only in the eternal Moment, Barth talks about the Moment without separating times; it is impossible, for Barth, to separate the times of these moments, for the Moment is not in time.[1]

The second point, which I shall make in order to show that, for Barth, the Moment is eternal (timeless) Moment, is - that, according to Barth, the Moment, as the moment of revelation, reveals the secret of time which is not in time, but beyond time. Therefore, the Moment of revelation is the timeless Moment. What is interesting in relation to this point is that Barth discusses the revelation of the secret of time in relation to his doctrine of God's negation and God's affirmation. Thus our discussion on this problem will also be related

1. For a similar interpretation of the early Barth's theology, see Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth (New York: Abingdon Press, 1965), p.202: "Our true hope lies beyond time in an eternal Moment, an event occurring on the boundary between time and eternity. [In his early writings] Barth identified this event as the Resurrection of Jesus Christ."

not recognized this distinction up to the Moment, this Moment also reveals "our lack of humility, our sin".[1]

In this sense, Barth relates the secret of time to man (the 'existence'). So the secret of time is also the secret of the existence. When the secret of time is revealed, the sin of man is also revealed. However, as we have seen, the secret of time also implies the Eternity, which is not in time, but is revealed as the primal origin and the end of time. Similarly in the Moment in which the sin of man is revealed there is also the possibility of being a righteous man. The eternal Moment, for Barth, is the Moment in which man is negated and at the same time affirmed. "Man," says Barth, "it is who has been and will be in God, who dies and lives, falls and stands; it is man who is what he is and is also what he is not; men it is who have been created as this or that particular man and who have been also created anew as the One; men it is who are individuals both in their particular once-for-allness and in their universality. Men are always the first AND the second; but they are the second in the overcoming of the first, in Christ; that is to say, in the invisible New Age. We spend our years as a tale that is told --- this is the secret of time which is made known in the 'Moment' of revelation, in the eternal 'Moment' which always is, and yet is not" ("Romans," p.497). This Moment, therefore, is the Moment in which Adam and Christ meet and separate. In this Moment we are 'in Adam' and at the same time 'in Christ'; but we are 'in Christ' in the overcoming of the self in Adam. In this Moment, first God "drives men helplessly on to the barrier which hems them in, and hands them over to the god

1. In this sense, Barth at this time (1922) does not differentiate between (1) Plato's concept of the relation between the world of Ideas and the world of Phenomena and (2) the meaning of Christian revelation. According to Barth, Plato, like Abraham, had already seen that which will be revealed in Christ. Cf. "Romans," pp.45-47, 85-90. By equating Plato's thinking and the content of revelation, Barth betrays that he understands revelation as eternal revelation.

to Barth's doctrine of God's negation and God's affirmation. According to Barth, the secret of time is not different from the dialectic between the realm of eternity and that of time.

"Between the past and the future---between the times (Zwischen den Zeiten!)---," says Barth, "there is a 'Moment' that is no Moment in time. The 'Moment' is the eternal Moment --- the NOW--- when the past and the future stand still, when the former ceases its going and the latter its coming. Then it is that time reveals its secret: it is not time which goes and comes..." ("Romans," p.497). In this passage Barth relates the Moment and the structure of time; there is the Moment in which there is no differentiation of times--- the eternal Moment; in this Moment there appears that which is not in the flux of time, but reveals the meaning of time. What is that? We may quote one phrase in relation to this question: "Eternity, as the boundary of time, is the end of time; as the primal origin of time, it is its goal" ("Romans," P.414). According to this passage, for Barth, the primal origin and the end of time is Eternity; it is closely related to the concept of the secret of time, for Eternity is not in time, but is the meaning of time as the primal origin and the end of time. As far as this secret of time (that there is the primal origin and the end of time which is not in time), is revealed in the Moment, this Moment is also related to eternity, and it is also not in time. In the eternal Moment we know that there is something which is beyond time. According to Barth, to fail to recognize that behind the visible [that is in time] there lies the invisible universe, which is the Origin of all concrete things [the Eternal], is "our lack of humility, our lack of recollection, our lack of fear in the presence of God" ("Romans," p.46). And it is called by Barth Sin. Yet in the eternal Moment, there appears that which is not in time; the Moment, therefore, is the Moment in which the distinction between time and eternity is revealed. And if we have

of this world"("Romans," p.93). By this judgment God affirms that "beyond the barrier at which we stand is --- God"("Romans," p.93). For the righteousness of God which is revealed in this Moment is the sovereign and regal display of the power of God. However, according to Barth, this judgment "in which we stand can be understood only in the light of the divine affirmation from which it proceeds"("Romans," pp.94f.). It is the meaning that we are 'in Christ' in overcoming the being 'in Adam'. That is to say, the marks of human unrighteousness and ungodliness are crossed in the Moment by the deeper marks of the divine forgiveness. "The discord of human defiance," says Barth, "is penetrated [in this moment] by the undertones of the divine melody 'Nevertheless'"("Romans," p.95). In this Moment, therefore, God's No and Yes take place. It is the Moment of Resurrection, of Judgment, and of our faith as we have seen in the last section. In this sense, Barth calls this Moment the Critical Moment(Cf."Romans," pp.165f.).

"As new men we stand on the threshold of a new world. But the old man also is mankind, humanity, and the world of men. Each particular man is therefore doubly conditioned. He is conditioned, on the one hand, by that which dissolves his particularity, and on the other, by that which affirms it. As the old man, he is what he 'is', the man 'we' know, who is under the wrath of God: as the new man, he is what he is not, the man 'we' do not know, who is righteous before God. Accordingly, in the light of the critical 'Moment', there is opened up a perception which extends backwards to the actual context in which all men stand by law, and forwards to a radically different, and indeed opposite, context. Both, however, are universal, orderly, necessary, and unavoidable. If a man be in Adam, he is an old, fallen, imprisoned, creature: if he is in Christ, he is a creature, new, reconciled and redeemed"("Romans," pp.164-165).

Therefore, the critical Moment is the Moment in which we are condemned as the old man and at the same time justified as the new man. Of course, Barth, in some places, speaks of the triumph of Christ and, therefore, of the new man: "Genuine movement [between the old man and the new man] can take place only if the balance between the two be wholly and finally disturbed... Christ is contrasted with Adam as the goal and purpose of this movement. Hence between them there can be no equipoise. As the goal, Christ does not merely expose a

distinction. He forces a decision between the two factors. By doing this, He is not merely the second, but the last Adam ... There can be no return movement from the righteousness of Christ to the fall of Adam"("Romans," p.166). But we have to remember that here Barth speaks of the eternal Moment. Surely, there is the triumph of Christ and, therefore, of the new man over the old man. Only in the eternal, critical moment, however, are we in Christ; in this Moment we are no longer the objects of God's negation, but of God's affirmation. Only in this Moment are we already justified and sanctified. But within the flux of time we are always the old man. "The Gospel," says Barth, "is the power of God, the power of Resurrection... The Gospel is our life; and yet it is not our life"("Romans," p.166). "This is the significance of the critical 'Moment,' which we name faith or Resurrection"("Romans," p.166). Therefore, in the last analysis, the dialectic between 'old' and 'new' is not a chronological dialectic, but a vertical dialectic. It is not different from the dialectic between time and eternity.[1] And it is revealed in the eternal Moment which does not belong to time.

But this Moment, as the Moment in which the secret of time (the dialectic between time and eternity) is revealed, has an indirect relation to time. According to Barth, this Moment is between the times. Of course, the eternal Moment itself is not a moment in time. This Moment is a special and qualified Moment. This eternal Moment is the Moment, completely hidden and unobservable.

1. God's world(New world)

Eternity

New man

old man

Time (temporality)

Our World (Old World)

Yet, according to Barth, "each moment in time is a parable of the eternal 'Moment'" ("Romans," p.497). Barth goes on to say: "Every moment in time bears within it the unborn secret of revelation, and every moment can be thus qualified" ("Romans," p.497). Of course, this does not mean that either every Moment in time is the eternal Moment or that every Moment in time can be the eternal Moment. For, according to Barth, the eternal Moment does not have temporality. The eternal Moment is the Moment which always is and yet is not. Therefore, it is the timeless Moment. Now we can easily see how Barth relates this eternal Moment to his eschatology.

The third point, which we shall consider to show that the Moment is the eternal and the timeless Moment, is the fact that Barth's eschatology at this time (1922) is a timeless eschatology which has a close relation to the eternal moment.

As we have seen, the Moment of revelation, for Barth, is not in time, but the end of time or the boundary of time. This is the point from which Barth draws out his eschatology. Barth sees the last (eschaton) in this Moment. For Barth, the last is not the chronological last. On the contrary, the Moment in which I confront God and His negation is my last, my death. Yet, as we can guess in the light of the last discussion, God's 'No!' must be transformed into God's 'Yes!' ("Romans," p.189). For, in fact, God's 'No' itself is a 'negation' for the sake of God's affirmation.[1] The man who dies in the Moment, therefore, lives again in the Moment. "Precisely," says Barth, "because the 'No' of God is all-embracing, it is also His 'Yes'" ("Romans," p.38). "He [the new man] is the zero-point between two branches of a hyperbola stretching to infinity; and

1. Cf. Karl Barth und E. Thurneysen, Komm. Schoepfer-Geist (Munich, 1924), s.23: "In God the Yes and the No exist only for the sake of the Yes." cited in G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. Harry R. Boer (London: The Paternoster Press, 1956), p.40.

being this he [the new man] is, in unimaginable fashion, both end and beginning. The new subject, being that which is radically and absolutely 'other', must, therefore be contrasted with what I am; it is, in fact, what I am not. ... Under the banner of the death and the Resurrection of Christ --- the new man comes into being and I am born from the above" ("Romans," p.149). Hence the Moment of revelation is the last ('eschaton') and at the same time the Moment of the New Creation (or Primal Creation). But both of them only exist in the Moment.

In this sense, for Barth, there are no eschatological events in the sense that a series of eschatological events will happen at the end of time; there is no end of time in this sense of the word for Barth. Barth says:

The End of which the New Testament speaks is no temporal event, no legendary 'destruction' of the world; it has nothing to do with any historical, or 'telluric' or cosmic catastrophe. The end of which the New Testament speaks is really the End; so utterly the End, that in the measuring of nearness or distance ... are not merely of little, but of no importance; so utterly the End that Abraham already saw the Day --- and was glad. Who shall persuade us to depress into a temporal reality what can be spoken of only in a parable? ... Who shall persuade us to make of God an idol, and then, on the basis of so grave a misunderstanding, bid us shamelessly make light of Him? Who shall persuade us to transform our expectation of the End ... into the expectation of a coarse and brutal spectacle? Who shall be able to lull us comfortably to sleep by adding at the conclusion of Christian Dogmatics a short and perfectly harmless chapter entitled --- 'Eschatology'?" ("Romans," p.500).

Does this mean that Barth does not have any eschatology? We cannot give an affirmative answer to this question. Rather, it means that, for Barth, as we have said, there is no eschatology in the traditional sense of the word. That is to say, Barth's eschatology is a different eschatology from that of traditional theology.[1] According to Barth, the End of time is not in time, but

1. Cf. "The end of history is not to be interpreted as an end within time as we know it, for no end within time can be real and complete end. The end is also the beginning, and so the nearness of the end is interpreted as the transcendental relation of the present to its origin in the eternal." T.F.Torrance's summary of Barth's thought on the "eschaton" which is based on The Resurrection of the Dead, pp.110f. T.F.Torrance, op. cit., p.78.

beyond time ("Romans," p.500, passim). The End is, if we can discover the First of time, from the First of time; for the End of time, like the First of time, is what is beyond time. We can relate this to Barth's 'two-worlds theory.' As we shall see, according to Barth, there are two worlds which are absolutely different from one another: God's world and our world. God's world is beyond our world; in Jesus Christ who is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection, God's world touches our world, but without touching it, for the touching takes place only in the eternal Moment. In this sense, we can call Barth's eschatology timeless eschatology.[1] The timeless eschatology, as a kind of eschatology, also speaks of the Kingdom of God. Barth affirms very clearly the reality of the Kingdom of God:

"Above and beyond the apparently infinite series of possibilities and visibilities in this world there [in the Gospel] breaks forth, like a flash of lightening, impossibility and invisibility, not as some separate, second, other thing, but as the Truth of God which is now hidden, as the Primal Origin to which all things are related, as the dissolution of all relativity, and therefore as the reality of all relative realities. Though --- nay, rather, because --- human life is temporal, finite, and passing to corruption, it is revealed in the Gospel that the glorious, triumphant, existential inevitability of the Kingdom of God cannot be hidden" ("Romans," p.331).

As we can see in this passage, while Barth clearly affirms the reality of the Kingdom of God, he does not affirm the presence of the Kingdom in this time. That is to say, Barth does not recognize the presence of the future in this time. In this respect, we cannot equate Barth's eschatology with realized eschatology.[2] For, Barth always speaks of the imminent coming of the Kingdom

1. T.F.Torrance also calls the early Barth's eschatology 'timeless eschatology.' Cf. Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology: 1910-1931 (London: SCM, 1962), pp.78-80.

2. This is because the term 'realized eschatology' reminds us of C.H.Dodd's eschatology which is more static and Platonic. Cf. C.H.Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom (London: Collins, 1962); The Apostolic Preaching and Its Development (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936). The person who thinks of early Barth's eschatology as 'the realized eschatology' is Philip J. Rosato. See his book The Spirit as Lord: The Pneumatology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T.T.Clark, 1981), p.27. It seems to me that it is impossible to equate early Barth's eschatology with Dodd's eschatology, for Barth's eschatology is more dynamic than that of Dodd.

(Cf. "Romans," pp.31,78,92,103).[1] But Barth does not take the same line as those who hold to the thorough-going (or consistent) eschatology, either. For, as we have seen, he does not think the "eschaton" to be in the flux of time. It is true, of course, that Barth speaks of the Parousia of Christ. His way of speaking about it, however, is very special: "We should await the Parousia: we should, that is to say, accept our present condition in its full seriousness; we should apprehend Jesus Christ as the Author and Finisher" ("Romans," p.501). In this sense, Barth speaks of "the eternal Moment of the Appearance, the Parousia, the Presence of Jesus Christ" ("Romans," p.499). Therefore, for Barth, the Parousia is also in the eternal Moment. The coming of the Kingdom is in the eternal Moment.

"By new," says Barth, "must always be understood the eternal world in the reflection of which we stand here and now. The mercy of God which is directed towards us can be true, and can remain true, only as a miracle -- 'vertical from above'" ("Romans," p.102). In this sense, for Barth, the new heaven and the new earth have already come in the Moment. But we as men in time and history still await the new heaven and the new earth, for the new heaven and the new earth which have already come, are only in the Moment.[2] This is what is characteristic of the timeless eschatology. According to Barth, we have already received all things (unlike consistent eschatology which awaits the imminent coming of the Kingdom), but we must still await the coming of the Kingdom

1. We can find here the influence of J.C.Blumhardt and C.Blumhardt on Barth's eschatology, for the Blumhardts were pre-millenarians. Cf. Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, tr. B.Cozens and H.H.Hartwell (London:SCM,1959), pp.588ff; Berkouwer, op. cit., p.45f; Torrance, op. cit., p.36.

2. For a similar interpretation of the early Barth's eschatology, see Leonard de Moore, "The concept of revelation in Barthianism," The Journal of Religion, XVII (1937), p.135: "We are not to think that the term 'eschatological' in the Barthian theology means the doctrine of things that have not yet temporally happened, but which we expect will at some indefinite time in the future occur. Eschatological here means that which we wait upon God for in each conscious moment of our lives, now."

(unlike realized eschatology). The affirmation of God, the positive 'Yes', according to Barth, is the Kingdom of God and the dominion of God ("Romans," p.295). But, as we have seen, this 'Yes' is only in the hands of God and in the eternal Moment. In this eternal Moment we "stand as new men on the threshold of the new world, the world of life" ("Romans," p.166). It is the 'already' of the timeless eschatology. But this 'already' is not only a part of the Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of God which is fulfilled in principle, but the complete fulfillment or the consummation of the Kingdom of God. Nevertheless, Barth's eschatology still has another factor: the 'not yet.' But in so far as the 'already' is the complete fulfillment or consummation of the Kingdom of God, the 'not yet' is not a waiting for a consummation of what is fulfilled in principle. In a sense, for Barth, the waiting for the Kingdom of God is a waiting for what is not in time and history. That is to say, the Kingdom of God, for Barth, has already wholly come and at the same time has not yet come at all. The Kingdom of God is wholly given and is at the same time wholly veiled. The relation between the 'already' and the 'not yet,' in a timeless eschatology, is not different from the structure of the relation between time and eternity. In the eternal Moment, what is in the realm of eternity (the Kingdom of God in this case) is always 'already' in its totality. However, in the flux of time, the Kingdom of God is always 'not yet' in its totality. Hence the structure of the 'already' and the 'not yet', like the tension of time and eternity, produces the eternal KRISIS. The fact that there is a timeless eschatology in the second edition of the "Romans" makes it clearer that the Moment which, as we have seen in the last few paragraphs, is closely related to this eschatology, is the eternal and timeless moment.

Having examined Barth's use of the Moment in the second edition of the "Romans" from three aspects, we can now conclude that for Barth the Moment does not have temporality and, therefore, is the timeless Moment. In this sense,

Barth's use of the term 'Moment' is considerably different from that of Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, as we shall see in chapter III of this study, the 'Moment' is the 'Moment' in time, a time which is not different from our time. The importance of the Moment, for Kierkegaard, lies in its temporality. That is to say, if the moment is not a moment in time, then what is important is only in the realm of eternity. But, according to Kierkegaard, the Moment is a decisive Moment because of its temporality. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, the moments to which the term 'moment' is applied, are different moments in time. And the moments are in time. The fact that for Barth, unlike in the case of Kierkegaard, the Moment is not the moment in time implies two points which are very important for the understanding of Barth's view of revelation. And in these two points, differences between Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard, are also reflected.

First, as we have mentioned several times, according to Barth, since revelation takes place only in this eternal Moment, revelation itself is not in time, history and our world. It is true, of course, that there are some places in which Barth seems to hint at the relation between revelation itself and the things which are in time and history, and which stand in relation to revelation. However, even in such cases, Barth does not equate 'revelation itself' with 'that which are in time'. For, according to Barth, revelation as the happening or the event in the eternal Moment which is not in time, does not belong to time. Therefore, even Jesus himself as an historical person who actually lived in time and history as such is not revelation, as we shall soon see.[1] Only Jesus Christ who is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection is regarded by the early Barth as revelation. According to Barth, if Jesus who actually lived

1. Cf. section 2 and 3 of this chapter; Colm O'Grady, The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968), p.15: "As the Christ, as revelation, Jesus is not historical. The man Jesus, the life of the historical Jesus, is not revelation."

in time, history, and our world could be regarded as revelation, then God's revelation would be a relative one. For, according to Barth, what is in time, whatever it may be, cannot be absolute. But "the Truth of God is not liable to the 'flux of history.' His action can neither be perceived everywhere nor be dismissed as being nowhere" ("Romans," p.277). Hence, revelation is in the Moment which always is and at the same time is not. Only Jesus Christ, who is not in time and history, but is in the light of Resurrection which is also not in time, can be regarded as revelation.[1]

This point is clearer when we consider Barth's dialectic between revelation and the impresses of the revelation. In his exegesis on Romans 3:20, Barth says as follows: "What advantage then hath the Jew? He has an advantage. He possesses law ---the impress of revelation--- experience, religion, piety, perception, vision; in fact, he has a Biblical outlook" ("Romans," p.90). According to this passage, what are found in the Old Testament are "the impresses of the revelation" which are the results of the revelation, so that these "impresses of the revelation" are signs, witnesses, types, recollections, and sign-posts to the revelation. We must ask --- what, then, is the revelation? Barth's answer to this question is more ambiguous. But this ambiguity may be the clue to Barth's understanding of revelation. So far we have seen, Barth says that the Resurrection is the 'revelation' and, therefore, what is interpreted in the light of Resurrection [e.g., Jesus Christ] can be called revelation. Does Barth, now in this exegesis on Romans 3:20, sanction

1. And, therefore, God who is revealed in Jesus Christ is only an unknown God. God is known, says Barth, as the unknown God. See Monsma's interesting summary of early Barth's view of God (*op.cit.*, pp.79f.): "He [God] is the pure boundary and the pure beginning of all that which we are, have, and do, standing opposed to man and all things human He is never identical with what we call God or surmise to be God. He is the unconditional Halt! with reference to all human unrest, and the unconditional Forward! with reference to all human rest, the Yes in human No, the No in human Yes, the First and the Last and as such the unknown."

other revelations besides the revelation in the Resurrection? What is important in this connection is that Barth does not call what are found in the Old Testament "the impresses of revelations," but "the impresses of the revelation." Therefore, even though Barth acknowledges another revelation, that revelation is only one revelation. What, then, is the relation between the revelation in the Old Testament period and the revelation in the Resurrection? To answer this question we shall quote once again from Barth's exegesis of Rom. 3:21:

"The revelation of the righteousness of God is witnessed by the law and the prophets: it has been proclaimed long ago. Abraham saw the day when God would judge the world in righteousness; Moses saw it also; the Prophets saw it; Job and the Psalmists saw it. We are encompassed by a cloud of witnesses who stood, all of them, in the light of this day; for the meaning of every epoch in history is directly related to God. In His righteousness every promise is fulfilled....The Messiah is the end of mankind and here also God is found faithful" ("Romans," pp.95f.)

What Barth tries to state in this passage, we may say, is the universal meaning of the revelation which is revealed in the light of the Resurrection. Jesus Christ, who is in the light of the Resurrection and, therefore, is not in history and time, is the fulfillment of all human activity. Hence, for Barth, revelation only exists in the light of the Resurrection; it only exists in the eternal Moment. What has remained in time and history, in relation to this revelation, is only the impress of this revelation. "The effulgence, or, rather, the crater," says Barth, "made at the percussion point of an exploding shell, the void by which the point on the line of intersection makes itself known in the concrete world history, is not that other world which touches our world..." ("Romans," p.29). And again, "...the Crater, by which the holy men [of the Old Testament] sit and wait, is burnt out" ("Romans," p.74). What is in time, whatever it may be, cannot be directly identified with the revelation. Not only what is in the Old Testament, but also even the historical Jesus who is in time and history is in the same situation. That is to say, neither of them are revelation, even though revelation is closely related to them. Barth's

differentiation between revelation itself and what is in time in relation to this revelation, we may say, is related to Barth's doctrine of the eternal Moment. For, according to Barth, revelation is only in the eternal Moment and, therefore, cannot be in time.

Secondly, we find that the same structure pertains when we look at faith, even though it is not so clear as in the case of revelation. As far as faith is the faith in God who reveals himself in the Moment, faith itself also cannot be in time, but is in the eternal Moment. This is the point which I shall argue in the next few paragraphs.

In most cases, in fact, Barth speaks of the 'Moment' as the 'Moment' of faith. For example, Barth says: "It is the 'Moment' when men are moved by God, by the true God, the Creator and Redeemer of men and of all human things; the 'Moment' when men surrender themselves and all that they are to God. The 'Moment' of the movement of men by God is beyond men...." ("Romans," p.110).[1] What we can see in this passage is that the Moment of faith itself is beyond men; it rests in God's hand. Barth elevates the Moment of faith to the realm of the 'beyond'. Therefore, for Barth, faith itself is something transcendent which does not belong to time and this world.[2]

Hence, according to Barth, any outer expression of faith, because it is a concrete expression in time, cannot be equated with faith itself.[3] In this sense, Barth says: "Genuine faith is a void, an obeisance before that which we can never be, or do, or possess" ("Romans," p.88). This means not only that the

1. Cf. "Romans," pp.33, 110ff, 124, 166, 202, 227, 366, 381.

2. Cf. Colm O'Grady, The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968), p.18: "Faith is a divine act. Its object is God, and no human act can have God for its object: God is in man for only God can hear the Word of God."

3. Cf. John McConnachie, "The Teaching of Karl Barth," The Hibbert Journal, XXV (1927), p.396: "Faith is not to be identified with its historical or psychological manifestations. It lies completely outside the phenomenal world. It is not visible to man."

object of faith is not in time, but also that the faith which believes the object of faith itself is not in time and is therefore a void in time. Thus, "even faith, if it proceeds from anything but a void, is unbelief; for it is then once again the appearance of the slavery of unrighteousness seeking to suppress the dawning truth of God, the disturbance of all disturbings" ("Romans," p.57). Genuine faith itself, for Barth, is not in time. This is an inevitable consequence of the fact that revelation itself is only in the eternal moment.[1]

However, this does not mean that there is nothing which is related to faith in time. There is something which can be related to faith in time. But as far as that which is related to faith or even called faith (in time) is in time, it is not faith in a real sense of the word. Genuine faith as the Beginning, the Miracle, and the Creation "confronts even the moment [which is in time] when we believed" ("Romans," p.499). No concrete things belong to God's realm. Barth tries to distinguish clearly between "time and the strange Moment of eternity" ("Romans," p.499). In this sense, the moment of faith itself must be described as follows: "It is not time but eternity which lies 'beyond'" ("Romans," p.500). In so far as we are in the eternal moment, we are in faith and we believe in God and His revelation. But in so far as we are in time, we are not in faith and we do not believe in God and His revelation. The following passage summarises well Barth's thinking on this problem: "In time, we are vessels of wrath: in Eternity, we are not merely something more, but something utterly different; we are vessels of mercy" ("Romans," p.360).

Only in this connection can we understand Barth's far-reaching criticism of

1. In a sense, one of the reasons why Barth tries to interpret 'pistis', first of all, as 'God's faithfulness' can be seen in this connection. As far as man's faith in time is concerned, it cannot be the basis of the justification of man by God. Cf. "Romans," PP.41-42, 78-81.

religion.[2] According to Barth's thinking, as we have seen, all things which belong to man, time, and this world, even though they are the expressions of faith, cannot be directly equated with faith, which belongs to the realm of 'Beyond'.[3] In this sense, faith is neither piety nor a religion: "Faith ... is never identical with 'piety,' however pure and however delicate. In so far as 'piety' is a sign of the occurrence of faith, it is so as the dissolution of all other concrete things and supremely as dissolution of itself" ("Romans," p.40. Cf. "Romans," p.128). In the moment in time in which we say that we believe in God, according to Barth, we are in unbelief. For genuine faith is not in time; in the moment in time in which our faith is visible we are unbelievers.

As it is well-known, Barth does not differentiate between the object of reprobation and the object of election. As far as the object is concerned, there is no difference between God's election and reprobation; the Church of Esau is the Church of Jacob.[4] Does this mean that there is no difference between election and reprobation? No, there is an absolute difference between them. What is the difference?

"The Church of Esau alone is observable, knowable and possible. It may be seen at Jerusalem, or Rome, or Wittenberg, or Geneva. The past and the

2. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, trans. John Drury (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 53: "The second edition [of the "Romans"] is like dynamite, it revolutionized religion and derives us to the abyss."

3. Cf. "Romans," p.366: "Religion is not the Kingdom of God, even if it be the Kingdom of God-Religion of Blumhardt's decadent successors. Religion is a human work ... When the Church speaks of faith, it means notoriously a profitable 'something' But how can a human work be the faith by which men are justified by God? Can there be a 'supreme' religion, a highest pinnacle of all human work, in the relation between God and man? If such a religion can be found any where, it would be in the 'religion' of the prophets and psalmist of Israel, which is nowhere excelled, certainly not in the history of Christianity, and not even in the so-called 'Religion of Jesus.' But, in fact, a religion adequate to revelation and congruent to the righteousness of God, a law of righteousness, is unattainable by men, except in the miracle of the 'absolute Moment.'"

future can be comprehended restlessly under its name. The Church of Esau is the realm where failure and corruption may be found, the place where schisms and reformations occur. But the Church of Jacob is capable of no less precise definition. It is unobservable, unknowable, and impossible Church, capable neither of expansion nor of contradiction; it has neither place nor name nor history; men neither communicate with it nor are excommunicated from it. It is simply the free Grace of God, His Calling and Election; it is Beginning and End" ("Romans," pp.341f.).

The difference between the Church of Jacob and the Church of Esau, therefore, is the difference between the realms to which they belong. What is in God's realm of eternity is what is elected: what is in the realm of time is what is reprobate. They are related to one another. So Barth immediately adds as follows: "Our speech is of the Church of Esau, for we can speak of none other. But we cannot speak of it without recollecting that its theme is the Church of Jacob. The very life of Esau, questionable as it is, depends upon Jacob; and he is Esau only because he is not Jacob" ("Romans," p.342). However, as far as we are in time, we cannot be directly members of the Church of Jacob. Only in the eternal Moment of revelation and genuine faith which is not in time are we members of the Church of Jacob.[5]

The usage of Moment as the eternal Moment makes Barth place revelation and genuine faith not in time (man's realm, and our world), but in the eternal Moment and, therefore, in God's realm of eternity. Barth himself thinks that this is the only way to guarantee God's freedom in His revelation and His relation with man. Here we can find a difference between Barth's position on

4. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, op. cit., p.90: "In the 'Romans,' the Church was necessarily the razor's edge of dialectics. Seen from God's point of view, it is the realm of God's revelation, the 'invisible Church of Jacob.' Seen from man's point of view, it is the 'visible church of Esau,' the realm of sinful pride when the divine is anthropomorphized and viewed subjectively. 'The Church is the great negation of Revelation. Atheism is the authentic essence of the Church.'" See also Peter H. Monsma, op. cit., pp.81ff.

5. Cf. Peter H. Monsma, op. cit., p.82: "Double predestination does not divide men, but constitutes their deepest community, with respect to it all men occupy the same place For us the visible Jacob is Esau and only the invisible Esau is Jacob."

revelation and faith and that of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard, as we shall see in chapter III, finds that in God's revelation God binds himself to time, man, and this world. In the Moment of Incarnation God became an individual man and, therefore, after the moment of Incarnation there is the incarnate one (the God-man). "God in time," for Kierkegaard, is the God-man in time and history. And in the case of faith, faith is also in time, for, according to Kierkegaard, we can believe in God and His revelation after the moment (which is in time) of New Birth. In so far as the moment of New Birth is in time, faith is also in time. Both of these differences come from their different use of the term "Moment." [1]

Up to now, we have considered Barth's understanding of Moment in the second edition of the "Romans" and drawn out the implications of such a use of "Moment." What has been shown by our consideration is that for Barth, unlike Kierkegaard, Moment is the eternal Moment which does not belong to time. In the last analysis, therefore, the difference between Barth's understanding of Moment and that of Kierkegaard comes from Barth's eternalization of the moment. This eternalization is closely related to Barth's understanding of the relation between revelation and history, which we shall consider in the next section.

1. R.H. Roberts suggests an interesting contrast between the early Barth and Kierkegaard: "The existential dialectic of the temporal and the eternal found in Kierkegaard, in which the existing individual 'in time' comes into relation with the eternal 'in time', becomes in Barth an eschatological crisis, a confrontation of the temporal by a consuming eternity." ("Barth's Doctrine of Time," in S.W. Sykes (ed.), Karl Barth: Studies of His Theological Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 96).

What is the relation between revelation and history? This is the question which we shall ask of Barth in this section. There are lots of problems which may be raised in relation to this question. Is there any room for historical revelation in the "Romans"? What is the relation between the historical Jesus who actually lived in history and revelation? Does revelation have any relation to history?

To discover Barth's position on the relation of revelation and history in the "Romans", we shall follow this outline: (1) How does Barth understand the relation between revelation and the historical Jesus who actually lived in history?; (2) How does Barth understand the relation between revelation and history in general?; (3) How does Barth understand Overbeck's special term "Urgeschichte" and relate it to the problem of the relation between revelation and history?

Through this consideration I hope to show that, according to Barth, even though history has a relation to revelation in the sense that in revelation the meaning of history is revealed, history as a series of happenings in time has nothing to do with revelation in the sense that revelation does not take place in the flux of history. Even in the case of Jesus, as far as he is in history, Jesus is not revelation. Only in the light of the Resurrection can Jesus Christ who is not in history be regarded as revelation. Therefore revelation does not belong to history, but to "Urgeschichte" which is above history. We can show that in these three points Barth's understanding of the relation of revelation and history is different from that of Kierkegaard which we shall consider in chapter III of this study.

Let us start from Barth's understanding of the relation between revelation and the historical Jesus. By the historical Jesus we mean the historical person Jesus who actually lived in past history. According to Barth, the historical Jesus, Jesus of Nazareth, lived in the years A.D. 1-30 and died on the cross. What is important for Barth, however, is the fact that Jesus has been declared to be "the Son of God with power" in the Resurrection which is the revelation. "The visible significance of His life," says Barth, "cannot be understood apart from the disclosure and revelation of the invisible glorification of the Father. This is the Resurrection of Jesus from the dead" ("Romans," p.203).[1]

Jesus, therefore, has meaning only in the light of the Resurrection. However, what is important in the light of the Resurrection is neither 'the personality of Jesus' ("Romans," p.159), nor the 'Religion of Jesus' ("Romans," p.366), nor 'the conduct of Jesus' ("Romans," p.507), nor his teaching (e.g., the sermon on the Mount) ("Romans," pp.159, 507). As far as his historical life is concerned, he is not superior to any other man. For example, St. Francis "far surpassed Jesus in 'love'" ("Romans," p.57). What is important in the light of the Resurrection, for Barth, is only his death ("Romans," p.159). What is possible in the life of Jesus is "the possibility of death" ("Romans," p.159).[2] And in the light of the Resurrection the death of Jesus means God's negation of all things in time and history. What is revealed in the death of Jesus which is

1. In trying to find the meaning of the life and death of Jesus in the Resurrection, Barth in the "Romans" (1922) holds a position which is very similar to that of Rudolf Bultmann, who says that the Resurrection, even though it is not in history, reveals the meaning of Jesus. See Bultmann's essay in Kerygma and Myth, I, ed. H.W.Bartsch, trans. R.H.Fuller (London: SCM, 1961), pp.381ff. For a discussion of the similarities between the early Barth and Bultmann, see Van A.Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), pp.139-146.

2. See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, op.cit., p.58: "The incarnation now becomes impossible. If the divine touches the world only tangentially, then there can be no such thing as the life of Christ. All there can really be is a death of Christ."

interpreted in the light of the Resurrection is that all things in time, history, and this world, whatever they may be, are under God's negation. This is, however, revealed in the Resurrection. That is to say, in the light of the Resurrection the cross reveals that whatever is visible (including Jesus) is under God's negation and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a thing which has a positive relationship with God.

This point is clear when we consider Barth's understanding of the Resurrection. The point which we shall consider in the next few paragraphs is that, for Barth, the Resurrection as the revelation is not a happening or an event in history and time. Therefore, what is revealed in the Resurrection is also not in history.

Barth says: "This reversal or transformation [Resurrection] is not an 'historical event' which may be placed side by side with other events. Rather it is a 'non-historical' happening" ("Romans," p.203). For if Resurrection is an historical event, it "becomes merely another of those human possibilities which Jesus in His Crucifixion abandoned" ("Romans," p.203). That is to say, if Resurrection is in history, what is revealed in this revelation (God's negation and His affirmation) is not a complete negation and affirmation. According to Barth's argument, therefore, the revelation of God's negation and affirmation as the absolute negation and affirmation cannot be in history. Barth puts it in this way: "The conception of the Resurrection emerges with the conception of death, with the conception of the end of all historical things as such" ("Romans," p.205, my emphasis). Thus, Resurrection must be an event which is not in history.

But Barth sometimes uses the term 'history' (Historie) in relation to the Resurrection. And there are some scholars who try to interpret Barth's early view of the Resurrection as an historical event, even though it cannot be

treated by historical analysis.[1] Therefore, it will be good to consider this problem more critically. In one place Barth says as follows: "The Resurrection is therefore an occurrence in history which took place outside the gates of Jerusalem in the year A.D.30 inasmuch as it there 'came to pass,' was discovered and recognized" ("Romans," p.30). How can we interpret this passage? Is it valid to interpret this passage as follows? --- In so far as the happening of the Resurrection is concerned, the Resurrection occurred in time and history; in so far as the meaning or the possibility of historical analysis, however, is concerned, the Resurrection is not a simple historical event. Can we therefore apply the German word "Geschichte", in its etymological sense, to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ?

We have to compare this interpretation with assertions made in other parts of the "Romans" to assess whether this is a right interpretation or not. The

1. Cf. H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, pp.289-292. After quoting some passages from the "Romans" which mention Resurrection, Mackintosh says: "Only a failure to enter sympathetically into Barth's convoluted thought can take these words to mean what they say upon the surface. In part, they are infected by the radical doubleness of the word 'history'; in part, we cannot but feel that, like many a Hegelian, Barth frequently tends to say 'A is not B' when his real meaning is 'A is not merely B'. He does fuller justice to the idea he is expounding, when he speaks of 'the victory which has occurred, does occur, and will occur in Christ' ("Romans," p.498). Supremely in Christ's rising from the dead, but mediately also in believers, the creative and transforming powers of God break into time" (p.292). Thomas F. Torrance, even though does not consider the "Romans" alone, also tries to emphasize that even in the early Barth there is a close relation between Resurrection (incarnation, ascension, and also Parousia) and 'time and space'. Cf. op.cit., pp.74-79. Contrasting Barth with Harnack in his "What is Christianity?" Torrance says: "The contrast with Barth could hardly be greater with his realistic proclamation of the incarnation and of the Resurrection as a new corporeality, and upon Revelation as absolute actuality, behind which lay a new determination to take with the utmost seriousness the doctrine of God as Creator and Redeemer of men, and to relate the ends and actions of God fully and realistically to create human existence and history" (p.74). James Smart has a somewhat peculiar interpretation. He on the one hand affirms that "the Resurrection is not in history, but belongs to this realm ["Urgeschichte"] above history" and, on the other hand, says that "Barth insisted on the incarnation as the Word becoming flesh In short, "Urgeschichte" becomes reality in time" (op.cit., p.115).

passages which we have mentioned at the start of our discussion of Barth's view of the Resurrection (see above p.35) show that, for Barth, Resurrection is not an historical fact in any sense of the word. The following quotation also negates the historicity of the Resurrection:

"Over all historical possibilities and probabilities and necessities and certainties death is supreme, for they all are mortal and passing to corruption. Were there a direct and causal connection between the historical 'facts' of the Resurrection --- the empty tomb, for example, or the appearances detailed in 1 Cor. XV --- and the Resurrection itself; were it [Resurrection] in any sense of the word a 'fact' in history, then no profession of faith or refinement of devotion could prevent it being involved in the see-saw of 'Yes' and 'No', life and death, God and man, which is characteristic of all that happens on the historical plane.....Therefore, if the Resurrection be brought within the context of history, it must share in its obscurity and error and essential questionableness" ("Romans," p.204).

What does Barth mean? If the Resurrection were, in any sense of the word, a 'fact in history,' then it would have to be an object which could be subjected to historical analysis and caught up in relativity of history. Thus, the Resurrection cannot be regarded as an historical fact which takes place in history, rather it would have to be regarded as a happening which takes place beyond the realm of history. Such an interpretation, for Barth, is the only possible interpretation of the Resurrection saving its meaning and its happening itself from being relative. That is to say, if the Resurrection is the revelation, it must take place in a realm which is beyond a realm of history. Hence it cannot take place in the flux of history.

I quote another passage which supports this interpretation of Barth's view of the Resurrection: "As history, it [the Resurrection] lies on the frontier of that which is not history; as non-history, it lies on the frontier of history" ("Romans," p.222). How can we see any other meaning in this passage except the meaning which we saw in the discussion of Barth's use of the eternal Moment? The only thing which we can say about the Resurrection is that it takes place, but that it is not in time and history, just as the eternal Moment is,

but is not in time. For, "the Truth of God is not liable to the 'flux of history'" ("Romans," p.277).

Therefore, the passage on p. 30 in the "Romans" which we have quoted above (p.36) cannot be interpreted as follows: The Resurrection, as a happening in history, is an historical fact, but the Resurrection in its meaning is not an 'historical fact' but more than an historical fact. Nor can it be interpreted as meaning that the Resurrection, as far as its happening is concerned, takes place in time and history, but we cannot find its meaning or even its reality through historical analysis. For, according to Barth, Resurrection itself does not take place in time and history. We can then say that Gerald O'Collins' interpretation of this passage is quite right: "At most, Barth admits that the Resurrection may be called 'historical' in the sense that certain men at a particular time and place came to know it and proclaim it." [1]

The validity of such an interpretation can be supported by two facts. First, this interpretation fits well with Barth's assertion that revelation does not take place in the flux of time and history. If the Resurrection is 'the revelation' as Barth tries to emphasize, it must happen in a realm which is beyond time and history. The Resurrection, thus, is not in history and not an historical event. [2] This does not mean, however, that the Resurrection does not take place. According to Barth, we must acknowledge the actuality or the reality of the Resurrection, even though it is not in time and history. For, the Resurrection as the revelation takes place in the eternal Moment and, therefore, in a realm which is beyond time and history. [3] And secondly, we can

1. Gerald O'Collins, "Karl Barth on Christ's Resurrection," Scottish Journal of Theology vol. 26(1973), pp.87f.

2. Cf. "Romans," p.435: "The action of God cannot occur in time; it can occur only in eternity." See also Niels Ferre, Searchlight on Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1966), p.98: "[For Barth] God never enters history History is judged by God, over against it stands eternity."

point out that Barth's distinction between "Historie" and "Geschichte" had not yet been developed at this time, even though he uses Overbeck's term "Urgeschichte" which we shall consider soon. Only at the time of the "Church Dogmatics", as we shall see in the second chapter of this study, does Barth call the Resurrection 'die Geschichte,' 'die Geschichtstatsache,' 'Faktum,' or 'die Ostergeschichte.' [4] Therefore, for Barth in the "Romans" (1922) the Resurrection is a complete (or, absolute) non-historical fact; the Resurrection happens only in a non-historical context or in a realm which is beyond the realm of history. [5]

In the last few paragraphs we have examined Barth's view of the Resurrection. We can conclude, as we have suggested at the start of this discussion, that, for Barth at this time (1922), the Resurrection is not a happening in time and history.

What about, then, the thing which is revealed in the Resurrection? Is the fact that Jesus is the Christ which is revealed in the Resurrection, in time and history? Is 'God's negation and His affirmation', which is revealed in the Resurrection as the meaning of the cross, in time and history? Is the revelation and what is revealed in the revelation, in time and history?

3. For a similar interpretation, see Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History, p.202: "Our true hope lies beyond time in an eternal moment, an event occurring on the boundary between time and eternity. Barth identified this event ... as the Resurrection of Jesus Christ."

4. Cf. Church Dogmatics III/ 2, pp.454,545; IV/ 1, pp.298,328. The meaning which Barth gives to these words will be discussed in chapter II of this study.

5. For similar interpretations of the early Barth's view of the Resurrection, see Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), pp.132-134, 154; Cornelius Van Til, The New Modernism (London: James Clark and Co., 1946), pp.97-100; Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History, pp.100f.; Stanley R. Obitts, "Historical Explanation and Barth on Christ's Resurrection," in Gerald F. Hawthorne, ed., Current Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), pp.366-367; and F.W. Camfield, Revelation and Holy Spirit: An Essay in Barthian Theology (London: Elliot Stock, 1934), p.137.

When we try to answer this question the thing which attracts our concern at first is the fact that Barth sees the Resurrection as the revelation of "what is unknown and unobservable in Jesus" ("Romans," p.30). And Barth even says that the years A.D. 1-30 are the era of revelation and disclosure ("Romans," p.29).

"Our discovery of the Christ in Jesus of Nazareth is authorized by the fact that every manifestation of the faithfulness of God points and bears witness to, what we have actually encountered 'in Jesus.' The hidden authority of the Law and the Prophets is the Christ who meets us in Jesus. Redemption and Resurrection, the invisibility of God and a new order, constitute the meaning of every religion; and it is precisely this that compels us to stand still in the presence of Jesus In Jesus we have discovered and recognized the truth that God is found everywhere and that, both before and after Jesus, men have been discovered by Him. In Him we have found the standard by which all discovery of God and all being discovered by Him is made known as such; in Him we recognize that this finding and being found is the truth of the order of eternity. Many live their lives in the light of redemption and forgiveness and Resurrection; but that we have eyes to see their manner of life we owe to the One" ("Romans," pp.96f., my emphasis).

What we find in these three quotations is that Barth's view of Jesus is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, as we have said in the first part of this section, Barth sees Jesus as the historical Jesus who actually lived in the past. However, on the other hand, Barth regards Jesus directly as Christ, as we can clearly see in the above quotation. Can we interpret this ambiguity by which Barth equates the historical Jesus and Jesus as the Christ as is shown to be the case in the light of the Resurrection?

In a sense, we may give a positive answer to this question. Even so, according to Barth, the life of Jesus itself is not the revelation.[1] In other words, the revelation which is related to the historical Jesus is beyond the

1. W.W.Wells, in spite of his interpretation that for the early Barth even though revelation is in history, it cannot be apprehended by men, makes an interesting point which suggests that revelation itself is not in history: "Although revelation is not a part of history, it does leave an effect, a burnt-out crater in history. However it must be noted that there is an infinite gulf between the revelation itself and the occasion" (*op.cit.*, p.197). Therefore, Wells' argument that revelation is actually in history cannot be sustained even within the structure of his own argument. It is impossible to equate the early Barth's view of Revelation, as Wells tries to do, with that of Kierkegaard.

historical life of Jesus.[2] Only in the realm of the 'beyond' can we regard Jesus as the Christ. For, according to Barth, the Christ is in the eternal Moment; only in this Moment does Christ intersect, vertically from above, the plane which is known to us. However, this intersection is only in the eternal moment which is not in time, as we have seen in the last section. Therefore, if the historical Jesus can be equated with Christ in the light of the Resurrection, the one who is equated with Christ is only in the eternal Moment. Within the flux of time and history, he is not Christ. The historical Jesus himself, as far as he is in time and history, is neither revelation, nor the Christ. The reality that Jesus is Christ is not in time and history, but beyond time and history.

Hence even what is revealed in the Resurrection, we may conclude, is not in history. The confession that 'Jesus of Nazareth is Christ' is possible only after the time in which Jesus of Nazareth actually lived. Revelation itself, Jesus Christ, is not in time and history; Jesus Christ is only beyond history.[3] However, this does not mean that for Barth Jesus Christ is not. Jesus Christ, for Barth, actually is beyond time and history. Barth puts it in these terms: "Jesus as the Christ, as the Messiah, is the End of History" ("Romans," p.29).

2. For a similar interpretation of the early Barth, see Peter Monsma, Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation (Somerville: Somerset Press, 1937), p.92: "Barth does not identify the historical reality of Christ (as revelation, as the centre of Gospel) with the historical Jesus, but with the resurrected one, or stated more cautiously, with Christ as the one to whose Resurrection witness is borne." See also John McConnachie, "The Teaching of Karl Barth: A New Positive Movement in German Theology," The Hibbert Journal, XXV (1927), pp.393f.: "In Christ we step across the boundary of the old world. The reference is to Christ, not to Jesus. The so-called historical Jesus who moves on the surface of history and psychology is, like all that is historical and psychological, liable to decay, and shares in the uncertainty of all historical things ... [But] Christ is not a figure of our history, not even the cornerstone of the house of humanity."

Having considered Barth's view of the relation between revelation and the historical Jesus, we can expand our inquiry to consider the question as to how Barth understands the relation between revelation and history in general. What we find to be the case is not so different from what we found to be the case in our discussion of the relation between revelation and the historical Jesus. For, in a sense, Barth thinks that the historical Jesus is the representative of history. This is the point which I shall try to argue in the next few paragraphs.

What is history? Barth replies as follows:

"History is the display of the supposed advantages of power and intelligence which some men possess over others, of the struggle for existence, hypocritically described by ideologists as a struggle for justice and freedom, of the ebb and flow of old and new forms of human righteousness, each vying with the rest in solemnity and triviality" ("Romans," p.77).

Thus, according to Barth, it is impossible to find the meaning of history in the flux of history. (Cf. "Romans," p.107). The only thing which is required is that it (history in the flux of time) comes to an end. But is there any end of history within history? As far as history itself is concerned, for Barth, there is no end. What seems to be the end of history in history is not the real end of history, for what is in history, whatever it may be, cannot be the absolute. There is no absolute end of history in the flux of history. In the historical realm, all things are relative; thesis and antithesis, positive and negative human possibility, and human restlessness and repose ("Romans," p.159). [4] There

3. Cf. the following considerations of the early Barth: Hans Frei, "The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Barth, 1909-1922: The Nature of Barth's Break with Liberalism," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Yale University, 1956), p.147: "In the second edition [of the "Romans"] one may wonder if Christ does indeed descend into a concrete time."; Hans Urs von Balthasar, *op.cit.*, p.58: "The critical point [in the "Romans"] is that the hard-core centre of Christianity, the incarnation, now becomes impossible"; and R.S. Barbour, "Karl Barth: The Epistle to the Romans," *The Expository Times*, XC (1979), p.266: ".... in Barth's Romans we find very little about the Incarnation and still less about the life of Jesus."

is neither an absolute 'Yes' nor an absolute 'No'.

If there is to be a real end to history, it must be beyond the realm of this relative history. Barth introduces us, at this juncture, to the Judgment of God which is beyond history:

"The Judgment of God is the end of history, not the beginning of a new, a second, epoch. By it history is not prolonged, but done away with. The difference between that which lies beyond the judgment and that which lies on this side of it is not relative but absolute: the two are separated absolutely ("Romans," p.77).

God's Judgment which is the absolute is the real end of history. However, the last sentence of the passage which we have just quoted implies that there is something which lies beyond God's Judgment and is absolutely separated from history. What is it? Is it a new history? No, Barth negates the possibility of a new history in the first part of this quotation. Barth continues the foregoing quotation by saying: "By His [God's] Speech and His Judgment a transformation is effected so radical that time and eternity, here and there, the righteousness of men and the righteousness of God, are indissolubly linked together. The end is also the goal; the Redeemer is also the Creator; He that judgeth is also He that restoreth all things" ("Romans," p.77). In the first part of this quotation, Barth surely suggests a transformation or restoration. However, the transformation is so radical that there is no difference between time and eternity, here and there etc. Therefore, what is transformed, what is restored, is not in history which is judged and, therefore, ended by God's negation.[5] Barth says:

4. Cf. "Romans," p.4 : "Everything in this world has its immediate cause. How indeed could it be otherwise?" See also Thomas W.Ogletree, op.cit., pp.81-114. esp., p.90: "So for Barth history is not only viewed as relative; it is also viewed as inherently meaningless. It cannot as such enjoy any claim to value and meaning. It is simply the realm of the transient and the passing."

5. Cf. Niels F.S.Ferre, Searchlight on Contemporary theology, pp.98f.: [For Barth] "God never enters history History is no place for redemption History is judged by God over against it stands eternity."

"...there is a claim to salvation from the wrath of God : the claim is where every claim is surrendered and broken down by God Himself; where His negation is final and His wrath unavoidable; when God is recognized as God. The claim IS where the history of the relation between God and man begins; where there is no history to record, because it only occurs and occurs eternally. The claim IS when men dare --- but even this is no recipe for blessedness but only the eternal ground of its perception --- to go forth into the fresh air and to love the undiscoverable God. And this occurrence IS --- in Jesus Christ" ("Romans," p.76).

What Barth tries to say in this passage is that when there is God's negation which is absolute, there is also a claim to salvation. And this claim to salvation is the beginning of the history of the relation between God and man which cannot be recorded as history, for it [the relation between God and man] exists only as a happening or occurrence which is an ever-occurring event. And lastly Barth relates this occurrence to Jesus Christ; this occurrence is in Jesus Christ.

At this juncture, we recall the fact that Barth speaks of Jesus Christ as the End of History. When the historical Jesus is no longer, there is Jesus Christ who is the end of history. Therefore, in the moment in which there is Jesus Christ, there is no history. In this respect, the historical Jesus is the representative of history. The fact that Jesus is negated, for Barth, means that all that is in history must be negated and is negated. And, accordingly, the fact that he is revealed as Christ in the Resurrection means that all that which is negated in Jesus is affirmed. As the fact of the Resurrection is not in time and history, however, the reality of God's affirmation is also not in time and history.

Thus there is a close relation between the historical Jesus and history in general in their relation to Revelation. In this sense, Barth says : "Jesus Christ our Lord --- This is the Gospel and the meaning of history" ("Romans," p.29). As we have said, according to Barth, the meaning of history cannot be found in history itself, for the realm of history is the realm of relativity.

Likewise, the meaning of the historical Jesus cannot be found in the historical life of Jesus itself. Only in the Resurrection is he revealed as the Christ --- this also is the meaning of history, for what is in Jesus Christ, as we have seen, is the affirmation of what is negated in Jesus.

What is contrasted in all the foregoing, in the last analysis, is history and eternity. Hence, the problem of the relation between revelation and history becomes the problem of the relation between history and what is beyond history. In fact, what for Barth is revealed in the revelation, is the absolute difference between history and what is beyond history (or, the End of History). What must be recognized in relation to revelation is the fact that there is an Absolute Origin and End of all beyond time and history. In this sense, Barth finds some similarities between Plato [who "in his wisdom recognized long ago that behind the visible, there lies the invisible universe which is the Origin of all concrete things" ("Romans," p.46).] and Abraham who believes in the unknown God. ("Romans," pp.140f.). For both of them, what is important is not history, but what is beyond history; both of them find the meaning of history in the realm of the beyond. In a word, revelation which reveals the meaning of history is not in history, but beyond history; and, accordingly, revelation is an eternal revelation.

Therefore, for Barth, what has happened in history is not important; what is important is only the meaning of history. But the meaning of history is not in history; it is the "non-historical factor." For example, when one reads the history of Abraham in the Book of Genesis, what is important is to discover the meaning which the description of the Genesis tries to transmit, not the historical facts themselves. Therefore, one can read the description of Abraham's history without believing in the historicity of Abraham. Barth emphasizes that we must see the importance of the non-historical factor (i.e.,

the meaning of history):

"In times of spiritual poverty, historical analysis is a method we are bound to adopt. But one day it will itself reach its limit, and must, to take a single instance, pronounce Abraham's personality to be unhistorical and then it too will stand before the same commanding necessity of a synthesis which is the starting-point of the Book of Genesis. [But] what Genesis tells us about Abraham is what concerns us vitally, though we may find it hard to recognize what it has to say, because our way of thinking is so very different. ... he [Abraham] is a far more 'unhistorical' figure than critical analysis has ever dreamed of....we have no desire to fetter or to cast suspicions upon the critical method For it [the critical method] inevitably shows that the historical Abraham really does not concern us. And just in so far as it comes to this conclusion, it opens the road to the understanding of the non-historical Abraham of the Genesis story" ("Romans," pp.147f.).[1]

According to this quotation the 'unhistorical' means that which is not historical, but which gives us the meaning of history. Faith, for Barth, is not related to the 'historical' which takes place in history, but to the 'unhistorical.' For even though it [the unhistorical] did not and does not take place in history, it reveals the meaning of history. What is interesting in this connection is that Barth accepts historicism to the extent that Barth also says that only the things which can be treated by historical analysis take place in history. That is to say, the reason why the historical analysis does not affirm something that is in the Bible (e.g., the Resurrection, the miracles, the revelation etc.) is not due to the fact that there is something wrong with historical analysis, but due to the fact that there was no happening (or, event)

1. Of course, for Barth, the Genesis story itself and the Bible itself are not important; what is important for him is what is beyond the words of the Bible. In the 'Preface' to the third edition to the "Romans," criticising Bultmann's book-review of the second edition of the "Romans," Barth says: "Rather, it is for us to perceive and to make clear that the whole [of the Bible] is placed under the KRISIS of the Spirit of Christ. The whole is litera, that is, voices of those other spirits. The problem is whether the whole must not be understood in relation to the true subject-matter which is --- the Spirit of Christ..... No human word, no word of Paul, is absolute truth. In this I agree with Bultmann --- and surely with all intelligent people. But, nevertheless, we must learn to see beyond Paul" ("Romans," pp. 17, 19). In this quotation Barth, in fact, suggests his answer to the question: "Which of us [Barth and Bultmann] is the more radical?" which is a discussion in which he says he does not wish to engage. Cf. "Romans," p.16. On Barth's view of Historical Criticism, see. "Romans," pp.6-11.

in history. Nevertheless, to fail to see the importance of the 'unhistorical' which is beyond the happenings in history, is, according to Barth, spiritual poverty.[1] For what is important is the 'non-historical,' the spiritual meaning of the things which happen in history. Faith is not to believe happenings in time and history, but to believe the meaning of history which is beyond the realm of history. Therefore, for Barth, what has happened and not happened in the realm of history is not important for faith. What is important is not in history, but beyond history.[2]

That with which revelation is concerned is also beyond history. In this sense, for Barth the relation between revelation and history is not different from the relation between what is beyond history and what is in history; this is also the same as the relation between the realm of eternity and the realm of history. History itself does not have a beginning and an end, nor does the meaning of history. All these [a beginning, an end, and the meaning of history] are beyond history.

Barth's understanding of the relation between revelation and history becomes more apparent when we consider the meaning which Barth gives to the term Urgeschichte. Barth borrows the term "Urgeschichte" from Franz Overbeck. What does this term mean in Overbeck and in Barth? According to Overbeck, "Urgeschichte" is the history which is in the realm of the Origin where the

1. The following observation of the "Romans" of Harvey makes clear what is Barth's view of historical criticism in the "Romans": "Barth's commentary ushered in a new theological era. In the first place, it enabled him and those who followed him to accept fully the methods of historical inquiry and yet to use that inquiry in such a way that the Scripture could be interpreted as documents which still speak to man about the deepest problem of his personal existence" (op.cit., p.26).

2. Cf. "Romans," p.20 : "It is precisely the hidden things which are displayed by the Spirit of God. He promises eternal life [in the beyond] --- to those who are dead [in history]. He speaks of the blessedness of the Resurrection [in the beyond] --- to those who are compassed about with corruption [in history]."

distinction between the particular and the universal has not yet been made.[1] Therefore, "Urgeschichte" is contrasted to ordinary history or the realm of history.[2] According to Barth's summary of Overbeck, Overbeck thinks as follows: "Out of the superatemporal, unknowable, inconceivable super-history (Urgeschichte) which is composed wholly of beginnings, in which the boundaries dividing the individual from the whole are still fluid, we have come. To the single, conceivably important Moment of death in which our life enters the sphere of the unknown where, throughout our life-time, exists all which is beyond the world known to us, we go." [3] For Overbeck these two poles --- 'Urgeschichte' and death --- are the basic boundaries of man and history. We live between these two poles. "What lies between these two ends, these two last things," says Barth, "is the world, our world, the comprehensible world which has been given to us. Whatever is or can be 'historical' is by its nature (eo ipso) part of this world. For 'historical' means 'subject to time.'" [4]

According to Overbeck, whatever is in this world is the object of criticism which reduces the whole to relativity. Within this world only a sceptical world-view is possible. And within history there is no beginning and no end: "There is no sense in asking about the origin of history. The question of whether at the dawn of history there was a golden age or pure bestiality is

1. Franz Overbeck, Christentum und Kultur (Basel: Benno Schwabe and Co., 1919), s.19. Cited in Cornelius Van Til, The New Modernism, op.cit., p.86. The following discussion of Overbeck's "Urgeschichte" is based on Van Til (op.cit.) and Karl Barth, "Unsettled Questions for Theology Today" (1920. the review article of Overbeck's "Christentum und Kultur"), in Theology and Church, trans. Louse Pettibone Smith (London: SCM, 1962), pp.55-73.

2. Cf. Thomas W. Ogletree, op.cit., p.86: "By the notion of the 'Primal History' (Urgeschichte) Overbeck is referring to that incomprehensible, superatemporal beginning of our being, the 'history before history.' It designates the point of origin, a point which in this historical existence must remain unknown to us."

3. Franz Overbeck, op.cit., pp.20f., 297. Cited in Barth, Theology and Church, p.58.

4. Barth, Theology and Church, p.59. quoting Overbeck, op.cit., p.242.

absurd. Nor is there any sense in asking about the end of history. In history nothing is ever finished." [1] Only beyond this history and world is there the realm of origin ('Urgeschichte'). This is the basic structure of Overbeck's thought about the relation between history and Urgeschichte.

According to Overbeck, the origin of Christianity is also related to 'Urgeschichte.' Christianity which is indeed Christianity is only in this realm of 'Urgeschichte.' Accordingly, Christianity, in fact, has nothing to do with history. Barth says: "Inflexibly he [Overbeck] confronts us with the choice: if Christianity, then not history; if history, then not Christianity." [2] That is to say, Christianity has nothing to do with history and, therefore, cannot be found in the realm of history; if any one tries to find Christianity in history, he robs Christianity of its true characteristic and makes it subject to the manipulation of men. Overbeck says as follows:

"For in the realm of history man is supreme. Here he makes his distinctions and differentiations relative to himself. It is the territory which he may call his own. He is lord in this realm because in it he merely deals with himself The attributes of the things of the phenomenological world are the complex of their operations by which they become the objects of scientific manipulation." [3]

Therefore, says Overbeck: "Historic Christianity ---that is the Christianity subjected to time --- is an absurdity." [4] According to Overbeck,

1. Franz Overbeck, op.cit., pp.27, 30. Cited in Van Til, op.cit., pp.88f.

2. Barth, Theology and Church, p.61.

3. Franz Overbeck, op.cit., pp.16,18. Cited in Van Til, op.cit., pp.873f.

4. Franz Overbeck, op.cit., p.242. Cited in Barth, Theology and Church, p.64. Here we must think of the difference between Overbeck's 'absurdity' and that of Kierkegaard. According to Overbeck, Christianity cannot be in history. Therefore, Christianity in history is an absurdity. However, for Kierkegaard, without the absurdity that Christianity is in history, there is no Christianity; Christianity must be in history. This is the reason why Kierkegaard attacked the state-church of Denmark which, according to Kierkegaard's understanding of the New Testament Christianity, was not faithful to the true character of church. This point will be discussed in detail in chapter III of this study.

Historic Christianity is not Christianity in the real sense of the word because it is in history. There is no possibility of a Christianity in history. The only possible abode of Christianity lies in the history beyond history (Urgeschichte). What is interesting here is the fact that Overbeck places Christ and the faith of His followers in Him in the realm of 'Urgeschichte': "Christianity means nothing else than Christ and the faith of his followers in him; it is something above time; in the life-time of Jesus, it (Christ and the faith in Him) has as yet no existence at all." [5] Therefore, Overbeck's position is nothing other than the following :

"The eternal permanence of Christianity can be claimed only from the eternal viewpoint (sub specie aeterni), that is, from a standpoint which knows nothing of time and of the contrast of youth and age existing only in time." [6]

Comparing Overbeck's understanding of 'Urgeschichte' with Barth's position on the relation between revelation and history, we can find a strong similarity between them. [7] The most outstanding similarity is their understanding of the realm of time and history, and its relation to the realm which is beyond this realm. For both of them [Barth and Overbeck] time and history is not the realm in which God acts. In the realm of time and history, man is supreme. Therefore, if God and His revelation exist, He and it would not and could not be in the realm of time and history, but must be in the realm of the 'unhistorical' or, the realm of 'Urgeschichte.' All those things which are related to God cannot be in the realm of history except their distorted form, their contradicted form. What is ideal is only in the realm of 'Urgeschichte.' For the realm of history is the realm of the relative. There cannot be an absolute

5. Franz Overbeck, op.cit., p.28. Cited in Barth, Theology and Church, p.62.

6. Overbeck, op.cit., p.71. Cited in Barth, Theology and Church, p.72.

7. For a discussion of the close relation between Overbeck and the early Barth, see Peter Monsma, op.cit., pp.69-74.

in the realm of history; what is absolute is only beyond the realm of history.

The second similarity between Barth's thought and that of Overbeck is, as we have suggested, their postulation of the realm which is beyond the realm of history. What is especially interesting is the fact that the characteristics which they give to this realm have a close relation with characteristics of the philosophies of Plato and Kant. In particular, their [Barth's and Overbeck's] understanding that what is in the realm of the 'Urgeschichte' is the origin of all things in the realm of time and history, reminds us of Plato's 'realm of ideas' or Kant's 'noumenal realm.' [1]

Therefore, we can conclude that the meaning which Barth gives to the term 'Urgeschichte' is not different from that of Overbeck. For Barth, like Overbeck, 'Urgeschichte' is 'non-historical' which conditions all history (cf. "Romans," p.140). Barth calls Jesus Christ the Urgeschichte. Here, we find the similarity between Barth and Overbeck. For, according to Barth, as far as the historical Jesus who was in time and history is concerned, he cannot be called the Urgeschichte; only when he is no longer in history, when he is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection which is not in history, he can be called Urgeschichte. If Jesus Christ is Urgeschichte, then he is not in history, but is the origin of history, which does not belong to time and history.

Up to now, we have considered Barth's view of the relation between

1. In relation to this problem it will be useful to quote the following observation of Berkouwer on Barth's "Romans" (1922): "Undoubtedly some philosophic, especially Platonic, thoughts have placed their stamp on Barth's "Roemerbrief" and this has not infrequently created the impression that he was more concerned with the crisis of "eternity" over time than with the judgment of the living God. Biblical thoughts are constantly obscured by a transcendental boundary-idea, which reminds one more of philosophical idealism than of the gospel." G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. Harry R. Boer (London: The Paternoster Press, 1956), p. 31. For further discussion of the Kantian background of Overbeck's and Barth's thought, see Van Til, New Modernism, pp. 42, 80-106.

revelation and history in three respects. According to our conclusion, Barth thinks that what is in time and history cannot be absolute, so that God's revelation cannot be in history, but must be beyond history as the origin of history. And he calls what is beyond history "Urgeschichte" following Overbeck. Now let us briefly compare Barth's view of the relation between revelation and history to that of Kierkegaard.

As we shall see in chapter III, for Kierkegaard revelation took place in time and history, a time and history which are not different from the time and history in which we live. Of course, revelation is a very special fact as the absolute fact. However, as far as the happening of revelation in time and history is concerned, it is not different from any other historical fact. The absolute fact is the absolute fact as an historical fact; it has the characteristics of an historical fact. That is to say, for Kierkegaard, revelation does not take place in a realm which is beyond time and history. If there were no revelation in time and history, there would be no revelation at all. Revelation is not something which is beyond or behind the things which are in time and history.

Here we can see a difference between Kierkegaard's view of the relation of revelation and history and that of Barth. Barth, as we have seen in this section, tries to make revelation the eternal revelation which is not in the flux of time and history. He does this in order to protect revelation from all kinds of criticism (e.g., historical criticism etc.). According to Barth, therefore, even though the historical elements which are related to revelation (which is beyond these historical elements) can be criticized and abandoned, revelation itself can remain without any difficulties.

Here a question may be raised: Does not Barth try to emphasize the absolute character of revelation which takes place in time and history? If this were the case, then we should have to think that even though their expressions are slightly different, there is no real difference between Barth and Kierkegaard. In fact, there are some scholars who interpret Barth in this way.[1] Their major thesis is that in the special situation of the early twentieth century, and especially in relation to the anthropological or relational theologies of nineteenth century, Barth tries to emphasize the absoluteness of God and His revelation. Barth's expressions which seem to suggest that revelation is not in time and history must be interpreted in the light of Barth's real intention which is to emphasize the absoluteness of God's revelation. One of the implications of such an assertion is that Barth, in fact, does not deny the historical happening of revelation. For example, Hans Frei says of Barth's intention in the second edition of the "Romans":

"The intention of the second edition of Der Roemerbrief is in large part to point to the complete newness, the miracle of the grace and freedom of God --- in contrast to the relational theologies of liberalism et. al. which always began with the givenness, the togetherness of God and man in the relation of revelation. To say simply that the togetherness of God and man is sheer novelty, sheer grace and miracle, would have found no dissent on the part of those whom Barth opposed. To distinguish his intention from theirs, he made use of the concept (among others) of revelation as eschatology." [2]

By the phrase 'revelation as eschatology' Frei means Barth's emphasis on the eschatological character of revelation; that, as we have seen, even though revelation is given wholly in the eternal Moment, we have to await it as men who live in the realm of time and history, for revelation is only in the eternal Moment and does not belong to time. That is to say, the reason why Barth expresses himself in such a way that it appears that he does not recognize the

1. For the views which interpret the theology of early Barth in this way, see. H.R.Mackintosh, op.cit., pp.289-292; Thomas F.Torrance, op.cit., pp.74-79; W.W.Wells, op.cit., pp.194ff.; James D. Smart, op.cit., pp.115f; Hans Frei, op.cit., pp.94ff..

2. Hans Frei, op.cit., p.94.

fact that revelation is in time and history is that Barth's intention is to emphasize the absolute newness of God in contrast to relational theologians.

However, is it possible to say that Barth's intention is to recognize the historicity of revelation? And is it possible to say that the reason why Barth expresses himself in such a way that he appears to deny the historicity of revelation is only to emphasize the absoluteness of God, and has no relation to his view of the dualistic structure of the realm of God and the realm of man?

It seems to me that it is impossible to answer these questions affirmatively. For, as we have seen in this section, for Barth, if revelation were in time and history, then it would not be the revelation in the proper sense of the word. According to Barth, what is in time and history is relative, whereas revelation must be absolute. Therefore, to speak of the historicity of revelation is, for Barth to make the revelation a relative one, an object of historical analysis. It is precisely this that Barth tries to avoid in his discussion of revelation. Hence, Barth's expression that revelation is not in time and history is not simply a question of emphasizing the newness and the absoluteness of revelation which takes place in time and history. According to his thought-structure, in which it is impossible that God should enter time and history, it is also impossible to say that revelation belongs to time and history.[1]

In contrast to Barth, for Kierkegaard if we were to assert that there is revelation which, in fact, as an eternal revelation, is not in time and history,

1. Thomas W. Ogletree, in his book Christian Faith and History, has clearly shown that the early Barth's view of history is similar to (or, more radical than) that of E. Troeltsch. See, pp.32-114. esp., p.43: "In fact, in a far more thoroughgoing sense than Troeltsch, Barth finds in history as such only the transient and passing, only a meaningless flux and flow of events. He too then looks beyond history for meaning and value."

this would be an attempt to take away Christianity. Thus we can say that there is a difference between Barth's view of the relation between revelation and history and that of Kierkegaard. In a sense, their understandings of this problem are two conflicting positions. This difference of their understanding of the relation between revelation and history, can be considered to be the reason why they use the term 'Paradox' in different contexts. This is the theme which we shall consider in the next section.

The point which I shall try to show in this section is closely related to the points which I have dealt with in the last two sections. According to the conclusions which we have reached in the last two sections, for Barth, God's revelation, even though it is related to what is in history, is not in time and history, but beyond time and history. This is the basic reason why God's revelation is called the Paradox by Barth. It is this point which I shall argue in this section. That is to say, for Barth, since revelation, as the revelation which is in God's hands, is not in time and history, it is called the Paradox.

At the back of this argument, there is Barth's two worlds theory: there are two worlds in conflict with one another without end -- God's world and our world. According to Barth, these two worlds are absolutely different from one another. Therefore, what is in God's world cannot enter into our world, for if it entered into our world, then it would become something which is in our world and cease to be something which is in God's world. The only way in which God's world has a relation to our world without ceasing to be God's world, is to touch our world as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it. God's world and the revelation of God's world (and also, the act or the event of this touching) thus, in fact, are not in time and history. Therefore, it is called the Paradox because it is not in our world.

According to Barth's thinking, therefore, when the relation between God's world and our world takes place, there must be two different elements which are involved in this relation; one of them is the element which is not in our world, but beyond it (revelation itself or the actuality of revelation), while the other one is in our world in relation to revelation itself, but is not itself the revelation. What is in our world, therefore, is not called the

Paradox, for it is in our world. Only what is not in our world is called the Paradox by Barth. To show this I shall consider two cases to which Barth applies the term Paradox: (1) the historical Jesus he says is not the Paradox; but Jesus Christ who is not in time and history, but interpreted in the light of the Resurrection which is also not in time and history, is the Paradox. (2) The positive relation between God and man which is given in Jesus Christ is not in time and history, but beyond time and history. Therefore the positive relation between God and man which is promised in the light of the Resurrection is the Paradox.

We shall consider these two cases in turn. Through this consideration, it will become clear that the context in which Barth uses the term Paradox is when he is speaking of the things which do not belong to and are not in our world, the realm of time and history.

First, Barth calls Jesus Christ the Paradox following Kierkegaard. However, as we shall see in this section and in chapter III, the contexts in which they call Jesus Christ the Paradox, it seems to me at least, are different from one another. The point which I shall make here is that, for Barth, since Jesus Christ in whom God's world touches our world does not belong to and is not in our world, He is the Paradox. This point will be clearer when we consider the fact that Barth tries to understand Jesus Christ in the light of the Resurrection.

The Resurrection of Jesus Christ, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter, is very important to Barth's understanding of revelation; it is "the revelation" ("Romans," p.30). The revelation of what? Barth says:

"[The Resurrection is] the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God, and the apprehending of God in Jesus. The Resurrection is the emergence of the necessity of giving glory to God: the recognition of Him as Paradox, Victor and Primal History (Urgeschichte)" ("Romans," p.30).

The fact that Jesus is the Christ is given to us only in the Resurrection; before the Resurrection, there is no revelation, there are not even any signs of this fact, only in the Resurrection is He revealed as the Christ. That Jesus is the Christ, for Barth, means that Jesus is our Lord and the Son of God, so that in Jesus Christ the Kingdom of God touches our world("Romans," pp. 27f.). But this is revealed only in the Resurrection.[1]

What does Barth mean by the expression that God's world (or, God's realm, or the Kingdom of God) touches our world? Does this mean that God's world comes into our world through its breaking through the line of the diastasis between God's realm and our world? It is hard, it seems to me, to answer this question positively, for Barth's description of the touching of God's world and our world does not allow us to interpret Barth in such a way. According to Barth, there are two worlds (or, realms) which are absolutely different from each other; the one world is the known world in which we live, "the world of men, and of time, and of things --- our world"("Romans," p.29). The other world, which is unknown, is the world of the Beyond, of the Primal Origin, of the Father, of the Primal Creation, and of the final Redemption(Cf. "Romans," pp.28, 226, 243, 289, 331, 497).[2] But, for Barth, the expression that one world is the known world and the other world is the unknown world does not mean that the other world which Barth calls the unknown world cannot be recognized at all. The world of God or the world of the Origin has its relation to our world from the first, for, according to Barth, the world of God is the origin of our world. However, God's world and our world do not have a similar nature or character.

1. Therefore, for Barth, the historical Jesus is not revelation. Even after the Resurrection, the historical Jesus who actually lived in time, history, and our world is not revelation and, therefore, is not the Paradox. For the historical Jesus and the historical life of Jesus are not in the new world.

2. These two worlds are sometimes referred to as the old world (of the flesh) and the new world (of the Spirit). Cf. "Romans," p. 30.

Barth introduces the name Jesus Christ into this dualistic structure of God's world and our world. "In this name," says Barth, "two worlds meet and go apart, two planes intersect, the one known and the other unknown" ("Romans," p.29). But, according to Barth, this is revealed only in the Resurrection: "... in the Resurrection the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh" ("Romans," p.30). Yet Resurrection itself has a very special character. Barth immediately qualifies the character of the touching which he has said takes place in the Resurrection by saying that it "touches it as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it. And precisely because it does not touch it, it touches it as its frontier --- as the new world" ("Romans," p.30). In a word, as we have seen in the last section, the Resurrection itself does not belong to and take place in our world and, therefore, it does not belong to time and history, but belongs to the realm of God, the new world. According to Barth, if the Resurrection were in time and history, it could not be the Resurrection in the real sense of the word:

"Resurrection ceases to be Resurrection, if it be some abnormal event side by side with other events."

"If we thrust the Resurrection into history, if we set the pre-supposition which is in Jesus within the sequence of events we introduce, as it were, a spectre which devours every living thing" ("Romans," p.115).

So, according to Barth, we have to regard the Resurrection as a non-historical happening: "This reversal or transformation is not an 'historical event' which may be placed side by side with other events. Rather it is the non-historical happening, by which all other events are bounded, and to which events before and on and after Easter Day point" ("Romans," p.203). For, what belongs to God's world cannot be in time and history.

Hence, Jesus Christ who is revealed in the Resurrection is also not in our world, history, and time. Of course, the historical Jesus is in our world, time and history as other men are. But the historical Jesus, as he was, is not Jesus Christ. Barth emphasizes the fact that the historical Jesus cannot be regarded as the Christ. The Day of Jesus Christ is only in the light of the Resurrection. "The new Day which has dawned for men in the Resurrection," says Barth, "is the Day of Jesus Christ; this is the Day that ushers in the transformation of all time into eternity" ("Romans," p.69). The Day of Jesus Christ has dawned for men in the Resurrection which does not belong to time; it has not dawned in the life time of the historical Jesus. The Day of Jesus Christ is the day that ushers in the transformation of all time into eternity, so it cannot be in time and history. On the contrary, it is and belongs to eternity and God's realm. Therefore, "Jesus as the Christ, as the Messiah is the End of History; and He can be comprehended only as Paradox, as Victor, as Primal History(Urgeschichte)" ("Romans," p.29).

Here we can find the answer to the question as to why Barth calls Jesus Christ the Paradox. For Barth to understand Jesus Christ as Paradox is the same as to understand Him as Victor or as Primal History (Urgeschichte). And following Barth's own terminology, it is the same as to understand Him as the End of History. The End of History, for Barth, is not an end which is and belongs to history, but the End which is beyond time and history. And, for Barth, if one does not understand Jesus Christ as the End of History, one does not understand Him as Paradox. Hence, to understand Jesus Christ as Paradox, for Barth, is to understand Him as the one who is not in time, history, and our world, but beyond them. For Barth, as we have seen, Jesus Christ is only in the light of the Resurrection which does not belong to time and history. Therefore, this Jesus Christ who is not in time and history is the Paradox in the sense

which Barth thinks of Paradox. That is to say, for Barth, the reason why Jesus Christ is the Paradox is because He, in whom God's world touches our world without touching it, does not belong to our world. According to Barth, if Jesus Christ were in time, history, and our world, then the new world (or, the Kingdom of God) would not have come into our world. For, if Jesus Christ were in time and history, then what had come through Him could not be the New World in the real sense of the word. Barth says:

"A negation which remains side by side with the position it negates must itself be negated, and is therefore no truly radical negation The Paradox which still remains in relationship with normal spiritual experience, however peculiar or abnormal ... it may be, is no real Paradox. That other from which we have come and which is contrasted with all concrete, known, temporal, human existence can be in no matter wholly distinct unless it be in every manner wholly distinct" ("Romans," p.115).

Therefore, if Jesus Christ is the Paradox in the real sense, He must not be in time and history. Jesus Christ as Paradox exists in, and belongs to, only the new world (or, the Kingdom of God).

This point is clearer when we consider the fact that Barth tries to relate Paradox and Urgeschichte. To understand Jesus Christ as Paradox, for Barth, is not different from the understanding which sees Him as Urgeschichte. Yet, as we have seen in the last section, the term 'Urgeschichte' means that which is not in time and history, but the Primal Origin of all that is in time and history. To understand Jesus Christ as 'Urgeschichte', thus, is possible only in the light of the Resurrection. That is to say, it means to understand Him as the one who is not in time and history. As far as Jesus who is in time and history is concerned, he cannot be regarded and called 'Urgeschichte.' Only when he is no longer in time and history, when he is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection, can He as Jesus Christ be called 'Urgeschichte.'

If the reason why Barth calls Jesus Christ 'Urgeschichte' is not different from the reason why he calls Him Paradox, then it is clear that for Barth the term Paradox can be applied only to the things which are not in time and history. That is to say, since Jesus Christ is not in time and history, Barth calls Him Paradox, as he [Barth] calls Him 'Urgeschichte' or the End of History.

When we compare Barth's understanding of Jesus Christ as Paradox to that of Kierkegaard, we find a considerable difference between them. As we shall see in chapter III, for Kierkegaard, the reason why Jesus is the Paradox is that he is the 'God in time' or the 'God-Man.' What is important for Kierkegaard is the fact that the eternal God came into existence in time and history; God became an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth. God in time, God in history, or God in our concrete world is the meaning of Paradox for Kierkegaard. If God were not actually in time, history, and our world, there would be nothing which Kierkegaard would call the absolute Paradox. For Kierkegaard, the historical fact that God is in time as an individual man (Jesus of Nazareth) is the absolute Paradox. And as far as its happening in time and history is concerned, for Kierkegaard this fact [the historical fact that God is in time as an individual man] is not different from any other historical fact. Therefore, Kierkegaard tries to emphasize the historical life of Jesus in his humiliation rather than the exalted state which starts from the Resurrection of Jesus. That is to say, the historical life of Jesus is the object of the possibility of offense and the Paradox.

We can conclude, thus, that (1) Barth sees Jesus Christ as the one who is not in time and history, whereas Kierkegaard (as we shall show in chapter III) sees Him as the 'God in time'; that (2) Barth tries to emphasize the Resurrection as the revelation and, therefore, the starting point of the Paradox, whereas Kierkegaard (as we shall show in chapter III) emphasizes the

historical life of Jesus and tries to see the absolute Paradox and the possibility of offense in this historical fact; and that, therefore, (3) Barth thinks of Jesus Christ as Paradox because He is not in time and history, Kierkegaard (as we shall show in chapter III) asserts that Jesus, as the God-man, is Paradox because he is in time, history, and our world.

Secondly, Barth speaks of the positive relation between God and man as 'Paradox'. In this case, as in the case of Jesus Christ, Barth does not think that the positive relation between God and man, which is introduced by Jesus Christ in the light of the Resurrection, is in time, history, and our world. So, here we find another example of the fact that Barth's usage of the term Paradox is related to the absolute diastasis of God's realm and our realm which makes it impossible that even God should break through the gap between these two realms. We shall examine this case in relation to Barth's discussion of God's 'Yes', for only in God's 'Yes', for Barth, is there a positive relation between God and man.[1]

Barth's starting point is again the Resurrection of Jesus Christ:

"The new Day which has dawned for men in the Resurrection is the Day that ushers in the transformation of all time into eternity ... In Christ there has appeared an end, but also a beginning, a passing to corruption, but also a becoming new; and both are for the whole and for all men. For the Redeemer who has been manifested in Christ is the Creator of all things" ("Romans," p.69).

Therefore, according to Barth, the Resurrection must be interpreted as God's "Yes" or God's affirmation to the things that are negated on the cross. The fact that the cross is God's "No" or His negation of all things in time, history, and our world can be understood only in the light of the Resurrection.

1. The following argument is closely related to our discussion of Barth's view of faith which we considered in section 1 of this chapter. See above pp.29-33. See also John McConnachie, "The Teaching of Karl Barth, op.cit., p.396: "Faith is not to be identified with its historical or psychological Manifestations. It lies completely outside the phenomenal world. It is not visible to men."

That is to say, without God's affirmation, there is no negation. The Resurrection as revelation reveals that the meaning of Jesus is God's negation of all that is in time, history, and our world. But the cross has such a meaning only in the light of the "Yes" of the Resurrection. Hence, there is no chronological order between the divine negation and the divine affirmation of all things in the world. God's 'No' and His 'Yes' are only in the light of the Resurrection; the divine negation and affirmation come from God's realm to which the Resurrection belongs ('Romans,' p.93). This is clear when we consider the question: Where can we find the triumph of God's 'Yes' over His 'No'? Where and when can we find the final triumph? Can we find the final triumph in time, history, and our world? Barth does not give a positive answer to these questions. According to Barth, as long as we are in this world of time and history, there is no time in which we are not under the negation of God. As far as our existence in time is concerned, we are the objects of God's negation. Of course, Barth does not deny the fact that there is God's "Yes." Certainly there is God's "Yes." However, it is not in time, history, and our realm; it is only in God's realm, as is also the Resurrection, the revelation of the divine negation and the divine affirmation.

Therefore, according to Barth, there is a positive relation between God and man. However, it is not in time, history, and our world. Hence, Barth also calls it the Paradox:

"The mercy of God triumphs! It has been given to us. The positive relation between God and man, which is the absolute Paradox, veritably exists. This is theme of the Gospel" ("Romans," p. 94).

Why is it the Paradox? Because it is not a relation which exists and can be found in time, history, and our world. Does this mean that what was not and could not be found in time, history, and our world up to now has appeared in time, history, and our world? It is easy to interpret Barth's intention in such

a way, when he speaks of "the theme of the Gospel". However, this is not a right interpretation of Barth's intention when he speaks of "the theme of the Gospel". For, according to Barth, what is in time, history, and our world, whatever it may be, cannot be something which has a positive relation to God.[1] Even Jesus is the object of God's negation. For Barth, that Jesus died means that all human possibilities were negated. Therefore, even after the Resurrection, there cannot be a positive relation between God and man in time and history. Nevertheless, the positive relation between them surely exists. Where? Only in God's hands and, therefore, in God's realm, as the Resurrection is the fact which is in God's hands.

If there were something in time, history, and our world, which relates this relation, then the relation between God and man would be a distorted relation. The only possible way for the Gospel to speak about this relation, therefore, is to speak of it in the language of promise and hope: "...as what we are, Thou and I can think of this positive relation with God only in terms of hope ..."("Romans," p.182). For we encounter the possibility of this relation "only in the form of a promise"("Romans," p.344).

Does this promise mean that even though it does not exist at the moment, there will be a day or time in which this positive relation will be in time and history? Does Barth mean something like this when he uses the term "hope" or "promise"? It is impossible to give an affirmative answer to these questions. For, as we have seen in our discussion of Barth's eschatology, for Barth, there is no time in which the new world comes and will come to us. Barth says: "...the eternal "Coming" fulfilment lies beyond life and death"("Romans," p.345).

1. Cf. R.S.Barbour, "Karl Barth: The Epistle to the Romans," p.266: "Again and again, in rereading this strange powerful book, I have noticed how 'invisible' a thing the Gospel is in Barth's exposition of it; and how frequently the language of time and eternity etc. is used in a somewhat Platonic way to express it."

Therefore, Barth calls it the eternal "Coming" fulfilment; there is no time in which the new world is not coming, but there is no time in which the new world enters into time; it is eternally coming; there is no time in which its coming ceases. The fulfilment of the promise or the hope is not only invisible at this moment (in time), but it will always be invisible in time. In spite of this invisibility, according to Barth, the positive relation between God and man surely exists in the eternal Moment.[1] Hence, the positive relation between God and man is beyond time, history, and our world.

Therefore, we may say that the context in which Barth uses the term Paradox is somewhat different from that in which Kierkegaard uses it. Whereas Barth uses Paradox when he tries to speak of something which is not in time, history, and our world, Kierkegaard, as we shall see in chapter III, uses the term Paradox (in the sense of the absolute Paradox, not the Socratic Paradox) in a context in which he affirms something which, as far as its nature is concerned, is not in time, is in time, history and our world.

1. Juergen Moltman speaks about this as follows: "It is not history, moving silently and interminably onwards, that brings a crisis upon men's eschatological hopes of future, as A.Schweitzer said, but on the contrary it is now the eschaton, breaking transcendently into history, that brings all human history to its final crisis. This, however, makes the eschaton into a transcendental eternity, the transcendental meaning of all ages, equally near to all the ages of history and equally far from all of them" (Theology of Hope (London: SCM, 1967), p.39).

2. Thomas W.Ogletree also notes this point: "The relationship [between God and man] is real because of an event, an occurrence. On the other hand, Barth does not wish to speak of this occurrence as something "historical" or "temporal" At this point he departs from Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, the Paradox which faith must face is the fact that Deity, the Eternal "came into being in a definite moment in time as an individual man." This is the absolute Paradox. Barth also speaks of an "absolute Paradox," but he modifies Kierkegaard's reason significantly. Rather than speaking of the "absurdity" that eternity has become time, Barth speaks of how eternity has become an event ("Romans," p.94) ... in his view, such an event can only be unhistorical or non-temporal in character" (Christian Faith and History, p.99).

The last question which I want to raise in this chapter is --- What is his basic thought-structure which allows Barth to understand revelation in the way in which we have shown him to understand it in this chapter? Why cannot God's revelation belong to our world of time and history? Why does God's revelation leave only a Crater in time, history, and our world which is not revelation itself? Why does not God enter into our world of time and history?

In a positive sense, Barth tries to emphasize the sovereignty of God. He thinks that to place God's revelation in time and history is to hurt God's freedom. If God is the sovereign God, He must be free even in His revelation. Therefore, God must reveal Himself only in the eternal Moment. In order not to be a immanent God, God must not be in thought, in history, in the human will, or in the God-consciousness of man. God must always be God; if he enters into the human world of time and history, He also becomes relative. There would be no possibility of remaining the eternal and absolute One, if He were once in time and history. Therefore, to remain as the eternal God, God does not enter into time and history. He must be the absolute and eternal God. Barth tries in this way to overcome all relational theologies and even his own early liberal theology before the period of 'dialectical theology.' Barth tries to emphasize the absoluteness and the sovereignty of God.[1]

However, in a negative sense, we cannot but say that there is a kind of absolute dualism at the back of his emphasis upon the sovereignty of God in the dialectical theology of the "Romans." In what follows, I shall point to Barth's absolute dualism and compare it with Kierkegaard's dualism. The point which I

1. Cf. John McConnachie, "The Teaching of Karl Barth," op.cit., p.387: "He [Barth] is concerned to protect the Transcendent against any direct human attempt to express it [the Transcendent] in cut and dry formulae."

shall make here is that whereas for Kierkegaard the dualism of God and man, and of eternity and time is a dualism which is overcome in God's act of revelation in time and history, for Barth the dualism between the realm of God and the realm of man, between eternity and time, between Urgeschichte and history, between the realm of the Origin and the realm of this world, and between what is beyond time and history and what is in time and history cannot be overcome even by God.

For Barth, the freedom of God is the freedom to be God absolutely or to be the absolute Other to man. Hence even in the case of revelation, God does not enter time, history, and our world; God reveals Himself only in the eternal Moment. Therefore, in the last analysis, revelation takes place in the realm which is beyond time and history. What God has done in Christ is not in the realm of time and history. What is in time and history is not God and has nothing to do with God. Of course, Barth sometimes writes as follows: "The Word of God is the transformation of everything that we know as Humanity, Nature, and History, and must therefore be apprehended as the negation of the starting point of every system ..." ("Romans," p.278). However, as we have seen throughout this chapter, this transformation is only in the eternal Moment. This is the importance of the Moment for Barth. As far as the stream or the flux of time is concerned, no transformation takes place. Therefore, there are two realms which are absolutely different from one another and there is no time in which there is no conflict between these two realms. For Barth, these two realms are eternally conflicting realms: the Eternal Realm of God (of the Origin and the End of this world, of Primal Creation, of the Resurrection, of Redemption, and of Final Victory) and the realm of man (of the flux of time, of history, and of things).[1] It is hard, of course, to equate Barth's postulation of these two worlds to Plato's static dualism, for Barth's two realms have a

more dynamic relation than in the case of Plato's dualism of two realms. However, the basic structure of both of their dualisms are the same; there are two worlds which share the relation of the Origin and the results. In a sense, this dualism can be related to the distinction between the world of fact and the world of meaning. For, according to Barth, it is impossible to find the meaning of history in the realm of time and history. What are in this world are only facts which have no meaning in themselves, so that the meaning of these facts cannot be found in the realm of time and history. Accordingly, the meaning of the realm of facts itself can be found only in the realm of meaning. Therefore, to understand and to discover the meaning of what is in the realm of time and history, one has to transcend the realm of time, history, and facts (or things) and see beyond the realm of time, history, and things.

Barth's assertion that the meaning of the cross can be found only in the light of the Resurrection which does not belong to time and this world, reminds us of this distinction between the realm of fact and the realm of meaning. In this sense, Barth's dualism is a kind of absolute dualism. Two elements in the dualism endure to the end of time; there is no time in which one element in the dualism can be overcome by the other element. It is true, of course, that Barth speaks of the final victory. However, as we have seen in this chapter, the final victory of Christ is not in time, history, and our world, but is beyond the realm of time and history; it is only in the eternal Moment. In this world, there is no change, no transformation. Therefore, the two realms continue in conflict without end.

1. Therefore, Wilhelm Pauck's observation on Barth's early writings is quite right: "Eternity limits time. Each belongs to a totally different sphere. It is therefore impossible that God, identified with eternity, can enter in the plane of man. ... Indeed God is the totally other, the unknown, the remote" ("Barth's Religious Criticism of Religion," The Journal of Religion, VIII (1928), p.458).

When we compare Barth's dualism to that of Kierkegaard, we can see the fundamental difference between their thought-structures. As we shall see in chapter III, Kierkegaard also emphasizes the absolute difference between God and man. But this distinction cannot be an obstacle for God. Of course, man cannot be God and cannot find the way to God by himself. But the difference between God and man cannot be an obstacle for God becoming an individual man to be the Revealer and the Redeemer. For Kierkegaard, God can overcome this distinction; God can be the "God in time." In this sense, for Kierkegaard, the dualism of God and man can be overcome by God Himself, even though man cannot even think of God's incarnation in time and history. The dualism in the thought of Kierkegaard is not an eternal dualism. God can enter the realm of man, time, history, and this world. Therefore, Kierkegaard's dualism cannot be regarded as the absolute dualism which we find in the theology of the early Barth. The absolute dualism of Ursprung and things, of Urgeschichte and history, of eternity and time, of the absolute Other God and man, pertains in the early Barth's theology. Because of this dualism Barth uses Kierkegaardian terms in his own way, transforming the terms to fit his own absolute dualistic thought-structure.

Here let us consider the famous passage in the preface to the second edition of the "Romans":

"I know that I have laid myself open to the charge of imposing a meaning upon the text rather than extracting its meaning from it, and that my method implies this. My reply is that, if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance: 'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth.' The relation between such a God and such a man, and the relation between such a man and such a God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy. Philosophers name this KRISIS of human perception --- the Prime Cause: the Bible beholds at the same cross-roads --- the figure Jesus Christ" ("Romans," p.10).

According to this quotation, Barth has only one system, what Kierkegaard called 'the infinite qualitative distinction between time and eternity.' It is true

that both of them start from this distinction and try to discover the character of the relation between such a God and such a man. However, they differ in the manner in which they express those things, and this difference is not simply a matter of degree, but of kind. As we have argued throughout this chapter, Barth tries to see the positive relation between God and man only in the realm of eternity and announces that there cannot be a relation between God and man in the world of time and history. The quotation which I have just quoted also reveals Barth's basic thinking on this problem. In this quote Barth speaks of this relation in two respects: (1) philosophically, it is the relation between the Prime Cause and men and (2) biblically, it is Jesus Christ. According to Barth, Jesus Christ does not differ from the relation between the Prime origin and this world, for Jesus Christ who is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection is God in the form of man. The relation between the Prime origin and this world is not in this world; it can be known only in the light of the realm of beyond. Likewise, Jesus Christ is not in this world of time and history, but beyond time and history.

But according to Kierkegaard, Jesus Christ as the God-man is in time and history. It is true that there is a qualitative difference between God and man. But Jesus Christ is the one who overcomes this qualitative difference between God and man. Therefore, He is called the absolute Paradox. Of course, Barth also speaks of Jesus Christ as the one who expresses and provides the positive relation between God [the eternal] and man [in time]. However, as we have seen in the last section, both Jesus Christ and the positive relation between God and man are not in time and history, for both of them are related to God's action, and ".... the action of God cannot occur in time; it can occur only in eternity" ("Romans", p.435). Even in the discussion of the relation of time and eternity, Barth does not overcome the dualism of time and eternity. And Barth tries to relate Jesus Christ to KRISIS which he borrows from Kantian philosophy.

Hence, when Barth calls Jesus Christ Paradox, he thinks that Jesus Christ, who is not in time and history, is the KRISIS of human perception. Moreover, he asserts that the permanent KRISIS is the message which Paul wants to preach in his Romans ("Romans," p.11).

To this point we have considered Barth's understanding of revelation in the second edition of the "Romans." According to our consideration, even though Barth uses a lot of Kierkegaardian terms in his "Romans", he usually transforms the meaning and the usage of the terms to fit his own thought-structure which we have called one of absolute dualism. The difference between the early Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard will become clearer in chapter III in which I shall discuss in detail Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation. The fact that there is a difference between the early Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard will make us raise an interesting question: What is the case in regard to Barth's later theology? For Barth did not see Kierkegaard as an important influence on his later theology. This is the question which we shall pursue in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

The Later Barth on Revelation

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the later Barth's understanding of revelation in relation to that of Kierkegaard. Through this examination I shall try to show that (1) even though the later Barth's understanding of revelation is closer to Kierkegaard than his earlier understanding, (2) Barth is still different from Kierkegaard.

(1) There are some things which we cannot find in the "Romans" in the later Barth's understanding of revelation, e.g., his emphasis on incarnation and his approval of the historicity of revelation. And these elements are something which the later Barth and Kierkegaard have in common. In these respects, it is clear that the later Barth is closer to Kierkegaard in his understanding of revelation than the early Barth.

(2) However, in spite of these similarities between the later Barth and Kierkegaard, there are considerable differences between their understandings of revelation. These differences are due to the differences in their understanding of incarnation and the historicity of revelation.

These two points are the main points which I shall try to show in this chapter.

Before we come to this consideration, it will be order to consider how Barth thinks of the relation between his early theology and his later theology in their relation to Kierkegaard. I want to quote one passage from Barth's Church Dogmatics:

"When the four thousand copies of the book [Christian Dogmatics] printed as volume I were sold out, I was faced with the task of first of all working at a new edition of the first part. My experience of twelve years ago in re-editing the Roemerbrief was repeated. I could and I wanted to say the same thing as before; but I could no longer say it in the way in

which I had said it before. What else was left me, except to begin at the beginning and, true, to say the same thing over again, but the same thing over again in a quite different way?"[1]

This quotation comes from Barth's "Foreword" of the Prolegomena to Church Dogmatics [the first volume of the Church Dogmatics] which was published in 1932, the most important year in the development of Barth's theology. In this passage Barth compares the rewriting of the Prolegomena with the re-editing of the "Romans," and says that both of these rewritings are an attempt to say the same thing over again in a different way. He wanted to say the same thing he had said, but he could no longer say in the same way. Especially, in the case of the change from the Christian Dogmatics to the Church Dogmatics, we have to ask: Why? Why does Barth change the direction of his theology from the early, so-called "dialectical theology" to the theology of analogy? It is not our task to answer this question. But we may make two points about this change. The first point is that Barth tries to avoid some of the criticisms or misunderstandings there had been of his theology. Barth says as follows: "The Word or existence?' The first edition gave acumen or even stupidity some cause to put this question. I may hope that the answer to it, at least so far as my purpose is concerned, is now clear." (CD, I/1, ix -x). This saying in the foreword may be clearer when we quote Barth's answer to the criticism of Th. Siegfried that "upon this foundation [existential thinking] he [Barth] proposes to build up his dogmatics." Barth wrote:

"That really was not my intention. But apart from better intention altogether, I ought to have realised that to drag in those concepts at that very point, in relation to what I already wished to say on that occasion, was a superfluous and dangerous game. Superfluous, because no proof of the doctrine of the Word of God by the fact that it was proved to be posited by existential thinking and that, therefore, an existential philosophy was asserted as its background and its justification, did as a matter of fact follow. Dangerous, because all that follows on the basis

1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1, part 1, trans. G.T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), vii-viii. Hereafter citations from the Church Dogmatics will be given in this form: CD, volume/ part and page, and will be placed in parenthesis within the body of the text.

of that passage might be understood as indicating something of that nature, namely, an existential philosophical proof of theology."(CD, I/1, p.142).

Barth agrees that the way in which he described his theology in the Christian Dogmatics might be the cause of misunderstanding of his real intention. What was Barth's real intention? It was to say that the foundation of theology was the Word of God alone. Barth's theology after 1932, therefore, tries to make that clearer than before. So we shall call Barth in this period the later Barth in contrast to the early Barth of "dialectical theology." [1] The second point which we may make on the change in the way in which Barth describes his theology is that Barth found the possibility of a more constructive (or, positive) way of doing theology out of his study of Anselm of Canterbury. In the Preface to the second edition of the Fides quaerens intellectum Barth comments as follows: "Only a few commentators, for example Hans Urs von Balthasar, have noted that my interest in Anselm was never a side-issue for me. On the contrary, whether my historical interpretation of the Saint was right or not, I took him very much to heart and absorbed him into my own line of thinking. Most commentators have completely failed to see that this Anselm book is a vital key, if not the key, to understanding the process of thought that has impressed me more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper for theology." [2] What is the vital key which Barth finds in his study of Anselm? That is the way to

1. By "the later Barth's theology" I mean the theology which Barth developed from the time when he published the first volume of the Church Dogmatics. Throughout this chapter I shall assume that the later Barth's theology is a coherent one (that is to say, it does not change in its basic intention and structure). Therefore, according to my assumption, there is no 'New Barth' or "New 'New Barth'" within the later Barth's theology. Compare Emil Brunner, "The New Barth, Observations on Karl Barth's Doctrine of Man," SJT, IV (1951): 124-35. On the opinion that Barth has a continuity in his later theology, see G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, p.10. See also Colm O'Grady, The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth, pp.43. And again John Thompson, Christ in Perspective in the Theology of Karl Barth, p.110. See also Robert T. Osborn, "A New 'New Barth'?", Interpretation, XVIII (1964), pp.62-95.

faith-knowledge. According to Barth's interpretation of Anselm, "faith is in its nature a call to cognitive understanding"[3]; so-called ratio fidei which is closely related to analogia fidei. [4] Therefore, the later Barth's theology which is based on an analogia fidei can be called "a theology of analogy" in contrast to the dialectical theology. [5]

What is important in relation to this present study is the fact that express reference to Kierkegaard is seldom made in the later Barth's theology. What is the reason for this? One of the reasons lies in the fact that Barth thinks of Kierkegaard as an existential philosopher. (Cf. CD I/2, p.728). What is characteristic of Kierkegaard, according to Barth, is his existential outlook and subjectivity. In an article which appeared in the Schweizerische Theologische Umschau for July, 1960, Barth regards Kierkegaard as the father of existentialist theology, and says that "it [Kierkegaard's existentialism] was possibly the last word of anthropocentric theology, the theology whose method derives from Descartes." [6] Barth's question, which he asked in his address given when he received the Sonning Prize, can be related to this evaluation of Kierkegaard: "Did not a new anthropocentric system announce itself in Kierkegaard's theoretical groundwork?" Barth seeks to substantiate this in the fact that the growth of modern existentialism stems from Kierkegaard: "The fact

2. Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides quaerens intellectum, trans. from the second edition (1958) by I.W. Robertson (London: SCM, 1960), p. 11. For the further discussion on Barth's debt to Anselm, see. CD II/1, pp.4, 92ff.; T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth, pp.182ff., 193ff.; Colin Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message (London: Tyndale Press, 1967), pp.47ff., 90ff. And see also Gordon Watson, "Karl Barth and St. Anselm's theological Programme," SJT, XXX(1977), pp.31-45.

3. Karl Barth, Anselm, pp.8f.

4. Ibid., p.46.

5. Cf. Hans Frei, op.cit., pp. 6, 193-200; Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, p. 47; Robert E. Wiles, The Ethics of Karl Barth, p.69; H.Zahrnt, The Question of God (London, 1969), pp.98ff.

6. Karl Barth, "Liberal Theology: Some alternatives," The Hibbert Journal, LIX (1960-1961), pp.213-214.

that a philosophy of existence, that Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre, could grow out of and base themselves on his work is understandable and legitimate, on the proviso that Kierkegaard wanted to be and was a Christian thinker in his own way." [1] Therefore, Barth tried to move beyond Kierkegaard's existential thinking because he believed Kierkegaard's thinking to be existential and too subjective. Hence, according to Barth's classification of the relation between Kierkegaard and theologians, Barth himself is "a theologian who also read Kierkegaard, and went through his school (ist durch seine Schule gegangen) --- but [who] passed through it (ist durch sie hindurchgegangen)."[2] The second reason why Barth moves away from Kierkegaard is because Barth thinks that there are some things that he has to learn in addition to what he has learnt from Kierkegaard. That is to say, Barth finds some deficiencies in Kierkegaard's theology, and tries to move beyond these. Such an attempt had already started in the Christian Dogmatics. In his Selbstdarstellung of 1964 Barth says as follows:

"I had to change my own learning a second time. I simply could not hold to the theoretical and practical diastasis between God and man on which I had insisted at the time of "Romans", without sacrificing it [diastasis] I had to understand Jesus Christ and bring him from the periphery of my thought into the center. Because I cannot regard subjectivity as being the truth, after a brief encounter I have had to move away from Kierkegaard again." [3]

But, as we have seen, this attempt to move beyond Kierkegaard in the Christian Dogmatics could be the reason why Barth has been misunderstood as existential. Hence, Barth pursues this attempt to move beyond Kierkegaard's existential thinking more thoroughly with the help of his study of Anselm.

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1. Karl Barth, "A Thank You and a Bow : Kierkegaard's Reveille," Canadian Journal of Theology, XI (1915), p.7.
 2. Cf. Karl Barth, "Kierkegaard and the theologians," Canadian Journal of Theology, XIII (1967), p. 65.
 3. Karl Barth, Selbstdarstellung (1964), cited in Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from letters and autobiographical texts, tran. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1976), p.173.

According to Barth, one cannot make a constructive (or, positive) statement about Jesus Christ (or, revelation) on the basis of Kierkegaard. Through his study of Anselm, Barth finds the way to make a constructive statement about revelation. Now Barth, in his own terms, is seeking to write "regular" as opposed to "irregular theology", that is, he is striving to be as complete as possible, to cover the whole ground regarding the range of concepts and themes of significance for church proclamation. (CD I/1, pp.316f.) Barth could not develop a theology which speaks of the positive character of the Gospel from Kierkegaard's thinking. And Kierkegaard, according to Barth, does not know that this gospel is the news from on high (or, from above). Moreover, Kierkegaard is too individualistic. These are Barth's negative evaluations of Kierkegaard. "His teaching," says Barth, "is, as he himself once said, 'a pinch of spice' for the food, not the food itself, which it is the task of right theology to offer to the church and thus to men. The Gospel is firstly the glad news of God's Yes to man. It is secondly the news which the congregation must pass on to the whole world. It is thirdly the news from on high. These are three aspects, in relation to which I had to do further study, after my meeting Kierkegaard in the school of other teachers." [1]

Therefore, the later Barth's theology, according to Barth himself, is a theology which moves away from Kierkegaard.

Up to now we have briefly considered the problem of how Barth thinks of the relation between his early theology and his later theology in their relation to Kierkegaard. Barth, as we have seen, thinks that in his later theology he moves away from Kierkegaard. This is the formal relation between Barth and Kierkegaard as Barth himself sees it. However, when we see the later Barth's theology in the background of his early theology, we find that the real relation between Barth and Kierkegaard is not the same as the formal relation of which

Barth himself thinks. In the last chapter, we have seen how different the early Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard are. When we turn our attention to the later Barth's theology, we find that Barth now tries to emphasize the historicity of revelation in contrast to his early theology. In other words, Barth now asserts that revelation happens in time and history; Barth now calls revelation an 'historical event.' [2] And, accordingly, Barth now emphasizes Incarnation; he speaks clearly of an 'the very God and very man.' There is no ambiguity in his assertion on the event of Incarnation in his later theology such as we find in the "Romans" (1922). [3] In these respects, we find a similarity or a closeness between the later Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard which we could not find in the early Barth's "Romans."

However, at this very point, the question is raised: What does Barth mean by historicity of revelation and the Incarnation? Is the real meaning which is behind the outer expressions of the later Barth's theology the same as the meaning behind Kierkegaard's usage of these expressions? These are the

1. Karl Barth, "A Thank You and a Bow," p. 7. Among these three, the first and the third points will be discussed in this study. The second point, that Kierkegaard is too individualistic, is not a problem which can be discussed in this study on Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation. However, Barth's second point is also not a right observation on Kierkegaard's thinking. For the discussion on the problem of whether Kierkegaard is too individualistic or not, see Michael Plekon, "Anthropological Contemplation: Kierkegaard and Modern Social Theory," Thought, VV (1980), pp.346-369; "From against to Ambivalence: Kierkegaard's Social and Theological Modernity Reconsidered," Dialog, XX (1981), pp.45-51; "Protest and Affirmation: The Late Kierkegaard on Christ, the Church, and Society," Quarterly review (1982), pp.43-77; "Prophetic Criticism, Incarnational Optimism: On Recovering the Late Kierkegaard," Religion, XIII (1983), pp.137-153; John W. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), esp. pp.3-46, 304-313; Bruce H. Kirmmse, "Kierkegaard's Politics: The Social Thought of Soren Kierkegaard in its Historical Context," unpublished Ph. D. thesis (University of California, 1977); Stanley R. Moore, "Religion as the True Humanism: Reflection on Kierkegaard's Social Philosophy," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVII (1969), pp.15-25. See also Paul Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence, pp.199-214.

2. Cf. esp. CD I/1, p.378ff.; I/2, pp.45-70; II/1 p.635ff.; III/1, pp.71-81, passim.

questions which we shall pursue in this chapter. In the following three sections, which consist of the main body of this chapter, therefore, we shall examine closely the later Barth's understanding of revelation in relation to that of Kierkegaard. So we shall take three points which they have in common in their understanding of revelation: (1) Incarnation as revelation, (2) the historicity of revelation and (3) the indirect form of revelation. In the following three sections of this chapter I shall discuss these respectively.

3. Cf. CD I/2, pp.1-12, passim. See also H.U.v. Balthasar, op.cit., pp.30-32, 100-108; J.A.Veith, "Revelation and Religion in the Theology of Karl Barth," SJT, XXIV (1971), p. 1. See again Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict: Nygren, Barth, Bultmann, tran. Eric H.Wahlstrom (London and Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1958), p.109.

As we have said above, in his later theology, Barth emphasizes Incarnation as revelation in contrast to his ambiguous way of speaking in the "Romans." It must be emphasized that, as far as the form of words which they use to speak of the Incarnation is concerned, the later Barth and Kierkegaard have an emphasis on Incarnation in common. In this respect, the later Barth's position is closer to Kierkegaard than his early position. Does this mean that the later Barth's understanding of the Incarnation is identical with or more or less similar to that of Kierkegaard? The task of this section is to find the right answer to this question. It will be clear that we cannot submit a positive answer to this question after finishing our discussion of this problem of the relation between their understandings of the Incarnation. We shall point out three ways in which the later Barth's understanding of the Incarnation is not the same as that of Kierkegaard. The first point is that we can find an Hegelian motive in the later Barth's understanding of the Incarnation. In a sense, Barth tries to interpret the Incarnation as the exaltation of humanity in general. The second point is that even though the later Barth emphasizes the Incarnation, Barth still tries to see the Incarnation in the light of the Resurrection. And the third point is that even though the later Barth emphasizes the freedom or the sovereignty of God in His revelation, Barth's way of describing Incarnation makes Incarnation a necessary event. In these three points, the later Barth's understanding of Incarnation is different from that of Kierkegaard. It is this theme which we shall substantiate in this section.

First, let us consider the later Barth's interpretation of the Incarnation as the exaltation of humanity in general. According to Barth, Incarnation consists of two elements which are related to the names of Jesus Christ: (1) 'the Son of God' and (2) 'the Son of Man.' [1] Incarnation consists in the

fact that the eternal Word of God (or, the Son of God) chose, sanctified and assumed human nature and existence into oneness with Himself, in order thus, as very God and very man, to become the Word of reconciliation spoken by God to man (cf. CD I/2, p.122). Therefore, the Incarnation is "the obedience of the Son of God" and "the exaltation of the Son of Man," or "the self-humiliation of God" and "the exaltation of Man." In this sense, Barth calls Jesus Christ "the Electing God" and "the Elected Man." (cf. CD II/2, pp.95ff., 116ff.; IV/2, p.32). What is interesting here is that, for Barth, the Incarnation is equated with the election of man and the reconciliation between God and man. Of course, there is a difference between the election and the reconciliation. The election takes place in eternity. It is the eternal election or "the eternal decree and will of God" (CD IV/2, p.35). But reconciliation happens in time; "As a history which took place in time, the true humanity of Jesus Christ is, therefore, the execution and revelation, not merely of a but the purpose of the will of God" (CD IV/2, p.31). In this sense, Incarnation and Reconciliation are the actuality of the Work of God. However, Election and Incarnation are the same thing, for the Incarnation is the fulfilment of the Election. In this sense, for Barth, Election is not different from Incarnation and Reconciliation.[2] In fact, in his doctrine of reconciliation (Vol.IV in the Church Dogmatics), Barth primarily deals with the unity of Christ's deity and humanity and relates this unity of deity and humanity in Christ to the reconciliation between God and men. In this sense, Barth is christological in every part of his Dogmatics. So we can start our discussion of Barth's

1. Barth clearly distinguishes the deity and the humanity of Jesus Christ. Therefore, according to Barth, the man Jesus is not a second God. Barth says: "He is not eternal as God is. He is only the creature of God But as this creature he is before all things" (CD IV/2, p.33.). See also IV/2, pp.77-88 in which Barth attacks the Lutheran notion of the divinization of the human nature. For Barth, the Son of God and the Son of Man cannot directly be identified. Cf. Dan L. Deegan, "The Christological Determinant in Barth's Doctrine of Creation," SJT, XIV (1961), pp.124f.

understanding of Incarnation with a discussion of the Election of God.

According to Barth, the Christian God is not God who is God for Himself, but God who from and to all eternity is the Electing God. "From all eternity," says Barth, "God posits His whole majesty in this particular relationship to this particular being over against Himself. God pledges and commits Himself to be the God of man" (CD II/2, p.177). But there is no one who elects and who can be elected without Jesus Christ, "Himself God and Himself man" (CD II/2, p.94). Who, then, is the Elector? Jesus Christ. Who, then, is the elected? Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is the electing God and the elected man. How can this be possible? Did we not say that, for the later Barth, Jesus Christ lived in a particular history? We shall discuss this problem in both the second and third sections of this chapter. What is important here is that Jesus Christ is the only agent who is connected with the election, for "there is no such thing as a will of God apart from the will of Jesus Christ" (CD II/2, p.115) and the men who are elect "are elect 'in him'[in Christ], in and with His own election" (*Ibid.*, p.117). Jesus Christ's election "is the original and all-inclusive election; the election which is absolutely unique, but which in this very uniqueness is universally meaningful and efficacious, because it is the election of Him who Himself elects" (CD II/2, p.117). Therefore, there are no other elections which are not in this election of Jesus Christ.[3] Hence the

2. Thus Barth calls Election the summa evangelii (CD II/2, p.3). In this sense Balthasar's observation that for Barth the doctrine of election is the cornerstone of Barth's theology is right: "The doctrine of election is the summa evangelii, the key to understanding God's whole Revelation in creation, reconciliation, and redemption..... Here we are at the cornerstone of Barth's whole theology. With it stands and falls the whole doctrine of God and the world, of creation and redemption, of man and divine providence" (*op.cit.*, pp.156-164). G.C. Berkouwer who emphasises the triumph of grace in the theology of Barth is making a similar point. Cf. G.C.Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. H.R.Boer (London: The Paternoster Press, 1956).

3. Cf. CD II/2, pp.50f, 94, 133, 163, 168, 170, 318f, 351ff.; IV/2, p.312.

election or the predestination is equivalent to the statement that "in the beginning with God was this One, Jesus Christ"(CD II/2, p.145).

But this Jesus Christ comes to history: "The eternal predestination is made manifest to us in that history of salvation (Heilsgeschichte)"(CD II/2, p.185). Barth tries to actualize the doctrine of the election of God.[1] According to Barth, there is no other way to understand God's predestination without actualistic understanding. What does Barth mean by actualistic understanding of the predestination (or the election)? It is the understanding which comprehends the person and work of Jesus Christ as an event, the history(Geschichte), encounter and decision between God and man.[2] Barth goes on to say: "God's electing and man's election; God's self-humiliation and man's exaltation by God; the self-giving as it is effected in the Son of God and the Son of Man Jesus Christ, and as it is made manifest in Him as the eternal divine decree; the history of salvation in which we can see and understand predestination itself: all these are an act, or they are not what they are"(CD II/2, p. 187, my emphasis). That is to say, if there is an election, it must be understood that it is accomplished and, at the same time, electing is going on even now. For, "we can think of Jesus Christ only as the

1. Not only in election but also in every part of his later theology Barth tries to present an 'actualistic' understanding. I shall use the term 'actualistic' as the adjectival form of 'Actualism' throughout this study. Balthasar, pointing out this trend of Barth's theology, says: "He ponders and probes the meaning of every thing from the view point of ultimate act and supremely concrete activity"(op.cit.,p. 165). In this sense, Hans Frei's observation that Barth changed his thought from the "Actualism" of the dialectical method to an analogical method cannot be sustained. Cf. Hans W. Frei, "Revelation and Theological Method in the Theology of Karl Barth," in Faith and Ethics, ed. Paul Ramsey (New York:Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp.51f.

2. For further discussion of the Actualism of the later Barth's theology, see Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth, pp.vi, 205ff. and Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction, pp.32-37. See also Donald Bloesch, Jesus is Victor!: Karl Barth's Doctrine of Salvation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976), p. 154 n.24; and W.Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man(London: SCM, 1968). pp.341f..

living and eternal Lord of temporal life"(CD II/2, pp.187f.). And the election (or predestination) is nothing but Jesus Christ Himself.

The only way, then, to understand the election which is the basis of the Incarnation is to understand the Incarnation itself. What is the Incarnation? It is the fact that God becomes a man. What does this mean? It means that the Son of God is on the way into the far country in order to exalt the Son of Man. But, according to Barth, it is one event; the Son of God goes into the far country and the Son of Man, at the same time, comes home again. The existence of Jesus Christ means the humiliation of God and, at the same time, "the homecoming of the Son of Man"(CD IV/2, pp.20-153, the section 64 of CD). In a naive sense, this phrase means that the true humanity of Jesus Christ is with the true deity of Jesus Christ; that is to say, Jesus Christ is 'God man' and 'the Creator creature'(CD IV/2, p.37). However, Barth tries to interpret the meaning of this passage as follows: "(1) this One, God, the Son, became and is also man;(2) His existence became and is also the existence of a man; (3) divine and human essence were and are united by Him and in Him; and (4) --- our present goal --- He raised up human essence to essence in Himself and therefore as true God became and was also true man"(CD IV/2, p.44, my emphasis). We have to give our attention to the way in which Barth moves from the specific to the general. Do these four points mean that the humanity of Jesus Christ is exalted and, therefore, Jesus Christ is the God-man? In a sense, Barth answers this question affirmatively. Barth emphasizes that "this is His exaltation"(CD IV/2, p.69). "It [the humanity which is exalted] will be the humanity of God"(CD IV/2, p.72).[1]

1. Cf. CD IV/2, p.52: "Our older dogmatics was at one in the fact that the unio hypostatica must be distinguished even in the formal sense from all other higher or lower unifications and unions; that it is sui generis, and therefore to be understood only in terms of itself."

Is this, however, all that Barth wants to say? Here, we must remember that Barth tries to emphasize the character of Geschichte or the Christ-event.[1] As we shall see in the next section, according to Barth, the Christ-event as Geschichte has the following characteristic: "Surely Jesus Christ does not exist only in the abstract succession of two 'states' Jesus Christ is already exalted in His humiliation and humiliated in His exaltation [And as He was] He is and He will be"(CD IV/2, p.110). The Geschichte of Jesus Christ, therefore, "is our history of salvation (unsere Heilsgeschichte) which changes the whole human situation"(CD IV/2, p.51). Accordingly, the exalted humanity in Incarnation is our humanity. "In Him [Jesus Christ], in this man, we have to do with the exaltation of the essence common to all men"(CD IV/2, p.69). So reconciliation between God and man happens in Him. In Christ all men are objectively justified, sanctified and called(CD IV/1, p. 163).[2]

Therefore, according to Barth, the exaltation of the Son of Man in the event of Incarnation is not basically different from the exaltation of man.[3] "The exaltation of man," says Barth, "which in defiance of his reluctance has been achieved in the death and declared in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, is

1.Cf.Karl Barth, "Humanity of God," in God, Grace and Gospel, p.38: "What we have in Him [Jesus Christ] is the history [Geschichte], the dialogue, in which God and man meet and are together."

2. In this sense, Barth says that the Humanity of God is an event. Cf. "The Humanity of God," in God, Grace and Gospel, p.46: "The Humanity of God, just because it is an event, is not to be fixed in a picture Its outer presupposition and motive consists in the fact that this intercourse between God and man concerns all men."

3. Cf.CD II/2, p. 118; Karl Barth, Der Goetze Wackelt (1947), p.119: "The Incarnation of Christ is the great glorification of man. In it, every man is ennobled in principle." (cited in Heinz Zahrnt, The Question of God, p.103); John Thompson, Christ in Perspective in the Theology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1978), pp.105f.: "Since God has become man in Jesus Christ and so exalted man to his side no one can be alone or without Him." In fact, the decree of Incarnation, the election itself has such a meaning. Cf. CD II/2, pp.162f.: ".... in the election of Jesus Christ God has ascribed to man election, salvation and life; and to Himself He has ascribed reprobation, perdition and death."

as such the creation of his new form of existence as the faithful covenant-partner of God"(CD IV/2, p.499).[1] In fact, Barth uses the term "the Son of God" to develop his doctrine of reconciliation and to show that in Christ the reconciliation has already happened once-for-all.[2]

In the first part of the 'Homecoming of the Son of Man', Barth defines reconciliation as follows: "In its literal and original sense the word apokatallasssein ('to reconcile') means 'to exchange.' reconstitution and renewal of the covenant between God and man consists in this exchange ---- the exinanitio, the abasement, of God, and the exaltatio, the exaltation of man. It was God who went into the far country, and it is man who returns home'(CD IV/2, p. 21). Therefore, according to Barth, "there is no one who does not participate in Him [Jesus Christ] in this turning to God. There is no one who is not raised and exalted with Him to true humanity"(CD IV/2, p.271). For, in Christ, or (more specifically speaking) in the Incarnation, the exaltation of man has already happened.[3] Hence, "even sinful man is seen together with the man Jesus, which means that in the man Jesus even sinful man is confronted by the One in whom the divine decision has been made concerning him, in whom there is already resolved and accomplished his deliverance from sin, his elevation, his restoration as a true covenant-partner of God. In other words, there is no

1. For Barth's concept of covenant, see CD III/1, pp.42-129; IV/1, PP.59ff. See also J.C.Scott, "The Covenant in the Theology of Karl Barth," SJT, XVII (1964), pp.182-198. According to Barth, there is only one covenant between God and man: the covenant of grace which is the internal basis of creation. Cf. also Donald Bloesch, op.cit., p.60. Hence, for Barth, the covenant-breaking has no meaning. For a similar observation, see Colin Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message, pp.114ff.

2. However, in the New Testament, "the Son of Man" does not mean a man or humanity. Rather, this term (or name) is used as an eschatological or Messianic Name. Cf. Geerhardus Vos, The Self-disclosure of Jesus (Grand Rapids:Eerdmans, 1978, third edition); Seyoon Kim, The Origin of Paul's Gospel (Tuebingen:J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1981), pp.239-252. And see also Maurice Casey, Son of Man: The Interpretation and Influence of Daniel 7 (London:SPCK, 1979), esp. pp.142-223.

Jesus existing exclusively for Himself, and there is no sinful man who is not affected and determined with and by His existence"(CD IV/2, p. 281). What remains is to affirm noetically what is ontic in Christ. As far as the ontic state is concerned, all men are reconciled in Christ; and there is no difference between the believer and the unbeliever. Barth concludes as follows:

"The point at issue is not that we have still to achieve, or even repeat, our reconciliation with God and therefore our exaltation as true man. The truth is --- and this is the love of God the Father and the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ --- that these have taken place and are proffered to us in Him, and in Him once-for-all. ... In Him we have both our justification and sanctification, both our regeneration and conversion. All this has been done and is in force. It does not need to be repeated or augmented. It is true and actual."(CD IV/2, p.369).

Barth can speak of the Incarnation in this way because of his special understanding of the doctrine of the Incarnation, that is his actualistic understanding of the Incarnation. What does Barth mean by the actualization of the doctrine of the Incarnation? Let us take one example of this actualistic understanding. Barth says:

"Surely Jesus Christ does not exist only in the abstract succession of two 'states.' Does not everything depend on the inner-connection: that the exaltation of the Son of Man begins and is completed already in and with the happening of the humiliation of the Son of God; and conversely that the exaltation of the Son of Man includes in itself the humiliation of the Son of God, so that Jesus Christ is already exalted in His humiliation and humiliated in His exaltation? Is it not the case, then, that His being in the unity of God and man is this history in its inter-connection? If we are speaking in any respect of this history, can we really abstract from

3. Cf. CD IV/2, p.49: "In Jesus Christ not only one man but rather the humanity of all men as such has been exalted and placed in unity with God." See also IV/1, p.131: "In Him [Christ] humanity is exalted humanity And humanity is exalted in Him by the humiliation of Godhead." See again Robert E. Willis, op. cit., p.71: "In Jesus Christ, humanity as such and totality is reconciled and sanctified."; J.A. Veith, op. cit., p.16: "What Barth means by the 'humanity' of Jesus is our redeemed humanity." And also Donald Bloesch, op. cit., pp. 121 and Hans Kueng, Justification: The Doctrine of Karl Barth and a Catholic Reflection (London: Burns and Oates, 1964), p.17.

But it (incarnation) is also an ever-occurring event. Cf. Colm O'Grady, The Church in Catholic Theology: Dialogue with Karl Barth, pp.64f.: "Incarnation is always a being which does not cease to be a becoming ... He [Christ] becomes ever more and more incarnate Christ's being and work consists in a continual descending of a divine act and in a continually corresponding ascending of a human act."

the literal sense of the two concepts? Do we really see and understand Him concretely if we do not see Him in this twofold movement, and at the same time in both the one movement and the other, so that there can be no question of a halt and therefore of a 'state'? We ask again: How could He be the living Jesus Christ if He were not the One He is in this movement?"(CD IV/2 p. 110).

Barth's understanding of Incarnation, as this quotation shows, is very dynamic and supra-historical. For Barth, there is no temporal succession of the humiliation of Christ and the exaltation of Christ. Incarnation itself means the exaltation of man and the humiliation of God.[1] Incarnation, therefore, is the union of God and man. And this Incarnation, the Christ-event, as the Geschichte of the once-for-all, takes place today and will happen tomorrow as well. For, according to Barth, the "once-for-all" does not have a static character such that if one event happened once upon a time as the "once-for-all", the event would pass on its effect to all generations. On the contrary, the "once-for-all", for Barth, means that if one event happened once as the "once-for-all," it has to happen continually. If there and then the humiliation of God and the exaltation of man happened as the "once-for-all," this event has to happen in every moment.[2]

According to such an actualistic understanding, there is no difference

1. Pannenberg, mentioning Barth's actualistic understanding of Christ's two natures and two states, comments as follows: "By combining these two themes, Barth comes closer to the basic outline of the Gnostic redeemer myth than is necessarily characteristic of an incarnational Christology that is constructed 'from above to below': The descent of the redeemer from heaven and his return there."(Jesus-God and Man (London:SCM, 1968), pp.33f.

2. Cf. H.U.v.Balthasar, op.cit., pp.293f.: "He [God] himself was the happening that Christ could bear witness to as prophet and teacher It [the theme of the Church Dogmatics] is still the story of God's salvific activity in the world through the human Jesus Christ, as activity that is only in so far as it is a happening. Barth described this happening as the "in-oneness" of two realities: the Lord's descent as a servant and the servant's ascent to the Lord." Balthasar's understanding which tries to interpret incarnation as Christ-happening fits well to Barth's intention, for, according to Barth, incarnation is an ever-happening event. O'Grady also observes this. Cf. Colm O'Grady, The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth, p.156. See also his The Church in the Catholic Theology, pp.64f.

between the person and work of Christ: "His work itself is one with His active person, and therefore He the doer and His deed are indissolubly one"(CD III/2, p.61). In this sense, the Incarnation is already the reconciliation. And what has happened in Christ is also happening even at this time. If there was the exaltation of the Son of Man in Christ, the exaltation of man happens even now.[1]

As a result, as Rosato points out, there exists "an ontological connection, totally independent of man's noetic understanding of it, between Christ and humanity in general, or between God and man." [2] If this is not the case, Christ-history as Geschichte has no meaning for Barth. In this sense, for Barth, the Incarnation is the exaltation of humanity in general. But this does not mean that it [the Incarnation] is a realization of an immanent possibility. Nevertheless, we can find an Hegelian motive in Barth's actualistic understanding of the Incarnation. Of course, this does not mean that Barth's understanding of the Incarnation is identical with that of Hegel. However, Barth's actualistic understanding of Incarnation makes him admit the principle that in the Incarnation the unity of God and humanity can be found. For, according to Barth, the person and work of Christ are identical. Of course, Barth asserts that there is a difference between Christ and other ordinary men. Nevertheless, even today the Christ-event happens and that is the exaltation of humanity.[3]

At this point we find a difference between Barth and Kierkegaard in their

1. Cf. CD IV/1, p.313: "Christ who was once obedient to the Father and offered Himself and reconciled the world with God is in eternity and therefore today. ... He not only went the way from Jordan to Golgotha, but He still goes it, again and again."

2. Philip J. Rosato, The Spirit as Lord: The Pneumatology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1981), p.123. This book was originally written as a doctoral dissertation at Tuebingen. His main thesis is that for Barth the Holy Spirit is God's noetic realization of the ontological relationship between Christ and all men.

understanding of the Incarnation. Of course, even for Kierkegaard, as we shall see in chapter III, reconciliation or redemption is only possible because of the Incarnation. But, for Kierkegaard, the Incarnation itself is not reconciliation. God became an individual man to be the Revealer and Redeemer of sinful man. But, there is, for Kierkegaard, no equation of the person and work of Christ. For Kierkegaard, there is no way to find the exaltation of humanity in the Incarnation. On the contrary, Incarnation is only the condescending of God Himself. And, even though Kierkegaard knows and believes in the exaltation of Christ, he does not relate this exaltation of Christ to the exaltation of humanity in general. Moreover, he does not see the humiliation and the exaltation of Christ as one movement. There is the period in which Christ is in his humiliation and another period in which Christ is in his exaltation. Kierkegaard sees a temporal succession (or, temporal connection) of the humiliation and the exaltation of Christ. And for Kierkegaard, the exaltation of Christ is an event which is related to Christ Himself; that does not mean the exaltation of humanity. On the contrary, we have to see Christ in his humiliation. That is to say, even though Kierkegaard emphasizes the contemporaneousness of Christ, he does not, if we may use a Barthian term, actualize Christ-history. What we find at this point is that these differences come from Barth's actualization of the doctrine of the Incarnation which is

3. Therefore, for Barth, as J.D. Bettis quite rightly points out, "the only vocation for theology is the understanding of human existence. [For instance], one of the implications of the Incarnation is that there is no difference between understanding what men are really like and understanding what God is really like When one has understood what is meant to be truly human, he has understood all there is to understand." Joshep Dabney Bettis, "Theology in Public Debate: Barth's Rejection of Natural Theology and the Hermeneutical Problem," *SJT*, XXII (1969), p.369. Colin Brown also points this out: "Thus in view of divine and human nature in the Incarnation, Barth posits a union of God with mankind generally. For, as his teaching goes on to imply, Christ's human nature embraces all humanity. The history of this relationship is the primal history which underlies all history For Barth the election of the man Jesus means the election of all mankind." (*op.cit.*, p.102f.).

quite different from Kierkegaard's emphasis on the contemporaneousness of Jesus Christ.

This is closely related to our second point in this section. That is to say, for Barth, Incarnation is an event which is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection and the exaltation of Christ. Here, Barth sustains the point, which he had developed in the "Romans" (1922), namely that the Resurrection is the revelation. Barth starts to discuss this problem by asking: "How do we really know that Jesus Christ was and is and will be the eternal Word of God in our flesh, the Son of God who becomes and is also the Son of Man, in whom, therefore, our human essence is exalted to fellowship with God?" (CD, IV/2, p.118). Barth seeks to find the basis of the revelation of the fact and meaning of the Incarnation in the Resurrection and the ascension of Christ. That is, before the Resurrection there is no revelation of the fact and meaning of Christ-event. The Resurrection is "the revelation of God the true, original, typical form of the revelation of God in him [Christ]." (CD, IV/1, p.301, my emphasis).

Jesus Christ as Geschichte means "Jesus Christ as He reveals Himself in His Resurrection and ascension." (CD, IV/2, p.132). "The knowledge of it [Incarnation] becomes real to men only in virtue of a special unveiling through Jesus' Resurrection from the dead..." (CD, I/2, p.38). Therefore, even for the later Barth, the Resurrection is the revelation [1]; only in the light of the

1. See also Karl Barth, Credo, p.97. For a summary of Barth's emphasis on the Resurrection as revelation, see John Thompson, op.cit., pp.87-97 which is primarily based on Berthold Klappert, Die Auferweckung des Gekreuzigten. Der Ansatz der Christologie Karl Barths in Zusammenhang die Christologie der Gegenwart (Neukirchen, 1971), ss.291-327. See also Herbert Hartwell, op.cit., pp.97ff. and Charles T. Waldrop, Karl Barth's Christology: Its basic Alexandrian Character (Berlin, New York, and Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers, 1984), p.138. See again Jacques de Senarclens, Heirs of the Reformation, trans. G.W. Bromiley (London: SCM, 1963), p.183.

Resurrection can one speak of Christ-history. In other words, because of the Resurrection the life and death of Christ become the Christ-history. Hence, for Barth, the Resurrection is the kernel of the New Testament and, accordingly, of Barth's own theology. Barth says: "All New Testament recollections hang on the recollection of the Easter experience"(CD, I/2, p.114). And again: "The Easter story signifies the event which is the proper object of all other narratives and teachings in the New Testament."(CD, I/2, P.114. Cf. IV/2, p.134). Therefore,

"In a strict and proper sense this reality [of revelation], and so fulfilled time in the midst of the times, is the Easter story and the Easter message. It is the revelation of the Word of God, with which Holy Scripture and with it the proclamation of the Christian Church are connected. With it they stand and with it they fall. With it also all church dogmatics obviously stands and falls"(CD, I/2, p.122).

All of Barth's theological reflections also depend upon the Resurrection. "The objective reality of Revelation"[Jesus Christ] is also so called only in the light of the Resurrection.[2]

What is the Resurrection, then? This is a very important question for an understanding of Barth's understanding of revelation. What is important and interesting is that Barth now (in his later theology) emphasizes the historicity of the Resurrection and also, accordingly, the historicity of revelation. This point will be discussed in the second section of this chapter. Here we shall be concerned with the meaning of the Resurrection. As we have mentioned, for Barth, the Resurrection is the revelation;

"As His [Christ's] self-revelation, His Resurrection and ascension were simply a lifting of the veil. They were a step out of the hiddenness of His perfect being as Son of God and Son of Man, as Mediator and Reconciler, into the publicity of the world for the sake of those for whose reconciliation He was who He was and is who He is. His Resurrection and ascension were simply the authentic communication and proclamation of the perfect act of redemption once for all accomplished in His previous existence and history, of the Word of salvation once for all spoken in

2.Cf.CD, IV/2, p.142: "This [Resurrection] is the objective basis from which alone, by the witness of the Holy Spirit, all subjective knowledge of Jesus Christ can derive."

Him"(CD, IV/2, p.133).

That is to say, this revelation is the revelation of what has already taken place in the pre-Easter life and found fulfilment in His death on the cross.[3] But if there were no Resurrection, all of the past things would be in vain. In this sense, the Resurrection is the once-for-all and all self-sufficient event of revelation --- the event of His self-declaration. Now in His Resurrection He reveals Himself as the Lord.[4] "As such He is now accessible to human acceptance and thought. Yet He remains always the Lord even of this human capacity to think and receive"(CD, IV/2, p.147). So in the Resurrection the disciples are certain of the immediate presence of God; God is wholly present to men in the Resurrection of Christ. But in this presence He is the Lord. God reveals Himself as the Lord. That is to say, God is present in this presence in the manner of God"(CD, III/2, p.488). Since He reveals Himself as the Lord, He is also the Lord of time. As the Lord of time, He can enter into time, but He is not bound by time. So what happened in the Resurrection can happen at any time. Through the Resurrection the Christ-history becomes the once-for-all. That is to say, through His disclosure of Himself as the one who was before Easter-Day, He can disclose Himself to us as the one who is and who will be as He was before. But this disclosure cannot be understood as a static revelation. It must be understood as a dynamic revelation. This means that He becomes an actual event. So from now on Christ must be understood as an act, an event, or

3. However, for Barth, what takes place in the Pre-Easter life is not in History. Barth says: "The whole life and death of Jesus are undoubtedly interpreted in the light of His Resurrection"(Credo, p.96). And again: "All miracle stories have in their way, it seems to me, similar significance. They are signs of the coming Kingdom, manifestations of the free grace of God. But just in this character as signs that emerge, but that, far from becoming the rule, disappear again that, so to say, break into, yes, break through, the life of Jesus in the flesh --- all that belongs properly to the Easter story. They are rays of His Resurrection and Ascension"(Credo, p.75).

4. Cf. CD, IV/1, pp.301ff., IV/2, pp.141ff. and 298ff. And see also Karl Barth, The knowledge of God and the Service of God (London: Hodder, 1938), p.87f.

a Geschichte. Barth asks as follows: "How can that which God did in Jesus Christ yesterday not be His act today and tomorrow?" (CD, IV/2, p.111). The Resurrection reveals that He who lived and died, as the one who lived and died, is the Lord of time. His being as the one who lived and died is his eternal being, and therefore His present being today. "His history [Geschichte]," says Barth, "did not become dead history. It was history in His time to become as such eternal history --- the history of God with the men of all times, and therefore taking place here and now as it did there and then. He is the living Saviour" (CD, IV/1, pp.313f.). As Geschichte Christ is a "genuine present --- and not now in spite of it, but just because of it, a genuine past and future" (CD, I/2, p.52). This history is never "not yet" or "no longer."

Barth sees the life of Christ in the light of the Resurrection. So he confesses that he is very God and very man. For, looking backward from the Resurrection, it must be constantly remembered that Christ is the Lord of time. The life of Christ, therefore, must be seen in accordance with this conception and in the light of the Resurrection. In the light of this Resurrection, the years 1 - 30 AD are the time of the revelation and the fulfilled time. However, as we shall see in the next section, these years themselves are not the time of revelation. But, in the light of the Resurrection, Barth says that even the time of the Old Testament is the 'time of expectation.' For, if Christ is the Lord of time, as Barth sees in the Resurrection, He has to be even in the Old Testament time. The criterion of all things in revelation, therefore, is Christ-history which is in the Resurrection.[1] The Christ-event is self-explanatory. Here we find the reason why Barth tries to actualize the

1. Therefore, for Barth, the prophetic office of Christ is not in his earthly life, but after the Resurrection. And in this sense, the prophetic office of Christ is closely related to the works of the Holy Spirit. Cf. CD, IV/1, pp.110-134. See also Karl Barth's Table Talk, ed. John D. Godsey (London and Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1963), pp.17f.

doctrine of the Incarnation. The one whom Barth finds in the Resurrection is God who reveals Himself as the Lord, as the free God. And God, as the Lord, acts in the Resurrection. Therefore, for Barth, God is always God who acts. Thus, if the Incarnation is God's act, then it must have a dynamic structure. Hence the exaltation of the Son of Man is at the same time the humiliation of the Son of God. In this way Barth sees the Incarnation and the life of Christ in the light of the Resurrection. So we can say that the Easter-Event is the ontic foundation of the Christ-history. Because of the Resurrection the Christ-Event is the objective reality of revelation.

The fact that Kierkegaard has a different view of the relation between the Incarnation and the Resurrection has already been mentioned in the last chapter. Whereas Barth tries to understand the Incarnation in the light of the Resurrection, Kierkegaard tries to understand the Resurrection in the light of the Incarnation. According to Kierkegaard's logic, if a person believes that there is Incarnation, then it is natural to believe the fact of the Resurrection.[1] Of course, Kierkegaard thinks that Christ's miracles, His Resurrection from the dead, and His Ascension into heaven are the 'proofs' which the Scripture presents for Christ's divinity. But, these proofs have the same characteristic as the Incarnation. They must be believed. And faith in the divinity of Christ is the ground for believing all other things. This is the reason why Kierkegaard emphasizes the absolute Paradox, the existence of the God-man. What is important for Kierkegaard is not that there is nothing which can be known about the fact that Jesus asserts that He is God, but that we try not to accept this assertion and this historical fact of the God-man, which is given to us. However, for Barth, there was no revelation, in the restricted sense of the word, to the disciples of Jesus before the Resurrection of Christ;

1. Cf. Training in Christianity, p.29. See also Chapter III of this study.

and, therefore, there were no possibilities of offence before the Resurrection. Hence, whereas for Kierkegaard the existence of the God-man (or, His historical life) is the life of the Revealer, for Barth the existence of Jesus Christ becomes revelation only in the light of the Resurrection. This difference between Barth and Kierkegaard is similar to that which I have pointed out in the last chapter that Barth seeks revelation in the Resurrection in contrast to Kierkegaard who emphasizes the historical life of Jesus (Christ in his humiliation) as the revelation. For, even though he speaks of the doctrine of the Incarnation, Barth, as he had done in the "Romans"(1922), tries to understand Christ in the light of the Resurrection.

The third and last point, which shows the difference between Barth and Kierkegaard, is that Barth, unlike Kierkegaard, makes the Incarnation a necessary event. This is closely related to Barth's trinitarian understanding of revelation. The task we shall undertake is not that of pointing out that whereas Barth understands revelation in the context of the doctrine of Trinity, that is not the case in Kierkegaard. In a sense, Barth is more trinitarian in his understanding of revelation. But this does not mean that Kierkegaard is not a trinitarian theologian, but that he does not primarily use the trinitarian structure in his understanding of revelation. The question which we are going to treat here is whether Kierkegaard and Barth see Incarnation as a free act of God in a real sense. As we shall see in chapter III, for Kierkegaard it must be a free act of God. To defend this is one of the major aims of his writings, against Hegelian philosophy and theology. At first glance, it seems to be the case that Barth also emphasizes the character of the Incarnation as a free act of God. But when we consider his descriptions of the Incarnation in his later theology, we find that we cannot submit an affirmative answer to the question as to whether he sees the Incarnation as a free act of God in a real sense. We

shall consider (1) the relation between the inner-life of the triune God and the Incarnation and (2) the relation between the Incarnation and the Creation of this world. Through this consideration of these two relations, we shall show that, for Barth, the Incarnation is a necessary act of God. Before considering these relations, it will be good to consider briefly Barth's trinitarian understanding of revelation.

The only way to know God is by the revelation of God; we do not know and we cannot know God before His revelation. Therefore, if we come to know that God is the triune God, that means that God has revealed Himself as the triune God. For "God is known through God and through God alone"(CD II/1, p.44). However, even this statement is not enough for Barth. According to Barth, God not only reveals Himself, but also, as the God who reveals Himself, is the one who is in His revelation. That is to say, God and His revelation are identical in His revelation; God is the one who is in revelation. Barth says: "Revelation is nothing less than God Himself." [1] Hence we must ask who is God in His revelation. According to Barth, this question is the only valid question about God. Barth answers: "God reveals Himself as the Lord"(CD, I/1, p.351,

1. Karl Barth, God in Action, trans. E.G. Homrighausen and Karl J. Ernst (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1936), p.12. Barth's argument can be summarized, as Colin E. Gunton does well, as follows: "Barth is referring to revelation as something that happens; not to subjective experiences but to events that are God, and specifically the events that come to expression in the story of the life, death, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Because this revelation is where God happens among men, it is impossible to distinguish between God's Word and God Himself, between what God does and what he is. There is no other reality lying behind it; it is God himself." (Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.129. See also Peter Monsma, op.cit., pp.115f., 131.

The following comment of G.C. Berkouwer also helps us to understand Barth's argument: "His [God's] being is revealed in His Action. It is precisely God's being, who He really is, that is revealed to us at the point of His dealings with us as Lord and Saviour. If we do not meet Him here, we will meet Him nowhere. God is, not as an abstract quality of being, but in the act of His revelation, in His Work. He is.... the living God, pure in act in the actuality of His work and revelation" (op.cit., p.191).

passim). What does this statement mean? Barth says as follows:

"To be Lord means to be what God in His revelation is towards man. To act as Lord means to act as God in His revelation acts on man. Lordship is present in revelation, just because its reality and truth are so utterly grounded in itself, because it need be actualised and legitimated in no other way than by the fact of its occurrence, because it is not in any relation to anything else but is revelation by its own agency, because it is the self-contained novum we spoke of. Lordship means freedom"(CD, I/1, p.352).

Hence, the statement that God reveals Himself as the Lord means that God freely reveals Himself as the God who is free. But this is not the only thing which we must understand in this statement. God, as God who is free, reveals Himself; God, as God who is free, reveals Himself through Himself; and God, as God who is free, reveals Himself. That is to say, God who reveals Himself is God who is able to reveal Himself; it is His property to distinguish Himself from Himself. "The Lordship which becomes visible in the Biblical revelation," says Barth, "consists in God's freedom to distinguish Himself from Himself, to become other than Himself, and yet to remain as He was: in fact more, to be the one God equal to Himself and to exist as the one sole God by the fact that He thus, so inconceivably deeply, distinguishes Himself from Himself, that He is not only God the Father, but also God the Son"(CD, I/1, pp.367f.). In a word, God who is in His revelation is God who is able to differentiate Himself from Himself. To be sure, God is one in Himself. But He is not alone. There is in Him a co-existence, co-inherence, and reciprocity. God in Himself is not just simple, but in the simplicity of His essence He is three-foldness --- the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[1]

Barth says:

"He [God] posits Himself, is posited by Himself, and confirms Himself in both respects, as His own origin and also in His own goal. He is in

1. Professor Wiles argues that this three-foldness in God gives rise to Barth's doctrine of Trinity. See M.F.Wiles, "Some Reflections on the Origin of the Trinity," Journal of Theological Studies, new series VIII (1957), pp.92-106.

Himself the One who loves eternally, the One who is eternally loved, and eternal love; and in this triunity He is the original and source of every I and Thou, of the I which is eternally from and to the Thou and therefore supremely I"(CD, III/2, p.218).

God is Himself, therefore, the One who is in the relation which relates Himself to Himself. Or, God is in Himself the one who is in love, who loves Himself through Himself. Hence, for Barth, the reality of God can be described as the Being of God in Act, as the One who loves, and in freedom.[1]

Hence, "the name of Father, Son, and Spirit means that God is the one God in a threefold repetition; and that in such a way, that this repetition itself is grounded in His Godhead; hence in such a way that it signifies no alteration in His Godhead; but also in such a way that only in this repetition is He the one God; in such a way that His Godhead stands and falls with the fact that in this repetition He is God; but also precisely for the reason that in each repetition He is the one God"(CD, I/1, p.402). That is to say, God as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit respectively is God in a specific way. So Barth wants to substitute the term 'three persons' for 'the three modes of being.' [2] The fact that God is in this three modes of being means that God is a self-moved being. Eberhard Juengel describes this characteristic of God's being in Barth as follows:

"The relational structuring of God's being constitutes God's being not in the sense of an independent impersonal structure in relation to this being; indeed the modes of God's being which are differentiated from one another are so related to each other that each mode of God's being becomes what it is only together with the two other modes of being. The relational structuring in God's being is the expression of varying "original relations" and "issues" of God's being. God's being as the being of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is thus a being in becoming. The doctrine of perichoresis and appropriation within the three modes of God's being differentiated from each other and united as "threefold" defines this knowledge: God's being is in becoming." [3]

In a word, God's being in Himself is a Being-in-act. Juengel's understanding of

1. Cf. CD, II/1, pp.263f., 339-83, 406-23.

2. Or, "three way of being". Cf. I/11, pp.412-416.

Barth's doctrine of the Trinity expresses clearly Barth's intention when he draws out his doctrine of the Trinity from the act of revelation. For Barth, there is no God who is not in Act.

What is important at this point is what this act of God is. We have already suggested that this act of God is the act of God's loving. In the original sense, this act of love is the one which is in God Himself. As we have seen, according to Barth, God is in Himself the One who loves Himself or the One who is able to differentiate Himself from Himself.[4]

The original love is God's love as such, the love of the Father, of the Son. And this loving is itself God who is in the act of love. God's loving is God's being, His essence and the nature of God. "God's act," says Barth, "is His loving"(CD, II/1, p.283, Cf. Ibid., p.351). Of course, Barth draws this fact out of God's revelation. But Barth emphasizes the priority of the act of God in Himself; God's being in itself is in act, in love, and in freedom. For

3. Eberhard Juengel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being is in Becoming, trans. Horton Harris (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academy Press, 1976), pp.63f. Colin E. Gunton also tries to understand Barth's doctrine of God as God the event-being or God in becoming based on the interpretation of Barth in E. Juengel (op.cit.) and R.W. Jenson (God after God: The God of the Past and the God of the Future, seen in the Work of Karl Barth (Indianapolis and New York, 1969)) in his doctoral dissertation for Oxford. Cf. Colin E. Gunton, op. cit., pp.127-185. Especially see p.167: "God's being is event, and therefore a becoming. He is what he does.... Incarnation is the movement of God into relation with the world Because this movement is God, there is no unmoved God behind or underlying it; rather it entails that God's being consists in a movement outwards to what is not God God is movement toward the other and this movement is expressed conceptually by the eternal relation of the Son to the Father in the Spirit. In its turn, this inner movement provides the ontological grounding for the outward movement we see to have happened in the life of Jesus." (my emphasis).

4. Cf. R.D. Williams, "Barth on the triune God," in Karl Barth: Studies of his Theological Method, ed., S.W. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p.181: "... there is in God, eternally, the capacity for this 'distance' or 'displacement', union with another even across the greatest gulf of contradiction and opposition. God's otherness to himself in his Word is the existence in him of response, mutuality, not simply a 'self-expression' of some sort. He is not, in short, a self."

Barth, the fact that God is as the triune God means that God does differentiate Himself to Himself, so that God loves Himself who is differentiated from Himself freely. There is no God who is not so. God as such reveals Himself to us.[1] What is revelation? As we have said several times the Incarnation which is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection is revelation. And in this revelation God is the one who is in this revelation. Barth states: "The God who reveals Himself is One in three of His own modes of existence, which consists in their mutual relationships, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In this way He is the Lord"(CD, I/1, p.400). And again: "The revelation of God, and therefore His being as Father, Son, and Spirit, is not an economy foreign to His essence, limited as it were from above or from within, so that we should have to inquire about the hidden Fourth, in order really to inquire about God" (CD, I/1, p.439). Therefore, God is the one who is in the act of this revelation. Without act, there is no God. This understanding comes from Christ, the God who assumes human form. But, according to Barth, "even in the form which He assumes by revealing Himself, God is free to reveal Himself or not to reveal Himself"(CD, I/1, p.369). Why? That is God's essence, God's nature, and God's freedom. Hence besides Christ there must be the Revealedness of God's revelation to us, if revelation is to have its effect (or, revelation would not be revelation). "Without this historical revealedness of God," says Barth, "revelation would not be revelation. God's revealedness makes it [revelation] a relationship between God and man, the effective meeting between God and man"(CD, I/1, p.381). But we must bear in mind that it is God's own revealedness; it cannot be a revealedness which is given to us. Therefore, even in this historical revealedness God is free. What does Barth mean by 'the historical

1. Cf. CD, II/1, p.275: "That He is God --- the Godhead of God --- consists in the fact that He loves, and it is the expression of His loving that he seeks and creates fellowship with us."; CD, II/1, p.283: "'God is' means 'God loves.'"; CD, IV/2, p.755: "The statements 'God is' and 'God loves' are synonymous."

revealedness'? Barth states:

"God's power to do what the Biblical witnesses ascribe to Him, not only to assume form [e.g., Christ], not only to remain free in this form, but in this form and this freedom of His to become the God of such and such men, Eternity in a moment, this is the third sense in which He is Lord in His revelation. We speak of revelation outside the Bible as well, and there is no reason for describing that as absolutely impossible ... God reveals Himself as the Spirit..."(CD, I/1, p.381).

Hence, the historical revealedness is the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in revelation there is the triune God, God the Father (Revealer), God the Son(Revelation), and God the Spirit(Revealedness). Thus revelation itself is God himself. The concrete form which makes this fact clear is Incarnation. And the one who became a man is God the Son. So revelation is "Dei loquentis persona"(the person of God speaking).(CD, I/1, p.349).

Now let us consider the relation, for Barth, of the Trinity and the Incarnation based on this discussion of Barth's trinitarian understanding of revelation. We have touched on this problem already in our discussion of Barth's trinitarian understanding of revelation. But our special concern here is the question of whether, for Barth, there is not a necessary relation between the Trinity and the Incarnation. If we accept Barth's expression of this problem at face value, then we must answer this question negatively. The Incarnation, according to Barth, took place in the divine freedom.(Cf. CD, I/2, pp. 135-137). Christ is the subject who acts. And there is no necessity which makes it [Incarnation] take place. Barth says:

"Its primary importance is to describe an act of God which, as it is freely resolved from eternity, is also freely executed in time. God did not owe it to man. He did not owe it even to the man Jesus. He did not owe it either in His eternal counsel or in its execution. He did not owe it even to Himself to an inner dialectic of His Godhead. Both in eternity and in time it was the act of His divine power and mercy as it is founded only in His freedom, in His free love to the world. Only in virtue of His free decision did it take place that as true God He willed to be and became and is true man as well It has no basis or possibility, and certainly no necessity, apart from His gracious good-pleasure"(CD, IV/2, p.41).

According to this quotation, there is no necessity for the Incarnation except God's gracious good-pleasure, God's free love, and His free decision. And even after the event of the Incarnation, as we have seen, God is free to reveal Himself or not to reveal Himself. That is to say, God's presence is always God's decision to be present(CD, I/1, p.369). Hence, there are some scholars who affirm that according to Barth, there is no necessity for the Incarnation.[1]

However, we have to consider some problems at this point. Is it possible that God is not the "God-for-us"? Is there any possibility that God would not reveal Himself as "God-for-us" or, as God in act? If we can find any affirmative answer in Barth's writings, then we must say that for Barth there is no necessary relation between the Trinity and the Incarnation. However, if we cannot find any affirmative answer in Barth's writings, we have to say that for Barth there is a necessary relation between the Trinity and the Incarnation. Which is Barth's position?

What is interesting here is that Barth always equates Christ with the Son of God in the sense of God the Son (or, the Word of God).[2] For example, Barth says as follows: "As this Word, which God Himself thinks or speaks eternally by Himself, the content of which, therefore, can be naught other than God Himself ---Jesus Christ, as the second mode of God's existence in God Himself"(CD, I/1, p.499). And again: "He [Christ] is God's Word, God's decree and God's

1. Cf. especially John Thompson, op.cit., pp.25ff.

2. For Barth, "the Word of God" and "the Son of God" are interchangeable names which have no differentiation (Cf. CD I/1, p.155, I/2, p.13, IV/2, pp.95,97,101), in contrast to the following observation of Balthasar: "It becomes clear that God's Word is not the most comprehensive designation for the nature and content of revelation. Word is only one designation for the Son, and it is the Son Himself in whom God has chosen to bind all things together in heaven and on earth."(op.cit., p.100). Charles Waldrop also argues that for Barth, there is no difference between these names. See, Karl Barth's Christology, pp.40-41, 141-145, 217. n.56.

beginning"(CD, II/2, p.95). Barth does not differentiate between the 'Logos' and Christ.(Cf. CD, II/2, pp.95-99). The second person of the Trinity is always the Logos ensarkos; there is no moment (even in eternity) in which God the Son is the Logos asarkos. [3] Barth asks as follows:

"In respect of the whole attitude and being of God ad extra, in His relationship with the order created by Him, can there be anything higher or more distinctive and essential in God than His electing? Must we not say that in His confrontation of the creature, in His relationship with everything which is outside Himself, God is God absolutely in the fact that from all eternity He elects, He decides one way or the other concerning the being and nature of the creature (with all that this involves)? And if so, how are we to distinguish God's electing from His Word and decree in the beginning? Are we not forced to say that the electing consists in this Word and decree in the beginning; and conversely, that this Word and decree in the beginning are God's electing, His free, subjective self-determination, the primal act of lordship over everything else, independently of all outward constraint, conditioning or compulsion? And if we agree in this with the exponents of the construction referred to, we must ask further whether we can agree in saying that God's Word and decree in the beginning consists in the fact that He has assumed and bears the name of Jesus Christ, that this name itself is God's Word and decree in the beginning"(CD, II/2, p.100).

On the basis of this quotation, we must ask of Barth: If that is the case, is there no difference between the generation of the Son of God from God the Father and God's election? What is Barth's answer to this question? To find Barth's answer, it will be good to look at Barth's exegesis of John 1: 1-2.[4]

"In the beginning was the Word." ---- According to Barth, the meaning of this phrase is that the Word as such is before and above all created realities; it stands completely outside the series of created things; it precedes all being and all time.

3. Cf. CD III/1, p.54, IV/1, pp.52f.,66. See also Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.49: "In the eternal decree of God, Christ is God and man. Do not ever think of the second person of the Trinity as only Logos. That is the mistake of Emil Brunner." For a discussion of this problem, see Charles Waldrop, Karl Barth's Christology, pp.46-48,91.

4. Cf. CD, II/2, pp.95-99; I/1, pp.484-512. T.H.Parker, in his essay in Studies in the Fourth Gospel, ed. F.I.Cross (London: Mowbray, 1957), shows the extent to which the Johannine writings have shaped Barth's mature theology.

"It is like God Himself." ---- To explain this phrase, Barth quotes one passage from an old creed: "There was no time when it was not." (CD, II/2, p.95). According to Barth's explanation of this passage: "This Word was in the beginning and at the beginning of all that which being created by Him, is distinct from God" (Ibid., p.95).

"And the Word was with God." ---The pros, says Barth, must be understood quite plainly and simply to mean this: That He could be in the beginning who was with God, who is beyond all created reality, because He belongs to God, because His being is as the being of God Himself.

"And the Word was God." --- Barth speaks of this phrase as follows: The Word was itself God; it participated absolutely in the divine mode of being, in the divine being itself. Hence Barth tries to interpret this passage as the teaching of homousion. After finishing his exegesis of this passage, Barth asks: "But who or what is the Word whose predicative are declared in Jn. 1:1?"

"In Jn.1:1 the reference is very clear: ho logos is unmistakably substituted for Jesus."---This is Barth's answer to his own question. In the last analysis, what Barth tries to say is that the Word is the monogenes theos, who was in the bosom of the Father; and as such the Word has made known to us the unknown God. At the end of this exegesis, Barth concludes: "Over against all that is really outside God, Jesus Christ is the eternal will of God, the eternal decree of God and the eternal beginning of God" (CD, II/2, p.99).

Two interpretations of this passage are possible. The first one is that God the Son became the decree of God, when God started to act ad extra. Barth suggests the possibility of such an interpretation, for he emphasizes the difference between God's act ad intra and God's act ad extra. However, it is impossible, it seems to me, to interpret Barth saying that there is a temporal

difference between these two acts of God. This point is clearer when we consider the second interpretation which I shall try to defend here.

The second interpretation is that for Barth, God the Son is already God's thinking and God's speaking even in God Himself. If God thinks something, or if God is the thinking God, then He is already the triune God. Therefore, the inner-life of the Trinity must be expressed outwardly, for He has already thought something, and God's thinking is nothing but Jesus Christ. That is to say, if God exists as the triune God, the Incarnation becomes a necessary one, for God's thinking, the second mode of God's being, is the logos ensarkos from eternity.

Therefore, according to the second interpretation, for Barth there is no difference between the eternal generation of God the Son from God the Father and God's election.[1] For Barth always equates the Son (monogenes theos) to Jesus Christ who is the decree of God (and therefore the election of God).[2] This equation appears not only in this part of the Church Dogmatics. We can find this equation throughout all of Barth's later theology. For example, in the first volume of the Church Dogmatics, Barth calls Jesus Christ the "Son of God" or the "Word of God," when he discusses the second person of the Trinity:

"Who is the Son of God? We have heard the preliminary answer: Jesus Christ is the Son of God who has come to us or as the Word of God spoken to us He does not first become God's Son and Word in the event of revelation Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God Himself, as God his Father is God Himself" (CD, I/1, p.474).

What is important at this point is that Barth does not say that the Son of God

1. Cf. Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.52: "From eternity the Son (as God and man) exists in God." See also CD IV/2, p.94.

2. For a similar interpretation of this problem, see Charles T. Waldrop, Karl Barth's Christology, pp.93f.: "The Son of God, Jesus Christ, is the act of God, the first product of God which is at the same time fully identical with God His [God's] life is the act by which he knows and loves himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit; it is his act in Christ."

as such becomes the Word of God or Christ in eternity. On the contrary, the Son of God is the Word of God, and He is Jesus Christ in eternity.[1]

The Word is spoken by God the Father, not made. Therefore, the Word is the eternal Word of the Father who speaks from all eternity or the eternal thought of the Father who thinks from all eternity. The Word is the one in which God thinks Himself or expresses Himself by Himself.

"As this Word, which God Himself thinks or speaks eternally by Himself, the content of which, therefore, can be naught other than God Himself ---Jesus Christ, as the second mode of God's existence, is God Himself"(CD, I/1, p.499).

Then, in so far as Jesus Christ is the Word of God, there is no difference between God's decision (and God's election) and the eternal generation of the Son of God.[2]

For Jesus Christ, as the Word of God, is "the eternal will of God, the eternal decree of God, and the eternal beginning of God"(CD, II/2, p.99). For Barth, there is no moment in which the Son of God is not Jesus Christ.[3] God's being as act or God's being as the Trinity implies the existence of the Word of God or Jesus Christ. Hence, there is no moment even in eternity (if we can differentiate between the moments in eternity) in which there was no election in Jesus Christ. It is not the case that first of all God the Son is, and then there is the election of God. Of course, the election of God is not at the beginning of God, for God has indeed no beginning. But if there is no moment in which God is not the triune God, there can be no moment in which there is no

1. Cf. R.D. Williams, op.cit., p.177: "The place of Christ before the Father, is not an after-thought in the being of God, but eternally in the identity of God."

2. Cf. "He [God] is eternally liable to elect, tending or intending to elect Eternally and in himself he meets and contains and overcomes the possibility of negation." (Ibid., p.180).

3. Cf. CD, II/2, p.121: "God's first thought and decree consists in the fact that in His Son He makes the being of this other His own being, that He allows the Son of Man Jesus to be called and actually to be His own Son."

election of God. For, the second mode of God's being is God's thought and God's election. For Barth, to say that there is the election or the choice of God is identical with saying that there is Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and the Word of God.[1]

The sphere in which God's election is, is the "sphere where God is with Himself, the sphere of His free will and pleasure. And this sphere is His eternity, which gives to the world and time and all that is in them their origin, their direction and their destiny"(CD, II/2, p.200).[2] In this sense, Barth holds a Supralapsarian position. For Barth sees the election of God only in Jesus Christ who is God the Son. Therefore, for Barth, election is closely related to the inner-life of the triune God. As Hartwell points out, according to Barth, "the Christian God is this God [the Electing God] or He is not God at all." [3]

What about, then, the relation between the Incarnation and the inner-life of the triune God? As we have seen, Barth emphasizes that the Incarnation is an act of free grace of God. But we have to realize that the Incarnation is the fulfilment of God's decision and God's election. According to Barth, the only basis or ground of the Incarnation is God's decree which God Himself resolves in eternity. Moreover, God's decree is not different from the existence of the Son of God, and therefore it is closely related to the inner-life of God.[4] Of

1. Cf. Juergen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: the Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 1981), p.143: "Barth's phrase about 'God in Christ' can in trinitarian terms only mean: the Father in the Son. But in the reflection logic of the absolute subject, the Son is nothing other than the self of the divine 'I', the counterpart, the other, in whom God contemplates Himself, finds Himself, becomes conscious of Himself and manifests himself."

2. In this sense, we can say, as G.C. Berkouwer does, as follows: "His [Barth's] conception leaves the impression that everything has already been done, all the decisions have been taken, so that one can hardly say that the historical fall and the historical reconciliation are at issue, but only the revelation of the definite Yes of God's Grace." (op.cit., p.250).

course, Barth says that the Incarnation rests on the freedom of God; it is an act of free grace. The only motive for this event is God's love, God's own good-pleasure. But we must consider the problem of whether God could do otherwise in the theology of Barth. I want to quote one passage from Barth's discussion of this problem:

"It [incarnation] is His free decision and act to be "God our Saviour" and the Friend of man. But in this decision and act, in this self-determination to be our Saviour and Friend, we have an eternal presupposition of His creative work and therefore of all creatures. The One who came with the Incarnation of His Word could not be other than He was. In His majesty and freedom God willed from all eternity to be for men "God our Saviour." The covenant fulfilled in time is a covenant resolved and established in God Himself before all time. There was no time when God was not the Covenant-partner of man. What appeared, therefore, in the epiphany of the man Jesus was not an accidental manner or disposition of this man, a moral disposition of this creature, but the xrestotes(kindness) of the Creator, which is identical with His philanthropia(love). This is the inner necessity with which Jesus is at one and the same time both for God and for man"(CD, III/2, p.218).

Does this quotation mean that the only reason for Incarnation is God's free love? Yes. Why not? But we must remember the character of the inner life of the triune God. To be sure, God is One in Himself. But He is not alone. There is in Him a co-existence, co-inherence and reciprocity, as we have seen. God is only as God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. God in Himself is not only simple, but in the simplicity of His essence, He is threefold. He posits Himself, is posited Himself, and confirms Himself. Or, He is in Himself the One who loves eternally, the One who is eternally loved, and eternal love. This is the relationship in the inner life of the triune God. Yet the One who is posited by Himself in the inner divine being is none other than the Word of God, the decree of God. Barth does not know a God who has no Word; God in Himself is the One who speaks, the One who is spoken (Word), and the One who is the

3. Herbert Hartwell, op.cit., p.105.

4. CD, II/2, p.76: "... in Himself, in the primal and basic decision in which He wills to be and actually is God God is none other than the One who is in His Son or Word elects Himself, and in and with Himself elects His people."

spokenness. And, according to Barth, the revelation which is introduced by the Incarnation is the reiteration of the relation which is in the inner-life of the triune God. "God repeats in this relationship ad extra," says Barth, "a relationship proper to himself in His inner divine essence. Entering into this relationship, He makes a copy of Himself. Even in his inner divine being there is this relationship"(CD, III/2, p.218). Rosato summarizes Barth's argument as follows:

"As the Father is related from eternity to the Son through the Spirit, so He is related in the course of time to man through the Spirit. This correspondence is most perfectly reflected in the man Jesus in whom the inner divine relationship of the Father and the Son through the Spirit realizes a matchless copy of itself in the creaturely world. The primary instance of the analogia relationis, and therefore, of the imago Dei, is for Barth the christological one, in which the union of the Father and the Son becomes a temporal reality in the man Jesus."[1]

Now we can ask one question: Is there no necessary relation between the inner life of the triune God and the Incarnation? Is there any possibility that God does not repeat the relation which He is in Himself? Even though Barth sometimes says that there are other possibility[2], we does not answer this question affirmatively. For even though Barth speaks of God's freedom, God's freedom is that which is in His act of Incarnation.[3] God himself is the One who acts. Of course, God's act is the act of loving and the act of freedom. However, He must act, if He is God. There is no possibility that God should not act. Barth says:

"In the same freedom and love in which God is not alone in Himself but is the eternal begetter of the Son, who is the eternally begotten of the Father, He also turns as Creator ad extra in order that absolutely and outwardly He may not be alone but the One who loves in freedom. In other words, as God in Himself is neither deaf nor dumb but speaks and hears His Word from all eternity, so outside His eternity He does not wish to be

1. Philip J. Rosato, op.cit., p.102.

2. Cf. e.g., CD I/1, p.450, II/2, pp.10, 166, IV/2 p.346.

3. Cf. CD II/1, p.320: ".... the freedom of God consists in His Son Jesus Christ." For a similar interpretation of this problem, see Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, pp.53f.: "Where his self, his truth and goodness is concerned, God by no means has the choice between mutually exclusive possibilities. For he cannot deny himself."

without hearing or echo, that is, without the ears and voices of the creature. The eternal fellowship between Father and Son, or between God and His Word thus finds a correspondence in the very different but not dissimilar fellowship between God and His creature"(CD, III/1, p.50).

Of course, the relation which is in God Himself and the relation between God and man which is produced by the Incarnation may be an analogical necessity, as Hendry points out.[1] But this analogical necessity comes from God's being as act. Therefore, we must discover the necessary connection between God's inner being and the Incarnation. In the last analysis, we cannot say anything else than this about Barth's position on the relation between God's being in Himself and God's being for us. Perhaps, Barth's basic intention can be found in the following quotation:

"The world cannot exist without God, but if God were not love (as such inconceivable!), He could exist very well without the world." [2]

Therefore, according to Barth, if God is God in act which is the act of loving, He must be in fellowship between He Himself and the creature; He must repeat the relation which He is in himself. There are some students of Barth who try to interpret Barth in this way. I want to quote some passages from their work:

"Finally it should be remembered that all this [election] is for Barth part of the doctrine of God. It is this which makes God the sort of God that He is. God would not be God without the covenant, without electing man to be His covenant partner. Therefore, Barth speaks of the humanity of God. When he does so, it is not in any general, altruistic sense. Barth does not simply mean that God is concerned for man, that He has man's best interests at heart. Rather, God has taken humanity into a permanent relationship with himself. God's Godness includes in itself His Humanity.[3]

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1. George S. Hendry, "The Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl Barth," SJT, XXXI (1978), p.243f.
 2. Karl Barth, Credo, p.32. See also CD II/1, p.275.
 3. Colin Brown, op.cit, p.108.

"Because in the event of revelation God does truly disclose himself, we can say that God's being itself is a self-movement toward the world. Only God as such a self-revelation makes revelation possible. Thus God's being as self-movement requires a history. Revelation means the correspondence between the being of God and the history of the divine life." [1]

"The argument is that because God is in fact related to the world, and to men in particular, through the reconciling activity of Jesus Christ, there is an eternal (and so in a sense necessary) relatedness within the divine reality."

"The double movement, within the trinity and ad extra, which is yet one single movement, is well expressed by Juengel also, when he discusses it as God's primal decision." [2]

Therefore, it is not an arbitrary interpretation of Barth to say that for Barth there is a necessary relation between the inner-life of God Himself and the Incarnation. [3] For clarification of our argument, I shall quote one passage from Evangelical Theology:

"God's being, or truth, is the event of his self-disclosure, his radiance as the Lord of all lords, the hallowing of his name, the coming of his Kingdom, the fulfilment of his will in all his work Just as his [God's] oneness consists in the unity of his life as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, so in relation to the reality distinct from him he is free de jure and de facto to be the God of man. He exists neither next to man nor merely above him, but rather with him, by him and, most important of all, for him." [4]

That is to say, God's being itself is the event of becoming Himself (the triune God) ---therefore, this event is the eternal event, for there was no moment in

1. O'Donnell, Trinity and Temporality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 87f.

2. Colin E. Gunton, op.cit., pp. 159, 168.

3. Charles T. Waldrop even argues that for Barth "since revelation and reconciliation occur within God's act ad intra, the necessity and importance of God's act ad extra are brought into jeopardy" (Karl Barth's Christology, p. 166).

4. Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: Introduction, pp. 9, 10-11.

which God is not the triune God ---- and this event of God's becoming Himself makes the event of the Incarnation a necessary event. For, God is the 'God-for-us' from eternity. In this sense, the following passage from Juengel makes very clear what Barth's position is.

"Barth's doctrine of Trinity attempts to formulate the being of God as event, in that it formulates the being of God as distinguished being, as being differentiated within itself The mutual relations of the three divine modes of being are to be thought of as the self-relatedness of the divine being. In this self-relatedness the being of God makes possible the self-interpretation of God [revelation].... God's-being-for-us [God in His revelation] is just little farewell to Himself as it is God's coming-to-itself." [1]

That is to say, for Barth there is no God who is not 'God-for-us.' "God is who He is, not in abstracto nor without relationship, but as God for the world" (CD, IV/3, p.762).

The fact that for Barth the Incarnation is a necessary event is clearer when we consider the relation between the Incarnation and the Creation of the world. This point is very clear in the later Barth's theology, and there are no differences in the views of interpreters of Barth on this problem. Therefore, I shall treat it very briefly. According to Barth, it is not possible to say anything that is meaningful about the Creation of the world outside of Jesus Christ. Only in Him can we understand the Creation, for Barth regards Christ as the decree of God who is in eternity. Before the Creation of the world there

1. E. Juengel, op.cit., pp.30, 101. Cf. also Juengel's own position, which is based on Barth's understanding of the Trinity: "The self-relatedness of the deity of God takes place in an unsurpassable way in the very self-relatedness of the Incarnation of God. That is the meaning of talk about the humanity of God. It is not a second thing next to the eternal God, but rather the event of deity of God. For that reason the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa." (E. Juengel, God as the Mystery of the World, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1983), p.372. Of course, Juengel's statement also reflects Karl Rahner's understanding of the Trinity. Cf. Karl Rahner, Trinity, pp.20,24,28,32,33; Theological Investigations, IV, p.96. However, even though the economic Trinity, for Barth, cannot be directly regarded as the immanent Trinity, the relation between the Trinity and the Incarnation is a necessary relation, as we have seen.

was Jesus Christ who is the decree of God; before the world was created, there already existed God's decision to become incarnate for the purpose of communication with man. Therefore, if there is the Creation of the world, there must be the Incarnation of God. For the Creation of the world, according to Barth, is based on God's decree to become incarnate, to have a relationship with man.

In his doctrine of Creation, Barth relates Creation and Covenant; Creation is the external basis of God's covenant of grace and the covenant is the internal basis of Creation.(Cf. CD, III/1, pp. 42ff., 94ff., 228ff.). And the covenant is fulfilled only in Jesus Christ who is the incarnate one. Yet before the Incarnation and the Creation of the world Jesus Christ existed as the true covenant-partner with God. In fact, He is God's one true covenant-partner.(Cf. CD, II/2, pp.10ff, 94ff., III/1, pp.42ff., IV/1, pp.52f.). For, as Herbert Hartwell rightly points out, "the covenant is in fact but the another aspect of God's election of grace in that the latter aims at the establishment of fellowship between God and man within the framework of a covenant and does so originally and basically in Jesus Christ." [1] Therefore, Creation is the background against which the event of the Incarnation can be discussed. God creates this world in order to have communication with man in His Incarnation. Hence, basically the Incarnation has no original relation to man's sin. And if man sins, the Incarnation takes place in spite of man's sin to accomplish God's original will. Barth says: "In delivering and fulfilling this first and eternal Word in spite of man's sin and its consequences as he would in fact have delivered and fulfilled it quite apart from human sin, sin is also met refuted and removed"(CD, IV/1, p.48). In this sense, the following passage from Balthasar is not far from Barth's position:

1. Herbert Hartwell, op.cit., p.116.

"If Christ is the first in nature, then he is also the first in the realm of sin. His Cross is not the result of sin, but of his own eternal decision to empty himself. All sin is framed within this decision of his, and it becomes impossible to pass an ultimate judgment on the sinner. God's grace worked absolutely and irresistibly." [1]

Therefore, we can conclude that for Barth there is a necessary relation between the Creation of the world and the Incarnation. [2]

Up to now, we have considered Barth's understanding of the Incarnation. We have found that for Barth the Incarnation implies the exaltation of humanity in general; that Barth sees the Incarnation in the light of the Resurrection; and that for Barth the Incarnation is regarded as a necessary event in relation to the inner life of God Himself and especially in relation to the Creation of the world. These three points are the ones which Barth and Kierkegaard do not have in common. Thus we can conclude: (1) Because of Barth's emphasis on the Incarnation, the later Barth's understanding of the Incarnation seems to be closer to that of Kierkegaard than his earlier understanding. (2) Nevertheless, in the last analysis, we find a considerable difference between their understandings of the Incarnation.

1. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *op.cit.*, p.200.

2. For further discussion of the logical and the necessary relation between the Incarnation and the creation of this world in Barth's theology, see Dan L. Deegan, "The Christological Determination in Barth's Doctrine of Creation," *SJT*, XIV (1961), pp.119-135.

In this section we shall discuss a more fundamental difference between Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard: the difference between their understandings of the historicity of revelation. As we have seen, Barth in his later writings affirms the historicity of revelation. As far as Barth affirms the historicity of revelation, Barth's later position is nearer to Kierkegaard's position than is his early position which is well expressed in the "Romans" (1922). But when we analyze Barth's understanding of revelation more deeply, we find that it is impossible to identify the later Barth's affirmation of the historicity of revelation with Kierkegaard's assertion about the historicity of revelation. To show this point is the task which we shall pursue in this section. In order to do this, I shall analyze the later Barth's concepts of (1) 'time' and of (2) 'history.' And after this analysis I shall compare them with those of Kierkegaard which we shall see in detail in chapter III. Through this examination we shall find that there is a considerable difference in their understandings of the historicity of revelation.

Let us, then, start from Barth's assertion about the temporality of revelation. As we have seen, Barth in his later theology affirms that revelation takes place in time. In this point the later Barth's understanding of revelation is different from his early understanding of revelation. But the time in which Barth says revelation takes place is, as we shall see, a very special time. Therefore, in the concrete time in which we live, there is no revelation. Thus Barth's basic position on the relation between revelation and concrete time is not different from his early position. So even though the expression by which he affirms the temporality of revelation is nearer to Kierkegaard than his early position, Barth is still different from Kierkegaard.

in his understanding of the historicity of revelation. This is the first point which I shall try to show in this section.

The important sections in the Church Dogmatics in which Barth deals with the concept of time are paragraphs 14 ("The Time of Revelation"), 31 ("The Eternity and Glory of God"), 33 ("The Election of Jesus Christ"), 41 ("Creation and Covenant"), and 47 ("Man in his Time"). Since Barth's main thrust does not change throughout his later theology, however, we shall not differentiate between the contexts in which Barth deals with time, and try to draw out Barth's understanding of time.[1] It is a well known fact that Barth's doctrine of time is very ambiguous especially in its relation to revelation.[2] The following discussion is an attempt to find Barth's real intention when he uses the time concept in relation to revelation. That is to say, we are trying to find Barth's intention when he expresses the time concept in relation to revelation ambiguously with intention.

Basically, there are, for Barth, three kinds of time: (1) God-created time, (2) our time (or, the fallen time), and (3) God's time (or, the time of grace, real time, and fulfilled time). Through this differentiation between times Barth finds a way to move away from his early position on revelation in which revelation takes place only in the eternal Moment. However, our question is: Can we say that Barth, in a real sense, moves away from his early position? In what follows I shall show that we must give a negative answer to this

1. For a similar observation of this problem, see R.H. Roberts, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Time," in Karl Barth: Studies of His Theological Method, ed. S.W. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p.102: "The passage, 'Man in his Time'[CD, III/2, section 47] (often regarded as most significant with regard to the problem of time) is but the culmination and anthropological application of a set of conceptions which operate throughout the whole structure of the Church Dogmatics."

2. Cf. Ibid., pp.88-146.

question. Let us start from the question as to which kind of time is the most basic for Barth.

Is God-created time the most basic for Barth? In some passages Barth seems to affirm that the God-created-time is the most basic one. Barth states:

"Of course, God is the Creator of time also. But the time we think we know and possess, "our" time, is by no means the time God created. Between our time and God-created time as between our existence and the existence created by God there lies the Fall. "Our" time, as Augustine and Heidegger in their own ways quite correctly inform us, is the time produced by us, i.e., by fallen man. If on the basis of God's Word being in this time of ours we believe that God created time, this belief does not sidetrack our time; yet we cannot in any way identify our time with the time created by God. Our time, the time we know and possess, is and remains lost time, even when we believe that God is the Creator of time"(CD, I/2, p.47).

And again: "Creation comes first in the series of works of the triune God, and is thus the beginning of all the things distinct from God Himself. Since it contains in itself the beginning of time, its historical reality eludes all historical observation and account..."(CD, III/1, p.42).

"It [time] actually begins together with His Creation, so that we have to say that His Creation is the ground and basis of time"(CD, III/1, p.68).

"Time is willed and created by God as the form at any rate of human existence"(CD, III/2, p.526).

Can we, then, arrange the three kinds of time in the order of God-created time, our time, and God's time, on the basis of these passages? Can we say that first there was the Creation of God, secondly the fall, and then the act of grace? In some passages Barth seems to affirm this order: "When man lost the time loaned to him [God-created-time], he received it back again in Jesus Christ, i.e., in history, commencing immediately after Creation, of the covenant of grace which was fulfilled in His death and Resurrection"(CD, III/1, p.75). Is this order the one which Barth has in mind when he writes his later theology? In a sense, we can submit an affirmative answer to this question. For, in the end, Barth

affirms this order for the sake of logic, not because this order is the temporal order.

However, the basis of Barth's affirmation of the logical order of Creation--Fall--Redemption is not Creation (or, God-created-time), but the time of grace.[1] Barth states as follows:

"We have called the time of grace the counterpart of that of Creation. But it can and must be asked whether in the last analysis the time of Creation is not on the contrary to be understood as the counterpart of that of grace, and therefore the time of grace as the true prototype of all time. In the last resort, we cannot evade this elucidation. If it is true that the world and man are created in Jesus Christ, i.e., for His sake and for Him, in actualisation of the compassion in which from all eternity God turned to the creature in the person of His Son bearing and representing it, then Creation does not precede reconciliation, but follows it. In this case it is not in Creation but in reconciliation that this compassion reaches the goal towards which God had looked from all eternity. In this case, too, the first and genuine time which is the prototype of time is not the time of Creation but that of the reconciliation for which the world and man were created in the will and by the operation of God. Real time, in this case, is primarily the life-time of Jesus Christ, the turning point, the transition, the decision, which were accomplished in His death and Resurrection; together with the time preceding and following this event in the history of Israel and the existence of the Christian Church. It was in correspondence with this real time, and as the necessary and adequate form of this event, that time was originally created --- in and with Creation and at the same time also as the form of the history of Creation itself..... If the time of Creation is ultimately a reflection and the counterpart of the time of grace, then as the beginning of all time is necessarily real time in the supreme sense"(CD, III/1, p.76)[2]

Now we can understand Barth's logic such that he takes the reality of the time of Creation from the time of grace as real time. In the first part of this quotation, Barth affirms clearly that the true prototype of all time, the first and genuine time, is the time of grace, the time of reconciliation. Barth also affirms in the second part of this quotation that on the basis of the reality of the time of grace, we must say that the time of Creation, as the beginning of all time, is also real time.

1. Cf. Heinz Zahrnt, The Question of God, p.96: "Seen from above --- and this will always be Barth's viewpoint --- Creation only sets the stage for the story of the covenant of grace: "

2. Cf. also Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, pp.58, 63.

Therefore, what is important for Barth is the prototype of all time. According to this quotation, the prototype of all time is the time of grace or the time of reconciliation. What is the time of grace then? According to Barth, the time of grace is the time "in which the covenant takes place"(CD, III/1, p.73). When does the covenant take place? Barth gives a somewhat vague answer to this question. But this vagueness has something to do with the character of the time of grace which Barth calls as such. First of all, the time of grace, as we find from the passage which I quote above, is related to Jesus Christ. So this time of grace is the third time in which revelation in Jesus Christ takes place. The time of grace is the time which God's revelation has and, accordingly, God has for us. Therefore, the time of grace is "God's time"(CD, I/2, p.49, passim). What does Barth mean by "God's time"? What is apparent from the first to the last in his later theology is that God's time is not our time. Of course, these two times have a common element: temporality. God's time is also a temporal reality. So Barth calls God's time also "time." But the temporality which God's time has is neither identical with the temporality of our time, nor similar to our time. For the temporality which God's time has is "eternal temporality." Barth, in his later theology, emphasizes the temporality of God which is different from our temporality. Barth says:

"Even the eternal God does not live without time. He is supremely temporal. For His eternity is authentic temporality, and therefore the source of all time. But in His eternity, in the uncreated self-subsistent time which is one of the perfections of His divine nature, present, past and future, yesterday, today, and tomorrow, are not successive, but simultaneous. It is in this way, in this eternity of His, that God lives to the extent that He lives His own life"(CD, III/2, pp.437f., my emphasis).

"God also lives in His Time. But His time is eternity, which has no fixed span, no margins, no other measure but Himself God Himself is not only the ground and content but also the form of His existence. To the extent that He is His own form of existence He is eternal, and He is in eternity as in His time.....Hence in His eternity He is indeed the Creator

of time, but as its Creator He is the One who, and as such is and will be; who is, and as such was and will be; who will be, and as such was and is. In His eternity He is beginning, and middle and end. He is not, therefore, apart from all these. If He were, we shall have another false definition of eternity. Eternity is not timelessness. It is beginning, middle, and end in fulness, for it is all three simultaneously. It is always the first and second as it is also the third. Thus God is His own dimension"(CD, III/2, p.558).

"God's being is eternal in whose duration beginning, succession and end are not three but one, not separate as a first, a second and a third occasion, but one simultaneous occasion as beginning, middle and end.... God is both the prototype and fore-ordination of all being, and therefore also the prototype and fore-ordination of time. God has time because and as He has eternity. Thus He does not first have it [time] on the basis of Creation, which is also, of course, the Creation of time. He does have time for us, the time of revelation, the time of Jesus Christ, and therefore the time of His patience, our life-time, time for repentance and faith. But it is really He Himself who has time for us. He Himself is time for us. For His revelation as Jesus Christ is really God Himself..... Those who do not have time are those who do not have eternity either"(CD, II/1, pp.608, 611f., my emphasis).

These quotations from several parts of the Church Dogmatics make it clear that for the later Barth God's eternity has time, it does not lack time.[1] This is a very important point at which Barth differs from his early position in the "Romans." Now, in the Church Dogmatics, Barth says that God is eternal, but God has temporality. But, is the temporality which God has identical with the temporality which man has? We cannot give an affirmative answer to this question. For Barth emphasizes the difference between God's time and our time or between God's temporality and our temporality. "His [God's] eternity," says Barth, "is authentic temporality, and therefore the source of all time..... But man, who is not God, who is a creature and not the Creator, cannot live like this. If he is to live at all, he needs an inauthentic temporality distinct from eternity. He needs the time created by God, in which past, present and future follow one another in succession, in which he can move from his past

1. Cf. also CD, II/1, p.615, and Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.55. See also Colin E. Gunton's observation concerning Barth's concept of God's eternity: "Barth's conception of the eternity of God is bound up with God's temporality, and does not intend to be its negation as some conception of timelessness."(Becoming and Being, p.140).

through his present to his future, in which these three elements, corresponding to his life-act as a whole and in detail, form a sequence"(CD, III/2, pp.437f.). Therefore, even though both of them [God's temporality and our temporality] have a common element which is called "temporality", they are different from each other. This is a very important point in Barth's doctrine of time in relation to his understanding of revelation. For the time in which revelation takes place is God's time which has a different temporality from our temporality.

At this point we can give an answer to the question as to what God's time is. God's time, as the time of revelation and reconciliation, is the time in which God reveals Himself and reconciles us with Himself. That is to say, God's time is the time in which God acts. "So the time God has for us, as distinguished from our time that comes into being and passes away, is to be regarded as eternal time"(CD, I/2,p.50). For this time is the time related to God Himself. Hence, this time has to be eternal time. Whereas, in the "Romans," he calls this 'the eternal Moment,' now Barth calls this 'eternal time.' How can he use the term 'eternal time' in his later theology? We have seen that in this period Barth endows temporality with God's eternity. That is why Barth can use the term 'eternal time'. In the period of the "Romans", for Barth the eternal has no temporality, moreover it is the opposite of time. But now in the Church Dogmatics Barth speaks of the temporality of the eternal. Therefore, the time in which God acts is the time of God, God's time. "'God reveals Himself'," says Barth, "means 'God has time for us'"(CD, I/2, p.54, passim). But here we have to bear in mind one point: the temporality or the time which God has for us is different from our temporality or our time. As we have seen, even though they have the same name [temporality or time], they are different from each other. They do not belong to the same plane, the same horizon. If we are not clear about this point, we will be confused when we read

the later Barth's writings. To emphasize this once again, "time" (God's time) and "time" (our time) are not identical![1]

Only on the basis of such an understanding of Barth's use of time can we properly understand the passages which follow:

"God had time for us, His own time for us --- time, in the most positive sense, i.e., present with past and future, fulfilled time with expectation and recollection of its fulfilment, revelation time and the time of the Old Testament and New Testament witness to revelation --- but withal, His own time, God's time; and therefore real time"(CD, I/2, p.49).

"Revelation is an eternal, but not therefore a timeless reality. It is also a temporal reality. So it is not a sort of ideal, yet in itself timeless content of all or some times. It does not remain transcendent over time, it does not merely meet it at a point, but it enters time; nay, it assumes time; nay, it creates time for itself"(CD, I/2, p.50).

If we read these passages without an understanding of Barth's new concept of the temporality of the eternal, it is easy to interpret them superficially to mean

1. Otto Weber makes this point clear. See Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, trans. A.C.Cochrance (London: Lutterworth Press, 1953), p.120: "Now, to be sure, there is a difference between "time" and "time." The "time" of the history of Creation is not to be confused with "our time.".... But on the other hand, neither is the time of Creation to be equated with the "time of grace", the time of the gracious now of fulfilment." Compare this with T.F.Torrance's interpretation of Barth that for Barth the Incarnation and the Resurrection is in our time and space. Cf. Karl Barth, pp.45f., 204-217, esp. "[For Barth] the Incarnation is taken seriously as the coming of the Son of God into human existence and history, as the Being of God in space and time at work for us and our salvation."(p.206). See also his "The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth," Religious Studies VI (1970), pp.121-135, esp., p.124. And again "Karl Barth," SJT, XXII (1969), pp.1-9, esp., "Barth's exposition makes it clear that the great watershed in theology is the Incarnation of God the eternal Son, the staggering fact of the actual existence of the personal Being of God within our coporeal existence in space and time"(pp.4f.). When we relate such an interpretation of Barth to Torrance's own view of the Incarnation and the Resurrection (Cf. Space, Time and Incarnation (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) and Space, Time and Resurrection (Handel press, 1976)), we find that he interprets Barth here in a somewhat conservative way. For an argument that Torrance does not see Barth's intention, see R.H.Roberts, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Time," p.123. And see also his "The Ideal and the Real in the Theology of Karl Barth," pp.177f. Besides T.F.Torrance, the scholars who interpret the later Barth in such a way are H.R.Mackintosh(op.cit., pp.269ff.), H.U. von Balthasar (op.cit., pp. 100-108) and Robert E. Willis (op.cit., pp.82-90).

that now Barth affirms that God can enter our time and assume our time; so that we conclude that Barth overcomes the absolute dualism of his early days. However, as we have seen, the time of which Barth speaks in these passages is different from our time. Of course, Barth says that revelation is not a timeless reality, it does not transcend time, it does not merely meet time at a point, but it enters time! But we have to think of the problem of what Barth means by "time" in these passages. Is it our time? Does revelation enter our time? Does revelation assume our time? We cannot say "Yes" to these questions. According to Barth, the time in which God acts is a new time. Barth states:

"Compared with our time, it [God's time] is mastered time and for that very reason real, fulfilled time. Here the dilemma does not arise, between a present that disappears midway between past and future, and a past and future that dissolve for their part into a present. Here there is a genuine present --- and not now in spite of it, but just because of it, a genuine past and future. The Word of God is. It is never 'not yet' or 'no longer.' It is not exposed to any becoming or, therefore, to any passing away, or, therefore to any change. The same holds also of the Word of God become flesh and therefore time..... The word spoken from eternity raises the time into which it is uttered (without dissolving it as time), up into His own eternity as now His own time, and gives it part in the existence of God which is alone real, self-moved, self-dependent, self-sufficient. It is spoken by God, a perfect without peer (not in our time, but in God's time created by the Word in the flesh, there is a genuine, proper, indissoluble, primal perfect), and for that reason there is coming into the world a future without peer (for not in our time but rather in this God's time created by the Word in the flesh there is a genuine, proper, indissoluble, primal future). And so it is a present that is not a present without also being a genuine perfect, and a perfect and a future, the mean of which constitutes a genuine, indestructible present. Yet it is not any present, hopelessly collapsing into a "not yet" or a "no longer" like every present in our time(CD, I/2, p.52)

Therefore, for Barth, the time in which God acts is the time which belongs only to God Himself. God's time is not different from God's eternity. God's time has post-temporal, supra-temporal (or, co-temporal), and pre-temporal essence. So God's time is the eternal time. God's time is present, past, and at the same time future and vice versa[1]. And Barth says: "The incarnate Word of God is. But this means that it was and it will be. But again it was never

1. Cf. CD II/1, pp.636ff. See also Arnold B. Come, op.cit., p.98.

'not yet,' and it will never be 'no more.' On the contrary, it is 'now' even as it is 'once' (and to that extent 'no more'); and it is also 'now' even as it is 'then' (and to that extent 'not yet'). It is a perfect temporal present, and for that very reason a perfect temporal past and future. It enters fully into the succession and separation of the times which together constitute time, and transforms this succession and separation into full contemporaneity"(CD, III/1, pp.73f.) God's time thus is a different name for God's eternity.[2] What was called the eternal Moment in the "Romans" is now called God's time.[3] Of course, as we have said several times, God's time, unlike the eternal Moment, is a kind of time. But God's time is different from our time.[4] Now we have arrived at the answer to the question: Can we say that the later Barth moves away from his early position on the relation of revelation and our time in the real sense of the word? Our conclusive answer is a negative one. Even though Barth, in his later theology, recognizes the temporality of the revelation, the time in which revelation takes place does not belong to our time, but only

2. In some places Barth seems to differentiate God's eternity and God's time (e.g., CD, III/1, p.70: "...prior to time there is only His [God's] eternity."). But Barth immediately adds that this eternity is revealed in Creation as God's readiness of time, that is, God's temporality. Barth says that God's temporality as His eternity is the prototype (Urbild) of time.(Cf. CD, III/2, pp.526, 558, III/1, p.67).

3. R.H.Roberts and Colin E. Gunton also observe a similar point: "In a passage of importance, Barth sums up the temporal dimensions of the 'fulfilled time' in terms not incompatible with the early conception of the 'eternal Moment--the Now!'"(Richard H.Roberts, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Time", pp.103f.); "It may well be that despite his insistence upon the historical character of revelation Barth has failed to maintain the full temporal reality of revelation."(Gunton, Becoming and Being, p.181). See also J.A. Veith, "Revelation and Religion in the Theology of Karl Barth," SJT, XXIV (1971), p.11: "Revelation does not actually occur within our time....".

4. See Oscar Cullmann's observation of Barth's time-concept in his later theology. Cf. Christ and Time, trans.Floyd V. Filson (London:SCM, 1962), pp.62-68, esp., pp.62f.: "Karl Barth, in contrast to his earlier publications, lays very strong emphasis in his Dogmatik (II/1, 1940, pp.685ff.) on the temporal quality of eternity. But the philosophical influence which controls the concept of time in his earlier writings, especially in the commentary on Romans is still operative in the Dogmatik of 1940."

belongs to God. In this point Barth's basic position has not changed.

The second point which we shall examine in this section is the later Barth's understanding of history and its relation to revelation. Since time and history are closely related concepts, we can examine this second point in relation to the first point, that of the later Barth's concept of time. And what we can guess at this moment is that the later Barth's view of history is similar to his view of time. As we have seen, for the later Barth, there are two streams of time: God's time and our time. The point which we shall show here is that accordingly, for Barth, there are two kinds of history which are exclusive to each other: Heilsgeschichte (or, non-historical-history) and history. According to Barth, revelation does not take place in history, but in Geschichte. For Barth, Geschichte is revelation or revelation-history. To substantiate this point, we shall examine Barth's discussion of Creation and Resurrection. After finishing this consideration we shall compare the later Barth's understanding of the relation between history and revelation to that of Kierkegaard, which we shall examine in detail in chapter III. It is these tasks which we shall pursue in this second part of this section.

Our starting point is Barth's discussion of Creation-history. Yes, we have said 'Creation-history.' Barth wants to use the term history (Geschichte) in his discussion of Creation.[1] According to Barth, Creation itself is history (so there is a history of Creation) and the aim of Creation is also history (the history of the covenant of grace). That is to say, the conclusive purpose of Creation is the fulfilment of the covenant of grace. Therefore, the fulfilment of the covenant of grace takes place in history. So there is the history of the

1. I shall use "history" as a translation of Geschichte, and "History" as a translation of Historie. Or they can be distinguished as the theological history and the historical history.

covenant of grace. "But," says Barth, "in view of the biblical economy and emphasis, it has to be said at once that the history of this covenant of grace, though its actualisation follows Creation, has in God's intention and purpose a dignity which, although different from that of Creation, is not inferior but equal.... Creation sets the stage for the story of the covenant of grace"(CD, III/1, pp.43f). Therefore, according to Barth, Creation itself is the beginning of the history of the covenant of grace. In this sense, Barth says the following:

"If the eternal and determinate will of God is the source of their [all things] inner beginning, Creation is the source of their external beginning. And herein lies the peculiar dignity of the Creation, that as the external beginning of all things it stands in certain respects in direct confrontation with its inner beginning, its eternal source is God's decision and plan"(CD, III/1, p.43, my emphasis).

Therefore, Creation is the external beginning of all things. But this statement, for Barth, is a theological statement. Hence, the history of Creation is only a history in the theological sense of the word.

It means that Creation is not History or the History in the historical sense of the word. What is History? Barth answers that the historical History (History) is "the History which is accessible to man because it is visible and perceptible to him and can be comprehended as History"(CD, III/1, p.78). What happens in our time belongs to History. But must we say that only what happens in our time, accordingly, what belongs to History, can happen? No, there is also a non-historical-history. This is Barth's strong assertion in his later theology. In fact, for Barth, revelation does not happen in History, in the flux of our time. It only happens in non-historical history (Geschichte), in God's time. Therefore, in so far as Creation can be known in revelation, it does not belong to History. Creation is by nature wholly "non-historical" history, or, Barth uses this term again, pre-historical (urgeschichtliche) history. (CD, III/1, p.80). We must, Barth asserts, recognize that there is

non-historical history which does not happen in our time, but really happens in time [God's time].[1]

So Barth uses a technical term 'saga' which is the narrative of prehistorical history. Barth defines 'saga' as follows: "an intuitive and poetic picture of prehistorical reality of history which is enacted once and for all within the confines of time and space"(CD, III/1, p.81). The biblical history of Creation is connected with history (Geschichte). In this sense saga is different from Myth. Barth states:

"Real Myth has never really had Creation as its theme and object. Myth does, of course, take narrative form, and it is often far more dramatic and lyrical than the biblical Creation sagas. But its tales and their events and figures are obviously pictures and embodiments of what happens always and everywhere and to that extent does not happen "anywhere or at any time." Not without a nod and a wink, ironically, condescendingly, by way of accommodation, myth tells a story "for children and those who love children". It chooses and uses the form of a story, but in the case of all intelligent persons it makes the demand that they should look through this story, that they should not cling to it as such, but in all the enjoyment of its events and forms, spurred on by its cheerful play, they should press on to its true non-historical, time-less and abstract sense, to a perception of the eternal truth presented in the play Myth has always arisen and still from the higher recognition, divination and poetic understanding of this kind of eternal truth. It has always been a worthy alter ego of philosophy"(CD, III/1, pp. 84-85).

From this long quotation on Barth's view of Myth, we can draw out the differences and similarities between Myth and saga. First, what is held in common is the narrative form. Both of them are a kind of narrative or story. However, they are different from each other in that Myth is related to the eternal truth which does not happen in time, while saga is related to a certain history (Geschichte) which takes place in time. A second difference between them, therefore, is that in Myth the man who creates the Myth is important, while in saga God who acts in His time is important. That is to say, what is fundamental to Myth is the contemplation of man and his cosmos as self-moved and self-resting, the contemplation of his emergence as one of his own functions.

1. Cf. CD, III/1, p.81; I/1, pp.119, 127, 244f. 255. passim.

In contrast, the importance in saga is "God and His activity, the distinction and confrontation between the Creator and the creature, the liberty of another divine reality which encounters man and his world and sovereignly decrees without reference to them"(CD, III/ 1. p.86.).

But both of them are not History. Of course, as we have said, saga is related to history, but Myth has nothing to do with history. In a sense, saga is a witness to history (Geschichte). Barth says: "The biblical history of Creation is pure saga, and as such it is distinguished from "History" on the one side and Myth on the other. Precisely in this form it [saga] is a constituent part of the biblical witness and therefore itself a witness to God's self-revelation"(CD, III/1, p.90). Therefore, Creation itself to which biblical sagas witness, is a prehistorical history which does not belong to our time.[1]

We can draw out a similar concept of history as Geschichte from Barth's discussion of the Resurrection of Christ. It will be good to start by quoting some salient passages from Barth's discussion of this theme.

"It is impossible to read any text of the New Testament in the sense intended by its authors, by the apostles who stand behind them, or by the first communities, without an awareness that they either explicitly assert or at least tacitly assume that the Jesus of whom they speak and to whom they refer in some way is the One who appeared to His disciples at this particular time [the forty days between the Resurrection and the ascension] as the Resurrected from the dead. All the other things they know of Him, His words and acts, are regarded in the light of this particular event, and are as it were irradiated by its light."(CD, III/2, p.442, my emphasis).

1. However, there are criticisms of Barth's concept of saga. For example, Gordon Kaufman says: "That Karl Barth's category, 'saga' --- which he somewhat pretentiously substitutes for myth on the ground that it is not non-historical like the latter(CD III/1, pp.81ff.) --- is really just an abstract non-historical as myth, can be seen in the fact that he, also, can find no genuine historical meaning in the fall (see, CD IV/1, pp.500f, 507ff.)" (G.D.Kaufman, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978, second edition), p.279. n. 17).

".... it is essential to grasp that when the New Testament speaks of the event of Easter it really means the Easter history and Easter time.... It happened "once upon a time" that He was among them as the Resurrected. This, too, was an event"(Ibid.).

"Jesus Himself did rise again and appear to His disciples. This is the content of the Easter history, the Easter time, the Christian faith and Christian proclamation, both then and at all times..... This is "the eschatological event" in its manifest form which is acquired at Easter. This is the act of God --- the act in which he appeared objectively in the glory of His incarnate Word, encountering first their unbelief and then, when this was overcome, their faith.... He Himself [Christ] was with them [His disciples] in time, in this time, beyond the time of His earthly life between His birth and death, in this time of revelation. This is what really took place."(CD, III/2, p.445).

"The resurrected is the man Jesus, who now came and went among them as such, whom they saw and touched and heard, who ate and drank with them, and who, as I believe, was still before them as true man, vere homo.... He is the man Jesus and no one else. He is not a soul and spirit in the abstract, but soul of His body, and therefore body as well. To be an apostle of Jesus Christ means not only to have seen Him with one's eyes and to have heard Him with one's ears, but to have touched Him physically."(CD, III/2, p.448).

In these four quotations Barth appears to emphasize the historicity (or, factuality) of the Resurrection. Moreover, Barth, on the bases of such an understanding of the Resurrection, criticizes Bultmann's understanding of Resurrection, saying that he [Bultmann] eliminates the objectivity and reality of the Resurrection, even though he does emphasize the centrality of the Resurrection in the New Testament writings. Barth writes:

"R. Bultmann 'demythologizes' the event of Easter by interpreting it as 'the rise of faith in the risen Lord, since it was this faith which led to the apostolic preaching.' [But] this will not do. Faith in the risen Lord springs from His historical manifestation, and from this as such, not from the rise of faith in Him." [1]

So many scholars conclude that in his later theology Barth affirms the concrete objectivity of the Resurrection.[2] What matters to them is that while Barth affirms the concrete objectivity of the Resurrection, he does not permit the

1. CD, III/2, p.443 citing Bultmann's essay in Kerygma and Myth, I, p.42. Cf. also Karl Barth, "Rudolf Bultmann ---An Attempt to Understand Him," in Kerygma and Myth, II, ed. Hans Werner Bartsh, trans. R.H.Fuller (London:SPCK, 1962), pp.83-132.

possibility of historical analysis. So they usually conclude that Barth's definitive position on the historical character of the Resurrection seems too good to be true[3], or that Barth is apparently contradictory.[4] But we have to remember Barth's special concept of history and time at this point. As we have seen, according to Barth, God's activity does not occur in our time, even though it [God's activity] has time. The time in which God's activity takes place is the time of God, God's time. Therefore, the activity of God, which takes place in God's time, is eternal. That is present and at the same time past and future, past and at the same time present and future, or future and at the same time present and past. And the history which takes place in God's time is a very special history. This history is not the History which is visible and perceptible to man. But this history is a real event. Christ's Resurrection was a Resurrection of the body(CD, III/2, p.448). However, this Resurrection, as the activity of God, takes place in God's time.[5] So we must say that the Easter experience of the disciples also takes place in God's time. For, if Christ's Resurrection is in God's time, while the disciples are in our time, then the disciples cannot experience the Easter experience. Barth says:

"What we have here is Deus dixit spoken in the existence of Jesus during these days [the forty days from the Resurrection to the ascension]. It is a decision which the apostolic Church cannot discuss or revise. For it is He who is responsible for it. He has appeared and acted as Kyrios among them He was the concrete demonstration of the God who has not only a

2. Cf. Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer, pp.154-159; Gerald O'Collins, "Karl Barth on Christ's Resurrection," pp.87-92. See also Christian Hartlich and Water Sachs in Kerygma and Myth, II, pp.113-125, and Gordon D. Kaufman, op.cit., p.414. n.2.

3. Gerald O'Collins, op.cit., p.90.

4. Van A. Harvey, op.cit., p.159.

5. In this sense, even though Barth seems to be trying to emphasize the historicity of the Resurrection in his later theology, his basic view of the Resurrection is not different from his early position in the "Romans" which we have examined in Chapter I. Cf. Karl Barth's Table Talk, pp.59f.: "If you had historical evidence [of the Resurrection], it would not be the Resurrection! This is a deed of God in Christ." For a similar interpretation of the later Barth's view of the Resurrection, see Fred H. Klooster, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ," The Westminster Theological Journal, XXIV (1962), pp.137-172. Esp. 141-155.

different time from that of man, but whose will and resolve it is to give man a share in this time of His, in His eternity. The concrete demonstration of this God, His appearance, is the meaning of the appearance and appearances of this man Jesus, alive again after His death, in the forty days.... This man, the incarnate Word of God, had not only to be present but to be apprehensible as the triumphant justification of God and man, as the revelation of the divine sovereignty over life and death which delivers man, and finally as the One who exists in the higher, eternal time of God. This is what Jesus was in His real and therefore physical Resurrection from the dead, in His appearances as the One who was really and therefore physically resurrected. This is the way in which He was 'manifested in the mode of God' to His disciples. This is the way in which He was the appearance of God which afterwards formed the object of their particular recollection of this particular time"(CD, III/2, pp.450f. My emphasis).

Therefore, according to Barth, the appearances of the resurrected One happen in a different time[1] and the men who experienced the resurrected one were given a share in this time of God, in God's eternity. This is the way in which Christ appeared as the resurrected one. In God's time Christ appeared as the physically resurrected one. As history which is in God's time, Resurrection is not in History which is in our time. It is Geschichte (history). But we have to bear in mind the point that Barth uses this term Geschichte in a very special way. Barth uses Geschichte as a technical term, as a theological term. It is not an historical Geschichte. Geschichte does not simply mean that which happens in our time and space, but which we cannot deal with by an historical analysis. Barth does not use this term for any happening except the Christ-event. That is to say, Barth does not call Geschichte all the things which happen in time, but are not contained in the historiography. What Barth calls Geschichte is the happening which happens in God's time. So Geschichte happens in time and is history. But it is not History which is open to

1. And according to Barth, God has his own spatiality and it is one of the possibilities of appearance in space, his own space. Cf. CD.II/1, p.470: "The spatiality of God is to be distinguished from the spatiality of every other being by the fact that it is the spatiality of the divine being God is spatial as the One who loves in freedom, and therefore as Himself God possesses His space. He is in Himself as in a space. He creates space." Barth finds God's spatiality in the Resurrection of Christ.

historical verification. For historical verification, for Barth, can be applied only to things which happen in our time. In this sense, Barth says that the Historical life (historische leben) of Jesus is a kind of History. But as History the Historical Life of Jesus is not revelation. For it does not happen in God's time.[1] Of course, the Historical life of Jesus is related to the Christ-event or the Christ-history. But as far as the History of Jesus is concerned, it is not the Christ-event or Christ-history. The one whom Barth calls Jesus Christ, the Word of God, is not the Jesus of History who lived in our time, but Christ who is witnessed to by the New Testament. At this point, it will be good to examine the relation between the Christ-history as Geschichte and the Scriptures. According to Barth, the Scripture is the witness to the revelation of God. The revelation of God which is witnessed to by the Scriptures takes place in God's time. Resurrection, which we are considering, also takes place in God's time as revelation. Therefore the history which is described in the Scriptures is the witness to the history of revelation. So the narratives of the Scripture do not offer precise chronological information about the history of revelation. Nevertheless, they are describing the event or history which takes place in God's time. That is to say, the narratives of the Scriptures are narrations of Geschichte. [2] Barth states:

"But the stories are couched in the imaginative, poetic style of historical saga, and are therefore marked by the corresponding obscurity. For they are describing an event beyond the reach of historical reach or depiction. Hence we have no right to try to analyze or harmonise them. This is to do violence to the whole character of the event in question.

1. For Barth, Christ-history (Geschichte) is not the History of Jesus of Nazareth, even though it can be related in the light of the Resurrection. Moreover, even in the light of the Resurrection the History of Jesus of History cannot be identified with revelation. It becomes revelation only in the light of the Resurrection. For a similar interpretation see R.D.Williams, op.cit., p.157: "...the revelatory event, properly so-called, is not simply identical with its historical form." See also G.Wingren Theology in Conflict, trans. Eric H. Wahlstrom (Edinburgh and London, 1958), pp.123f.: For Barth, "not even in Christ can the gulf between God and man cease to exist, because God can never act as man or in man, only through man."

There can be no doubt that all these narratives are about the same event, and that they are agreed in substance, intention and interpretation..... [So] each of the narratives must be read for its own sake just as it stands. Each is a specific witness to the decisive things God said and did in this event."(CD III/2, p.452).

Of course, this quotation is concerned only with the narratives of the Resurrection. But we can discover Barth's attitude to all of the Scriptures from this quotation.[3] Barth does not deny at all the necessity of historical criticism in the interpretation of the Scriptures.[4] However, Barth does not think that historical-critical interpretation is the whole of the question as to how to interpret the Scriptures. The importance of the subject matter of the Scriptures which Barth emphasizes makes Barth go beyond historical criticism.[5] Even though the stories of the Scriptures cannot be regarded as History, they must be regarded as a kind of historical narrative. For they are the witnesses

2. In this sense, Barth regards the narrative form of the biblical history as an indispensable one. Especially in the Gospel history Barth finds the way to understand the Christ-history. For, according to Barth, it gives us the narration of the way of Jesus from the baptism in the Jordan to Gethsemane and the Cross. But the importance of this way does not lie in the fact that it is the actual History, but in the fact that it enables us to understand the dynamic character of God's revelation.

3. A quotation from Barth's Credo can serve to show clearly what Barth's attitude to Scriptures is: "And now in this connection one of you has put to me concretely the specifically Dutch question, whether the serpent in the Paradise "really" spoke? --- I would decidedly oppose characterising this incident as "Myth"[But] the serpent's speech is indeed the invitation to man to face God with that question so significant for the very problem of theological exegesis: "Hath God said?" Where this question is heard, there a man must have the idea of being as God, there the fruit must be eaten. There he stands reflecting over the Word of God, and to that Word he will then most certainly not be obedient. The attitude of standing over it critically, as also of standing over it apologetically, should be given up. The fact that we do not give it up proves very palpably that the serpent has really spoken, yes, indeed!"(Credo, pp.190f.) Therefore, for Barth, even though the event does not happen in our time, the history can be significant in its relation to God and His revelation. In this sense, his basic view of the Scriptures does not change throughout his academic life.

4. Cf. Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.54. See also H.Zahrnt, op.cit., p.93: "Admittedly, he [Barth] repeats his earlier affirmation that the Bible is written by men and that therefore historical criticism is fundamentally justified." For further discussion of Barth's view of the Scriptures, see A.B.Come, op.cit., pp.383-398 and Thomas E. Provence, op.cit., pp.323-359.

to the history. Which history? Christ-history --- this is Barth's answer. Christ-history of which Barth speaks is not the Jesus of History, but Christ-event which takes place in God's time. What the Scriptures are concerned with, for Barth, is not the Jesus of History, but Christ-history.[6] In a sense, the existence of Jesus Christ (who is not the Jesus of History, but the One who is revealed as the Word of God and is witnessed to by the Scriptures) itself, is the Christ-event and Christ-history. Barth says:

"As the history of the divine deliverance for each and every man is wholly exclusively He [Jesus Christ] Himself, so He Himself is wholly and exclusively the history of the divine deliverance for each and every man.

5. The subject-matter (die Sache) of the Scriptures, for Barth, is Christ-history or simply Jesus Christ. And this Jesus-history implies not only the gospel history, but the whole narrative of the scriptures, for in the light of the Resurrection the time of the Old Testament becomes the time of expectation, and the time after Jesus Christ becomes the time of recollection. Barth uses several different words to indicate the subject-matter of the Scriptures which can all be used interchangeably: the theme (das Gesagte), the matter or object (das Gegenstand) and the subject-matter (die Sache). For a good discussion of Barth's view of the Scriptures and of the right interpretation of the Scriptures, see Thomas Edward Provence, "The Hermeneutics of Karl Barth," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Fuller Theological Seminary, 1980), pp.144-163. See also D.F. Ford, "Barth's Interpretation of the Bible," in Karl Barth: Studies of his Theological Method, ed. S.W.Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp.55-87.

6. In this sense, there is for Barth no possibility of penetrating the Scriptures in order to reach the Historical Jesus who actually lived in our time. For Jesus Christ who is the One of whom the Scriptures tell, is the one who is interpreted in the light of the Resurrection. That is to say, according to Barth, the writers of the Gospels are not concerned about the Historical Jesus, but Jesus Christ who exists in the light of the Resurrection. Cf. CD, I/2, pp.64f., 111-117, 122, 481; II/1, p.563; III/2, pp.443, 449f, 469, 478-485, 493-511; IV/2, pp.102ff., 132, 250, 291, 307. So the man Jesus whom Barth calls as such is not the Historical Jesus, but the one who exists in the light of the Resurrection. For a similar observation on this problem, see Gordon D. Kaufman, op.cit., p.185. n.9. Of course, there are some scholars who assert that for Barth the real Historical Jesus is Jesus Christ who is spoken of in the Scriptures. Cf. Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth, esp., p.208., and Thomas W. Ogletree, op.cit., pp.204ff. However, when we consider the characteristics of Barth's use of the term "Christ-history", it seems to me, it is impossible to identify the Jesus Christ of the Scriptures with the Historical Jesus. Barth says: "Jesus Christ in this character [Geschichte as the history of God's revelation] means Jesus Christ as He reveals Himself in His Resurrection and ascension"(CD, IV/2, p.132). For an argument that Jesus Christ, for Barth, is not identical with the Historical Jesus (contra T.F.Torrance), see R.H.Roberts,op.cit., p.111.

Hence man, this man, exists as this history(Heilsgeschichte) takes place. He is Himself this history"(CD, III/2, p.70).

What is interesting is the fact that Barth equates Christ-history with the history of salvation (Heilsgeschichte), or the history of the covenant of grace.[1] This fact reminds us of Barth's assertion that the election is the election of Jesus Christ who is in the beginning of all things. In this sense, according to Barth, the Christ-history which takes place in God's time is the eternal history which is present and at the same time past and future, and is past and at the same time present and future, and is future and at the same time present and past.[2] Of course, the Christ-history as the actualization of the covenant of grace has something to do with our time. But what is, or what takes place, in our time is not the Christ-history and revelation. In this sense,

1. Or, at least Barth sees the centre (or, the origin) of the history of salvation in Jesus-history. Cf. CD, III/2, pp.158-160: "His history [Christ-history] alone is originally and immediately the history of the covenant of salvation and revelation inaugurated by God". See also CD, II/1, pp.506-514; III/1, pp.59-61, 75-77; III/2, pp.158-160, 441-442, 472-478, 582-587; IV/2, pp.36, 515, 809, 818, 823f, 828f. For a similar interpretation, see H. Zahrnt, op.cit., pp.94-98. In this sense, Heilsgeschichte and Christ-history are equivalent concepts to the Urgeschichte of the "Romans." Therefore, Jerome Hamer's following observation is right: "The two words [Historie and Geschichte] are not synonymous by any manner of means: Geschichte is of itself opposed to Historie, and the juxtaposition historische Geschichte is simply unthinkable Geschichte pertains immediately to God; it is the divine activity (KD, III/1, 63). It is always the salvific activity of God, the only activity to which Barth seems to pay attention; it is always God's activity in the order of grace, established by a genus of intermittent interventions of His Word in the Holy Spirit."(Karl Barth, p.117f.). Therefore, it is impossible to say that for Barth Geschichte pertains to some Historical element, as do Robert E. Wills (op.cit., p.431) and Thomas E. Ogletree (op.cit., part III).

2. In this sense, the Christ-history takes place in every moment even for the later Barth. Cf. CD, IV/2, p.107: "'Jesus Christ lives' means that this history takes place today in the same time as did that yesterday --- indeed, as the same history. It is the most up-to-date history of the moment. ... In other words, when we say that Jesus Christ is in every age, we say that His history takes place in every age. He is in this operatio, this event." Therefore, it happens only in God's time, in the realm of eternity. For a similar interpretation, see H.U. von Balthasar, op.cit., p.380: "In this theology of happening and history perhaps nothing happens, because everything has already happened in eternity." See also G.C.Berkouwer, op.cit., p.250; Colm O'Grady, The Church in Catholic Theology, p.42; H.Zahrnt, op.cit., pp.112-122.

Barth states: "To put it quite concretely, the statement 'God reveals Himself' must signify that the fulfilled time is the time of the years 1-30 A.D. It must signify that revelation becomes history (Geschichte), but not that history becomes revelation"(CD, I/2, p.58). So the Historical Jesus as such is not the Christ-history and revelation. The revelation of God and the Christ-history take place in Jesus Christ who is in God's time. And this revelation as the event which takes place in God's time can be present in every time as the revelation in God's time. Only in this sense, is the time of the Old Testament the time of Expectation and the time of the New Testament the time of Recollection. For Christ-history is eternal history.[1]

Up to now we have considered Barth's concept of history. What is important for our analysis is that for Barth, the Christ-event or Christ-history is only in God's time. Even though this history is related to the Jesus of History, the Historical life of Jesus (and, the Historical Jesus himself) is not regarded as the Christ-history by Barth.[2] But the being of Jesus Christ (who is not the Historical Jesus, but the One who exists in the light of the Resurrection and, therefore, is described in the New Testament) is Christ-history, and His

1. In this connection, it will be good to quote E. Brunner's quite interesting comment on Barth. Mentioning the attempt to sublimate Christianity into a Christianity of timeless ideas, Brunner says: "This docetic danger does not threaten only Bultmann, but also Barth, who, for instance, when he was in Holland, being asked for his views on the Fall, said that it did not matter whether the serpent spoke, but what he [the serpent] said.(Cf. Credo, p.163). Behind this bon mot, there lies the important truth that even legends and sayings may be used by God as means for proclaiming His word." (Revelation and Reason, trans. Olive Wyon (London: SCM, 1947), p.281 n. 17). Thus Robert E. Wiles criticizes Barth's use of the term history as follows: "Now, it is difficult initially to see how the concept of history can be applied legitimately to events that have no obvious relation to the ordinary space-time frame-work of nature and history." (op.cit., p.447). And Richard H. Roberts also speaks of "an acute danger of a temporal docetism" in the later Barth's theology. Cf. "The Ideal and the Real in the Theology of Karl Barth," in New Studies in Theology, I, eds. S. Sykes and Derek Holmes (London: Duckworth, 1980), p.177.

history(Geschichte) is identical with His being. For Jesus Christ is wholly God and wholly man only in the Geschichte, so only in this history does he accomplish the reconciliation between God and man. And both the history of Creation and the history of Resurrection are also history only in this sense of the word. All these things take place in God's time.

Now we can compare Barth's view of the relation of revelation and history with that of Kierkegaard. In his later theology, Barth says that revelation has a close relation to history, so that it seems valid to argue that revelation takes place in our time and that it has a form of our history. But, in fact, Barth does not give these terms, time and history, their ordinary meaning, as we have seen in this section. On the contrary, Barth asserts that as far as the ordinary meanings of these words, time and history, are concerned, revelation does not take place in them. But revelation happens in a time and a history which have new meanings --- in theological time and history.

What is interesting, when we try to compare such a view with that of Kierkegaard, is the fact that Kierkegaard also tries to give these terms new meanings. As we shall see in chapter III, Kierkegaard contrasts Nature as the spatial order with History as the temporal order. The characteristic nature of the spatial order is that it only has an immediate existence. But what is in

2. Cf. Zahrnt, op.cit., p.113f: "The denial of the historical nature of revelation becomes particularly evident in Barth's teaching on the Incarnation. It is here that Barth pays the heaviest toll for having placed his starting point in eternity." See also R.H.Roberts, "Barth's doctrine of Time," p.111: According to Barth "The birth, death and the Resurrection of Jesus are temporally unlimited." See also Olav Valen-Sendstad, Ordet Som Aldri Kan Do (Bergen: A.S.Tunde and Co. Forlag, 1949), pp.92ff: "The entire Barthian neo-orthodoxy and incarnation teaching opens out in the idealistic and mystic banality that God's self-disclosure takes place in a hidden, unknowable sphere of the "I," not in history, not in the psycho-physical world which now at this time is in our world." cited in Robert D.Preus, "The Word of God in the Theology of Karl Barth," Concordia Theological Monthly, XXXI (1960), pp.110-111.

time can persist as past, after having been present. So what is in time cannot be given immediately to the senses, unlike that which is in Nature. For what is in time, as the historical, is a fact which comes into existence or has come into existence. So what is in time cannot be regarded as a necessary event in any sense of the word. Therefore, the sequence of the past, present and future is not an object of knowledge, but an object of belief. Of course, one can know what is coming into existence or what has been coming into existence. But one cannot know how it comes into existence. For example, suppose something exists. On the basis of that thing, we cannot infer that it must have come into existence. In this sense, what is in time is not an object of knowledge, but an object of belief. At the back of this discussion, there is the modern epistemological distinction between the truths of reason and the truths of history. The truths of reason are the objects of knowledge. For knowledge is the result of a cognitive act or a rational act. But the truths of history are not the result of a rational act, because they are accidental. Hegel, with the presupposition that what is ideal is what is real and what is real is what is ideal (and, rational), tries to interpret the historical as the rational. According to Kierkegaard, it is a kind of attempt to spatialize time. For if one has a presupposition, like Hegel, that what is real is the rational, then one must assert with certainty that what is in the past is a necessary thing (or, event). That is to say, what is in the past is an object of knowledge. So far as good. But if one has this view, revelation has lost its meaning. For, according to this view, what is in the past is a necessary event. So if there were something like revelation in the past, that would only be an actualization of the rational which was there from the first. And if man is rational, he can understand the event by his reason. So Kierkegaard attacks such a view of time and history. According to Kierkegaard this view of time and history does not see reality as it is. All things are confined to human reason, so that the

things which do not come into human reason are disregarded or changed into rational things. In contrast to this view, Kierkegaard asserts that what is in history cannot be regarded as a necessary thing and therefore not a rational thing. What is in history belongs to a different category from what is known by reason. Moreover, revelation is not merely an historical fact, but the absolute fact which is also an historical fact. So according to Kierkegaard, revelation cannot be regarded as necessary and rational.

How can this view of Kierkegaard's of time and history be compared with Barth's definition in his later work of God's time and Geschichte? In a sense, their views of time and history have some common elements. First, both of them place revelation in a time and history, which have new meanings. For Barth, revelation is in God's time and, therefore, in Geschichte. For Kierkegaard, revelation is in time which is not spatialized. If one were not to consider the difference between Barth's view of God's time and Kierkegaard's time which is not spatialized, then one would say that they have this in common, that revelation takes place in a special time. Secondly, both of them state that revelation is not a necessary event. But these are common elements only formally. When we consider their explanation of these matters, it becomes clear how different their views of this problem are. Of the first element, we must say the following. Barth's 'God's time' is different from the time in which, according to Kierkegaard, revelation takes place. For, whereas the time in which revelation takes place, for Kierkegaard, is the time in which every other historical fact takes place, Barth's "God's time" is a different kind of time from all human time. Of course, revelation which takes place in time, for Kierkegaard, is not only an historical fact, but the absolute fact, and, accordingly, it can also be applied to all of time. But this event of revelation is applied to all of time as an historical fact which has taken place

in time in the sense of the ordinary use of this word. However, for Barth, revelation takes place only in God's time. Of course, this revelation is related to things in our time, but what is in our time, according to Barth, is not revelation. Whereas for Kierkegaard revelation can be applied to all of time as the historical fact which took place in time, for Barth revelation, which takes place in God's time, takes place in every time. And in regard to the second element, we can say the following. Even though Barth says that revelation cannot be regarded as a necessary thing, Barth, as we have seen, makes revelation a necessary event. As we have seen, for Barth, revelation is a self-iteration or self-interpretation of God. And this self-iteration of God is based on the inner-life of the Trinity, which implies also the obedience of the Son of God to God the Father. And, for Barth, God the Son, as God Himself who is differentiated from God Himself, is God's thought and God's Word (logos) even in the inner-life of God. And this, God's thought, is not different from Jesus Christ. So, for Barth, if God is faithful to Himself, He cannot but be the God who is 'God-for-us' who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ. The inner-life of the Trinity makes for an inner necessity of the Incarnation. Moreover, the fact that revelation takes place in God's time is, for Barth, very natural to God. For God already has His own temporality from eternity. So the fact that God has time for us is very natural thing for God. So Barth sometimes says that revelation is a rational thing.[1] But, for Kierkegaard revelation cannot be regarded as a rational thing in any sense of the word. And the fact that God

1. Cf. CD IV/1, pp.740ff., IV/3, p.849, IV/2, pp.312ff., II/1, pp.204-54. See also Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, p.52. and Dogmatics in Outline, pp.22f. For discussion of Barth's rationalism and his affinity with Hegel, see the following works: Arnold B. Come, An Introduction to Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers, pp.140f., 248f.; Robert E. Willis, op.cit., pp.79f.; H. Hartwell, op.cit., pp.46f.; Robert Crawford, "The Theological Method of Karl Barth," SJT, XXV (1972), pp.331ff. See also Gordon H. Clark, Karl Barth's Theological Method (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1963), pp.109-117.

became an individual man to be the Revealer cannot be regarded as a rational thing which fits our reason.

We can conclude, therefore, that even though Barth seems to be close to Kierkegaard, they have a different understanding of the relation between revelation and history. According to Kierkegaard, revelation takes place as the absolute fact and, therefore, is an historical fact. But for Barth revelation takes place only in God's time which is not our time.

The problem which we shall deal with in this section is Barth's understanding of the incognito of Christ, or the indirect form of revelation. Barth emphasizes that revelation takes place in an indirect form. As far as the statement that revelation in Christ is an indirect form of revelation is concerned, there is no difference between Barth's view of revelation and that of Kierkegaard (which we shall examine in Chapter III). However, when we consider what they mean by the indirect form, we find a considerable difference between their understandings of revelation. The conclusion which we reach in this section is that whereas Barth asserts that indirect revelation is not the complete revelation, Kierkegaard sees the indirect communication of Christ as itself revelation; and that whereas Barth tries to find the reason for the indirect form of revelation in God Himself, Kierkegaard finds the reason in the fact that man is in sin. Therefore, whereas for Barth, revelation itself is always in the hands of God, for Kierkegaard what is revealed even in indirect form is in History as revelation itself, i.e., as the absolute fact.

Of course, in this section we are primarily concerned with Barth's understanding of the indirect form of revelation. However, during the course of our discussion of Barth, we shall try to compare Barth and Kierkegaard on the basis of the discussion of Kierkegaard's understanding of this problem in chapter III. So we shall show the differences between them through (1) a discussion of the relation between revelation and God and (2) a discussion of the relation between revelation and faith. The second point to be discussed is closely related to the first point.

One of the things which Barth emphasises in his later theology is that

God's Word is God Himself in His revelation (CD I/1, p.339, passim). To say this more briefly, for Barth, revelation is God Himself in His revelation. The event of revelation or the revealedness of revelation is also God Himself.[1] For Barth, revelation is not only an event which is connected with God, but God Himself who is in it. And revelation is not merely the truth of something which God gives us, but God Himself. Therefore, if God reveals Himself in Jesus Christ, then the Historical Jesus is not the revelation (Cf. CD I/1, pp.188f.), but God who reveals Himself in the light of the resurrection is revelation. For revelation must be God Himself. Only Jesus Christ who is revealed in the mode of God can be called revelation. In this sense, Barth says: "Revelation as such is not relative. Revelation in fact does not differ from the Person of Jesus Christ, and again does not differ from the reconciliation that took place in Him. To say revelation is to say, 'The Word became flesh'" (CD I/1, p.134). Jesus Christ who is Himself the Christ-history is revelation, for He is only in God's time. Accordingly, He is not in the history which is the realm of relativity, for Jesus Christ must be revelation and revelation, as God himself, must not be relative.

Jesus Christ who is in the event of the resurrection as God, and therefore God's revelation, was revealed to His disciples during the forty days from the resurrection to the ascension. "He [God] was not," says Barth, "both veiled and manifest, both manifest and veiled, in Christ. He had been veiled, but He was now wholly and unequivocally and irrevocably manifest" (CD III/2, p.449). Therefore, according to Barth, Jesus Christ who exists in the resurrection is revelation in the real sense of the word. But, according to Barth, the

1. Cf. Heinz Zahrnt, The Question of God, p.112: "The process of revelation [for Barth] is reduced to a monologue conducted by God with himself as three persons, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit." James Brown discusses this point in detail in his Subject and Object in Modern Theology (London:SCM, 1955), pp.140-166.

expression 'the forty days' does not have a literal meaning, but must be taken symbolically. "They [biblical account of the resurrection] do not offer precise chronological information as to the duration of the appearances"(CD III/2, p.452). For these appearances are not in History, in our time, as we have seen. These appearances are in God's time. So the event of the appearance of Jesus Christ as the resurrected One is beyond the reach of historical research or historical depiction. Therefore, Jesus Christ who exists in the light of the resurrection is the direct revelation. Therefore, His resurrection is in God's time. Hence, according to Barth, the traces of revelation which is in our time (e.g., recollections of the meeting with the resurrected One during the forty days, the records of this recollection, and even the Historical Jesus himself) is always an indirect revelation. For God cannot enter into our time. Of course Barth says that God has time for us in the act of revelation, but the time which God has for us, as we have seen in the last section, is God's time. According to Barth, it is impossible for these to be direct revelation in our time. For Barth revelation is God Himself and God cannot enter into our time. For if God entered our time, God Himself would be relative. According to Barth's presupposition, everything which is in our time is relative. And therefore, if there were to be a direct revelation of God in our time, God, as the revelation itself, would be confined to the structure of our time. For Barth, since revelation is God Himself, God's revelation is also in God's time. Therefore, if there is revelation, we cannot know it, for it is not in our time. Hence Barth says: "God is known only by God"(CD II/1, p.179). In this sense, for Barth, God, before and after revelation, is the hidden God. Even in the presence of the revelation God is hidden. Only God Himself receives revelation on behalf of us. Barth says: "How does homo peccator becomes capax verbi divini ?Manifestation must be added as something special, as a special act of the Father or the Son or both, to the givenness of the revelation of the

Father in the Son. This special element then in revelation is undoubtedly identical with what the New Testament usually calls the Holy Spirit, as the subjective side of the event of the revelation"(CD I/1, pp. 522, 514f.).[1] Of course, "man is the subject of faith. It is not God but man who believes"(CD I/1, p.281). However, Barth immediately adds the following: "But the fact that he believes is God's act the very fact of a man thus being subject in faith is bracketed as the predicate of the subject, God, bracketed exactly as the Creator embraces His creature, the merciful God sinful man"(CD I/1, p.281). So only in the Holy Spirit can we know and believe in revelation. But because of this subjective revelation, God once again becomes a hidden God for us. For what is known in the moment of subjective revelation is that God is hidden, God is wholly other, and God is totally unknown.[2] Therefore, "the moment," says Barth, "we have unreservedly to confess God's hiddenness, we have begun really and certainly to know God. As an assertion of revelation and therefore of faith, as a confession of our grateful responsibility to the God present to us, the insight that God is hidden from us is the infallible indication of the fact that it is by God Himself that we are led to the knowledge of Him, that we and our knowledge do not stand outside and afar off but in the very presence of God Himself. It is in the real knowledge of God that it is a question of apprehending God in His hiddenness, of comprehendere incomprehensibile. Only in the real knowledge of God can this be the case. If we apprehend, view and conceive God in His hiddenness, we stand already in the real knowledge of

1. Hartwell says (on the basis of CD I/1, p.468): "It is the work of the Son of God, that God can speak to us; it is the work of the Holy Spirit that we hear the Word of God"(op.cit, p.468).

2. Cf. CD I/2, p.245: "For only by the knowledge of that revelation, the knowledge of Jesus Christ, do we learn that God is a hidden God. Similarly, it is by the same Holy Spirit by whom God takes up His abode in us and makes us His temple, that God and man are separated with power and finality." Therefore, as R.E.Willis points out, for Barth, "The hiddenness of God in revelation constitutes a very real and persistent linguistic "crisis" which extends over every attempt to speak meaningfully of him [God]"(op.cit., pp.91f.).

God"(CD II/1, p.192). In a word, knowing the true God in His revelation, we apprehend Him in His hiddenness.

Therefore, for Barth, since revelation is not different from God himself[1], we cannot know God even in his revelation. Or, the only thing which we can know in the event of revelation is the fact that God is the 'Wholly Other.' Of course, Barth sometimes speaks of the veracity of man's knowledge of God. But "the veracity of our knowledge of God is the veracity of His revelation"(CD II/1, p.209). That is to say, God Himself, with His will to reveal himself and therefore His claim upon us, takes our place; and therefore with his power to reveal Himself, he does not ignore or eliminate but fills the void of our impotence to view and conceive Him. But this is possible only in God's hands. That is to say, only in the Christ-history or in Jesus Christ is this possible. "In Him [Jesus Christ]," says Barth, "the believing man, beyond and despite the darkness which is in himself, finds himself in the light, ready for God; he finds God knowable, and he does so with all the eternal definiteness, certainty and blessedness which is proper to faith, so far as it is faith in Him, as the temporal form of the eternal truth of Jesus Christ, which our own truth. But it is the Church who lives by the Holy Spirit and in faith"(CD II/1, p.159f.). Therefore, the one who knows God's revelation in its real meaning is only God Himself. In this sense, according to Barth, as God unveils Himself, He also veils Himself; and as He veils Himself, He also unveils Himself. Barth says:

"God reveals Himself in the mode of hiddenness; but the meaning of His revelation is His veracity. He unveils Himself to us in and through His

1. we discussed this problem in the last paragraph. See also H.Hartwell,op.cit., p.67: "The Word of God as addressed to man is the living God Himself in His revelation, and the Word of God, of God Himself in His Word, to man, a divine action initiated, executed and consummated by the sovereign and free grace of God."

veiling and to that extent beginning with His veiling. But He does unveil Himself; it is for this reason and to this end that He veils Himself and to this extent that His unveiling is the goal of His way and ours"(CD II/1, p.215).

Therefore, according to Barth, God's revelation to us is always an indirect revelation.[1] That is to say, God unveils Himself through veiling Himself.[2] The reason why Barth always says this lies also in Barth's equation of revelation with God Himself. Since Barth believes that God is identical with His revelation, one can say that the person knows God's revelation only if he comprehends God. However, such a knowledge of God is possible only for God. Barth says:

"When God knows Himself, the Father the Son and the Son the Father through the Holy Spirit, then that happens at a stroke and once for all in the same perfection from eternity to eternity. But our knowing of God is obviously not like this"(CD II/1, p.61).

So, according to Barth, we cannot say that we know the real meaning of revelation. The knowledge of revelation which has an analogical relation to God's own knowledge, exists only in the act of God's revelation and therefore, only in God's time.[3] So we must start to know revelation and God moment by moment as God reveals Himself to us. For as Berkouwer points out Barth believes that "true knowledge of God is given only in the miracle of God's revelation." [4] Barth says: "For temporally means in repetition, in a cognition which progresses from one present to another, which constantly begins afresh in every present, in a series of single acts of knowledge"(CD II/1, p.61). There is no guarantee of our knowledge of God except the sacramental reality --- Jesus

1. Cf. also CD, II/1, pp.9, 10, 16. Thomas W. Ogletree comments on Barth's concept of revelation as follows: "The meeting between God and man is always indirect, mediate, closhed, under a veil. What happens is that man encounters a part of reality surrounding him which is different from God such that this reality without ceasing to be a definite creaturely reality effectively represents God"(op.cit., p.119).

2. Cf. CD I/1, p.192: "The facts are that God Himself veils Himself and in the very process unveils Himself." See also pp. 184-212 and Credo p.20.

Christ--- who is in His own history(Christ-history) which is in God's time.

To sum up the first point which we have drawn out from Barth: Since Barth equates revelation with God who is in his revelation, there can be no direct revelation in our time for him.

Secondly, therefore, for Barth, faith in God's revelation has a very special meaning. First of all, for Barth, faith as an acceptance of the revelation of God, is subjective revelation itself. "The revelation of God in its subjective reality," says Barth, "consists in the existence of men who have been led by God Himself to a certain conviction. They believe that objective reality in revelation exists for them"(CD I/2, p.232). The moment of faith is the moment of subjective revelation.[5] And without subjective revelation,

3. For Barth the knowledge of faith is based on a double analogical relation. That is to say, (1) there is an analogical relation between God and God's revelation and also (2) there is an analogical relation between God's revelation and our knowledge of God. However, for Barth, both of analogical relations are not static, but dynamic ---- that is to say, only in the moment of God's act, is there an analogical relation between the two elements of analogy. Here we can raise the question as to whether our knowledge of God in our time can have an analogical relation to God and His revelation. In the system of Barth's thought, it seems to me, our knowledge of God in our time cannot have an analogical relation to God's revelation. For Barth believes that the analogia fidei can be understood only as a happening or an event. Hans Urs von Balthasar, in his book on Barth (op.cit., pp.94-95), clearly points this out: "It [analogia fidei] is an action, a happening, which makes man's decision in faith similar to God's. It is action, not being. [Moreover,] Creation's likeness to God is a one-way street. It is fashioned from above by the Word, which lays hold of creation."(based on KD I/1, 252,254,257). Because the relationship of analogy is established from above through the action of revelation, the analogy only takes place in the action of God. Therefore, if there is any analogy between our knowledge and God's revelation, the analogy only takes place in the moment of real faith which is identical with God's subjective revelation. Hence, our knowledge of God in our time itself has no analogical relation to God's revelation. For a discussion of the actualistic character of Barth's analogia fidei, see also H. Hartwell, op.cit., p.56, and A.B.Come, op.cit., pp.142-149. see also Colin Gunton, "Karl Barth and the development of Christian Doctrine," SJT, XXV (1972), p.172: "Barth's analogy is essentially one of event." See also R.W.Jenson, God after God, pp.95-113.

4. G.C.Berkouwer, op.cit., p.191.

objective revelation is in vain. Therefore, objective revelation itself is in need of subjective revelation.[6] As we have seen, objective revelation is, in a word, the objective side of the Christ-history. Yet the Christ-history is not static history which is in the past, but dynamic history which takes place even now. Therefore, subjective revelation is only another name for the dynamic character of the Christ-history. That is to say, in the moment of faith the Christ-history takes place, as it took place in the past, in God's time. So the moment of real faith is also not in our time, but in God's time. For "real revelation puts man in God's presence"(CD I/2, p.237).[7] According to Barth, if Christ-history does not take place now, then so-called objective revelation is "an idol like all the rest, and perhaps the worst of all idols"(CD I/2, p.237).

5. Cf. CD IV/2, p.341: "The event of revelation can take place only in the act of worship." At this point we must consider the relation between the prophetic office of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit. See IV/3, pp.317-335. For a similar interpretation of Barth, see John McConnachie, The Barthian Theology and the Man of Today (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1934), p.244: "Faith itself is revelation, for it is the event from the side of God." See also Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth, pp.67, 95, 179: "The historical event of faith, which is identified with the Word, is beyond all human perception." "For Barth, faith is a divine intervention that by-passes the human faculties of intellect and will." "Faith, grace, predestination have become practically synonymous in Barth's theology."

6. Cf. CD I/2, pp.237f. In this sense, Barth thinks of God's revelation as "God's revelation in his Son through the Spirit." (Credo, pp.20, 21, 22, 23, 130.)

7. Therefore, for Barth, unlike Schleiermacher, God is not in our feeling of absolute dependence, but we are in the presence of God in faith which is subjective revelation itself. Therefore, the moment of faith does not belong to us. As far as our experience is concerned, our faith-experience is not a real faith and not in God's time. But real faith which is beyond our own faith-experience and our knowledge of God is in God's time, the time of Christ-history. In connection with this, it is well to quote Richard Niebuhr's observation on Barth's realism: "In actuality Barth's realism must enlist a subjective idealism, in which the sole acting subject is Jesus Christ. At the moment of encounter with the risen Lord, the "knower," who has nothing of his own to contribute to the "recognition", fades into the overpowering subjectivity of the Son of God" (Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p.49). See also Colin Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message, pp.136ff: "What Barth has done is to transpose the action of justification from the encounter of the individual with Christ in history to the realm of a super-history where it is objectified, universalized and all but emptied of subjective response."

But, as we have seen, since revelation is God Himself in His revelation, revelation also takes place now: "And indeed what takes place at this point does involve a conviction, an opening up, an uncovering of the truth of objective revelation before the eyes and ears and the heart of man"(CD I/2, p.238). Hence, there is the revealedness of God's revelation; this is subjective revelation. But the revealedness of God and His revelation is God Himself, the Holy Spirit.[1] Subjective revelation, therefore, is not different from the fact that the Holy Spirit is in us or we are in Christ.[2] Hence, it is the divine act of lordship, the mystery and the miracle of the existence of God among us, the triumph of grace, in no less a sense than the Incarnation of the Word of God in Christ. Barth says: "For the mystery of the Word of God coming to us and apprehended by us is this: that the mystery of Jesus Christ now stands in our life as a miracle, that as God there became man, for that reason we here have God"(CD I/2, p.269). Therefore, faith in the true sense exists in the fact that we are in Jesus Christ, in Christ-history which takes place now. What does Barth mean by "in Christ"?

In a word, this means that we have our Lord in Christ. Barth explains this as follows: (1) we have found someone over against us, from whom we can no longer withdraw; (2) we have discovered His supreme authority, to which in all

1. Cf. Credo, p.130: "By Holy Spirit is to be understood: God who comes to man and indeed comes to him in such a way that He is known to him, that man lets himself be reconciled, in other words, that he believes in God's Word and Son Jesus Christ."

2. In this sense, for Barth, the difference between so-called natural revelation and the revelation in Jesus Christ lies in the question as to whether it [revelation] can be our perception or not. Cf. Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.56: "What we call revelation is what comes to our perception. God can reveal himself everywhere, in the garden, in a table etc., but the question is: are we sure of it? And in Jesus Christ in the Bible we are sure of it. From there we know that God is everywhere. We may have glimpses outside, but I would not like to call them revelation." In this sense, Hartwell says: "With him [Barth] this revelation is revelation only if it is recognized, acknowledged and accepted by man."(op.cit., p.69).

our obedience or disobedience we are always responsible and subject; (3) we are subject to command, in face of which there can be neither subterfuge nor excuse; (4) we exist in an ultimate and most profound irresponsibility, for in Him we always find ourselves to be sinners; (5) we are subject to a definite formation and direction of the Lord; and (6) we have no concern for ourselves, but His, Christ's concern, is our concern.[1]

When and where can we be "in Christ", then? When is this possible? Only in Christ-history in which our justification and sanctification take place. Hence, true faith which actualizes the condition of being in Christ is only in Christ Himself.[2] And we have faith only in Christ-history. All which is outside of Christ-history is only the attempt of man to replace God with other things. And that which is similar to faith which is outside Christ-history is only a form of religion which must be abolished by the Christ-history. Only what exists in Christ is belief or faith, all that which is outside Christ-history, which is in God's time, is religion as unbelief. Even the Christian religion, as far as its existence in our time is concerned, is not different from any other religion. But it can become the true religion in Christ-history and therefore in God's time. Barth says: "That there is a true religion is an event in the act of the grace of God in Jesus Christ. To be even more precise, it is an event in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. To be even more precise, it is an event in the existence of the Church and the children of God"(CD I/2, p.344). Of course, when Barth speaks of the Church, he implies even the visible Church in our time. But, according to Barth, "from the standpoint of their [Church's] own activity as such, they do not stand out decisively above the general level of religious history. They do not escape the

1. Cf. CD I/2, pp.270-279.

2. Cf. Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.69.

divine accusation of idolatry and self-righteousness"(CD I/2, p.344). Only if they are in Christ, can they be called the Church and the children of God. They themselves are not members of the true Church, but those who are in Jesus-Christ are members of the true Church.[1] Jesus Christ who is in God's time, creates, elects, justifies, and sanctifies Christian religion in His own time. (Cf. CD I/1, pp.346-361). Therefore, as the object of Christ's creation, election, justification, and sanctification, all belong to Christ-history and therefore to God's time.[2]

We can better understand Barth's intention when we compare this with Barth's discussion of the relation between the form of the Word of God and the Word of God itself. According to Barth, those things in our time which are the form of the Word of God (whether the Historical Jesus, the Scriptures, or the Church Proclamation) are not in themselves the Word of God.[3] But even though they are not the Word of God in themselves, they become the Word of God in God's hands and in God's time.[4] In the hands of God there takes place the Incarnation of the Word of God. Because of this, they become from time to time what they are not in themselves.[5]

1. But, according to Barth, the true membership of the true Church in Jesus-Christ is not confined to the Christian Church in our time. See Barth's answer to a student's question: {question} "Do you understand the "Body of Christ" ontologically or metaphorically?" {Answer} "It is certainly a metaphor, but a very expensive one. We cannot express this truth without metaphorical language: Christ, the Head; we the Church, His Body. Not everyone is in the Body of Christ. That is clear in the New Testament. The Body is made up of called, hearing, accepting believers. But everyone is a virtual member of the Body. No one is excluded"(Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.15) See also, "My point in anthropology is that every man is a virtual brother of Christ, because the whole world is healed in and through Christ"(Ibid.).

2. In this sense, for Barth, the real Church is an 'event' that happens in God's time. This point is closely related to Barth's view of the proclamation in the visible church. Both proclamation and Church are not in God's time. However, in God's time they become the Word of God and the real Church. Cf. Karl Barth's Table Talk, pp.41ff., esp.: "The church exists only as an event of the Word Word is a living reality It exists in God's action toward us.... ["Is the "body" of Christ an event?"] Yes, bodily existence is an event"(p.41).

That we are "in Christ" can be understood in this way. As far as we are concerned, we are not justified and sanctified. But in so far as we are in Christ, we have already been justified and the perfectly sanctified. In Christ we are that we are not. Barth states:

"In Christ the divine pardoning is not a remission "as if" man were not a sinner. As pardoning, it is the creative work of God, in the power of which man, even as the old man that he was and he still is, is no longer that man, but already another man, the man he will be, the new man" (CD IV/1, p.596).

And again:

"He alone on whom they look takes from that which they do, their lifting up of themselves, the doubtful and questionable character from which it is never free in and for itself.... He alone sanctifies it by accepting it as perfect, and therefore by continually justifying it. He alone gives to it here below in the world, where these men also exist, the power and significance of a right answer to His self-attestation and therefore of a witness to the sanctification of man as accomplished in Him (CD IV/2, p.528, see also pp.592f.).

Therefore, the justification and sanctification of an individual believer and the community are already accomplished or perfected in Jesus Christ. But this does not mean that in the Historical life of the Historical Jesus, all of these things are accomplished, but that in the Christ-history which takes place even now as it had taken place yesterday, all of these things are accomplished. Hence, what are justified and sanctified are not in our time; they are only in Christ-history. That we are in Christ, therefore, means that we are in

3. Even though there is room for discussion in the case of the Historical Jesus, it seems to me at least, in the light of Barth's whole thrust in his later theology, that to interpret Barth's view of the Historical Jesus as such is the right interpretation. For a similar interpretation, see Charles Waldrop, "Karl Barth's Concept of the Divinity of Jesus Christ," Harvard Theological Review, LXXIV (1981), pp.247ff., esp., p.248: "Although Barth does not say explicitly that the "is" in "Jesus of Nazareth is the Word of God" is an "is" of becoming, what he says seems to lead directly to that conclusion."

4. Cf. CD I/1, p.156: "Thus God reveals Himself in propositions by means of language, and human language at that, to the effect that from time to time such and such a word, spoken by the prophets and apostles and proclaimed in the Church, becomes His Word."

5. For example, see Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.26: "For me the Word of God is a happening, not a thing. Therefore, the Bible must become the Word of God, and it does this through the work of the Spirit."

Christ-history. According to Barth, this is the first meaning of faith. However, faith defined as such is not in our time, but only in Jesus Christ.[1] As far as we who are in our time are concerned, we are only unbelievers and sinners. But in Christ-history, we are the justified and the sanctified.

In this connection we can consider the second form of faith in Barth's theology. As we have seen in the last paragraph, Barth believes that real faith is only in Jesus Christ. Hence, in a sense the only one who has the first form of faith (real faith) is Jesus Christ who is in Christ-history. However, Barth does not mean to imply by this line of thought that man cannot be a believing subject. The belief in God and the knowledge of God in our time are human belief and human knowledge of God and therefore both our knowledge of God and belief in God are human undertaking and action. However, our belief and our knowledge of God in our time are not identical with real faith which we have discussed in the last few paragraphs. So I have suggested that it is necessary to distinguish the first form of faith (real faith) and the second form of faith (our faith in our time).[2] In the next few paragraphs, I shall try to draw out the characteristics of the second form of faith from Barth's discussion of faith in revelation.

1. In a sense, this faith is the faith of Jesus Christ. Cf. Karl Barth, "Gospel and Law," in God, Grace, and Gospel, trans. James Strathearn McNab (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), pp. 11f.: "God's grace is Jesus Christ who stands for us with His Humanity. And He stands for us by believing in our place, which means saying Yes to God's majesty and consequently to man's misery. In this faith of His He carried out once and for all what God wants with man and from man; He fulfilled the Law and kept all the commandment And therefore this faith of Jesus Christ which is the core of the Gospel takes, when the Gospel becomes manifest, that form which demands conformity and so becomes the commandment in all commandments, the principle of our cleaning, sanctification and renewal, the one thing in all those things that the Church has to say to itself and to the world."

2. John McConnachie also points out that Barth distinguishes the real faith and our faith-experience: "Barth distinguishes between two kinds of experience: experience as a meeting with God in His Word and experience as a human psychic consciousness"(op.cit., p.247). See also Peter Monsma,op.cit., pp.119-125.

First of all, the object of our faith in our time is given in the moment of subjective revelation and therefore in the moment of faith which is in Christ-history. There is no revelation which we must believe before subjective revelation. For objective revelation is only in God's time. Hence, before subjective revelation or the Christ-history in us, there is in fact no object which we have to believe, even though objective revelation happened in the past. The object of faith is given to us only in or after subjective revelation.

Secondly, when we believe in God through subjective revelation, we do not know God. This does not only mean that when we believe in God, we do not comprehend God, but that when we have faith in God, we do not know God at all or we know that we do not know God. For God reveals Himself in the form that He reveals himself wholly and He veils Himself wholly.[1] Furthermore, we can know God only in Christ; but we do not know God in ourselves.[2] It is not the case that whereas (1) we do not know God before our faith, (2) now by faith we know God. These two statements, for Barth, cannot be placed in a temporal sequence. Of course, we do not know God before we have faith. But even after we have faith, we do not know God, for only in Christ do we know God through an analogia fidei. And as we have seen, the analogy of faith is only in the moment of God's act of revelation. Therefore, as far as we who are in our time are concerned, we do not know God at all even we have received the faith-experience or the Christ-history has taken place. Of course, there are some traces of revelation in our time. And we can know these traces. In this sense, our knowledge of God which is in God's time, in so far as it is a kind of knowledge, bears a formal similarity to all other knowledge(Cf. CD II/1, p.21). However, since true

1. Cf. A.B.Come,op.cit., p.171; H.U. von Balthasar,op.cit., p.63. See also Peter Monsma,op.cit., pp.121-130.

2. In this sense, the following question of Balthasar about theology fits well with Barth's intention: "Is it [theology] general enough and empty enough to embrace the Revelation happening without damaging it?"(op.cit., p.211).

knowledge of God is only in the act of God, it does not stay in our time. The traces cannot be identified with the true knowledge of God which is in God's time. Hence, as soon as we think that our knowledge of God in our time is a right or proper one, our knowledge of God is not a proper one. For even though God does become an object of human knowledge, and even though man himself is given an active role in that knowledge, it is still a knowledge which God alone can initiate and bring to completion (CD II/1, p.69). It remains wholly contingent upon the decisive action of God. Only in Christ-history does it become a true knowledge of God. Hence, what we express in our time about God and His revelation is not a proper one. Our preaching, the Sunday-school lesson, a personal word of testimony, or a theological treatise --- all of these things in themselves are not truths which express God and his revelation. But only in Christ-history, these things can become the Word of God. Thus, what is in our time is not truth in the real sense of the word. And it does not even have an analogical relation to God's revelation. But in God's time it can become a true expression of God and his revelation.[1] Therefore, as far as the formal form is concerned, faith is to believe what is not truth, or we may say that faith is to believe in spite of the untruthness of our knowledge of God in our time. So Barth emphasizes the fact that we believe in God himself, not in the things about God. In spite of the inadequacy of our knowledge, we can believe in God who reveals Himself through it. According to Barth, revelation

1. Therefore, Barth says that even though it [human knowledge of God or human expression of God's revelation] in itself is not the truth and the true knowledge of God, it becomes and is true because of God's revelation: "The human knowledge of God becomes and is true because God is truly God in His revelation; because His revelation is true as such; because in it He truly claims human thinking and speaking; because by it He upholds us as those who think of Him and speak of Him in humility before Him" (CD II/1, p.214). However, as we can guess on the basis of Barth's usual argument, Barth immediately adds to this passage that "our knowing has its veracity from its goal" (CD II/1, p.215). That is to say our knowledge of God is true only in the work of the Holy Spirit. See also Karl Barth's Table Talk, pp.29-31.

itself makes us believe in spite of the untruthness of the external expression of the revelation.[2] If we say that what we believe or know is truth, for Barth, that means that God is confined to our faith and our knowledge. But God must be free even in His revelation. What is in our time is not God Himself and therefore revelation itself, but it can become God's revelation in Christ-history.

Thirdly, our faith is only hope, as far as we who are in our time are concerned. What was said about faith in God's time is only in God's time, so that faith in God's time is an eschatological faith. Therefore, faith in God's time is not yet given to us. And as far as we who are in our time are concerned, we can hope that one day we could be certain that our faith is the right one.[3] Barth says:

"Everything that is to be said about the man who receives the Holy Spirit is in the New Testament sense an eschatological pronouncement. Eschatological means not "with an improper or unreal intent," but "related to the eschaton, i.e., to what from our point of view is still in arrears for our experience and thought, to the eternal reality of the divine fulfilment and completion. Precisely only eschatological pronouncements, i.e., pronouncements related to this eternal reality, may, as pronouncements upon temporal circumstances, claim to have a real and proper intention. Or how could man be able to intend anything more real and more proper than the truth in this particular relation."(CD I/1, pp.530f.).

Therefore, for Barth, what is fulfilled and what is completed is only in God, in the eternal realm. Therefore, that has no limit, and is not merely related to

2. Cf. CD II/1, p.229: "For example, the words "father" and "son" do not first and properly have their truth at the point of reference to the underlying views and concepts in our thought and language. They have it first and properly at a point to which, as our words, they cannot refer at all, but to which, on the basis of the grace of the revelation of God, they may refer, and on the basis of the lawful claim of God the Creator, they even must refer, and therefore on the basis of this permission and compulsion, they can actually refer --- in their application to God, in the doctrine of Trinity." See also J.Hamer, Karl Barth, p.68. And again Thomas W. Ogletree, op.cit., p.128 and Leonard de Moore, "The Concept of Revelation in Barthianism," The Journal of Religion, XVII (1937), p.137.

3. For a similar understanding of Barth, see P.Monsma, op.cit., p.144.

an eschaton, but is itself the eschaton. But "that is the thing we cannot say of the man we know, even and above all in faith. He does not live an eternal life. That is and remains the predicate of God, of the Holy Spirit"(CD I/1, p.531). We, as ourselves, are always poor. Men remain as the same men as they were before they experience the revelation in God's time. Of course, faith is also our decision, confession or trust. And it calls for the exercise of our intellect and will(CD I/1, pp.268f.). But all of these in our time are not directly identified with faith in a real sense by Barth, even though he himself sometimes calls these faith. According to Barth this is the right attitude of the man who looks for everything from God's hands: "It is only en pneumati that we can and shall wish, one way and the other, to turn from ourselves to God, to pray to God, but not to consider God or dispose of God. But once more he alone prays who looks for everything at God's hand. And once more he alone looks for everything at God's hand who looks for nothing at his hand"(CD I/1, p.532).

To sum up Barth's formal form of faith: Faith in its formal sense in our time is to accept the fact that all things which are accomplished in Jesus Christ in Christ-history are in God's hand.[1] Hence, it [faith in the second sense of the word] starts to know God and His revelation in the moment of subjective revelation, but what we know in our time is only a half-truth or a limited truth about the revelation and God Himself, so that sure knowledge of God and of His revelation remains only as a hope, only as a promise. Why can we not go further in our time? Because God reveals Himself to us only in indirect revelation. That is to say, since God wholly reveals Himself and also at the same time wholly veils Himself, we cannot go further than to know God only in hope or as a promise. Because God is free even in His revelation, we cannot

1. In this sense, there is Barth's understanding of faith as "trust." For the further discussion of this problem, see Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth, pp.159-170.

know God in reality, but only in promise.

Therefore, for Barth, faith has its real object only in God's time. The object of faith is not given to us in our time. What is in our time which is similar to this object is our knowledge of God, is a very inadequate knowledge. So we must believe in God who is in God's time and in his revelation in spite of the inadequacy of our knowledge of God. The inadequacy of the revelation which is expressed in our time is not due to our sin or our limitedness, but to the special character of the revelation. And the reason why we believe in God in spite of the inadequacy of our knowledge of the revelation of God, lies in the inadequacy of the expression of God's revelation. And this inadequacy is a necessary thing, because revelation, as God who is in His revelation, cannot be expressed adequately in our time. Only in God's time does revelation reveal itself properly. In our time it is distorted or changed into something which is proper to our time. Therefore, we cannot find God's revelation, and accordingly God, in our time.

Now we are ready to compare Barth's understanding of indirect revelation with that of Kierkegaard. As we shall see in chapter III, for Kierkegaard the incognito of Christ is a very important concept. According to Kierkegaard Jesus is the God-man. That is to say, Jesus is an individual man who is also God. The incognito of Jesus Christ is not different from the fact of the God-man. He as God is not flesh and blood, but he became an individual man of flesh and blood. This is the cause of the offence. He is God, but chooses to become an individual man to be the revealer and redeemer of men.

What is important at this point is that Kierkegaard thinks that this indirect communication of God is revelation itself. For Kierkegaard, there is no other revelation that will be given about God except this indirect

communication. That is to say, for Kierkegaard, there is no possibility of knowing God except through this indirect communication. Of course, for Kierkegaard, we do not by our power accept this fact as revelation. Only when God gives the condition to understand this indirect communication, can we have faith in this fact. However, Kierkegaard's understanding of the God-given condition is very different from Barth's understanding of subjective revelation. Let us briefly discuss this problem.

In some respects they look similar. According to Barth, "subjective revelation is not the addition of a second revelation to objective revelation. Subjective revelation can be only the repetition, the impress, the sealing of objective revelation upon us; or, from our point of view, our own discovery, acknowledgement and affirmation of it." (CD I/2, pp.238f.) In this respect, subjective revelation seems similar to the God-given condition. For, Kierkegaard also thinks that the God-given-condition is not an addition to the event of the God-man. And in that Kierkegaard's Paradox of the God-man and Barth's objective revelation are not understood by man, they are similar. And the fact that both Kierkegaard and Barth imply the testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum, when they speak of the God-given-condition and of the subjective, also can be pointed to as a similarity[1]. However, even though Barth and Kierkegaard seem to have some similarities here, they are basically different from each other in the following ways.

First, whereas Kierkegaard's God-given-condition is the condition given to understand that this is the the Paradox which has already been given in time and history (therefore, the Paradox was there and rejected by our reason before God gives the condition), subjective revelation is the bringing of revelation which

1. Cf. CD I/2, Chapter II, Part 3; Philosophical Fragments, pp.78-80, 190.

is in Jesus Christ who is in God's time (therefore, there was nothing which must be believed and rejected by us before subjective revelation). According to Barth, the problem of subjective revelation breaks up, once again, into two questions: "(1) How does revelation come from Christ to man? and (2) How, as such, does it come into man?" (CD I/2, p.222). The reason why the first question must be included in subjective revelation lies in the character of objective revelation. As we have seen, Christ-history does not happen in our time and our history, but only in God's time. Therefore, with objective revelation, the truth of God cannot be revealed to anyone. This does not mean that man does not want to accept the revelation of God, but that, in accordance with the nature (of revelation), it is impossible to see the revelation, for it is not in our time. Therefore, in subjective revelation the object of faith must be given, and that before subjective revelation there is no object of faith in our time. Barth believes that the Christ-history is the act of God which takes place now and will take place tomorrow as it took place yesterday, in God's time. Hence, for Barth objective revelation is given in subjective revelation. Barth says:

"It is not that there are, as it were, two different points: at the one the Son of God assumes humanity; and then, at quite a different point, the question of our destiny is necessarily raised and answered. In the one reality of revelation He is, in His assumed humanity, the Son of God from eternity, as we, for His sake, are by grace the children of God from eternity" (CD I/2, p.238).

In contrast to this, for Kierkegaard Christ who is in his humiliation is the revealer. Even though people do not accept this fact, He remains the revealer. The condition for understanding this Paradox, for Kierkegaard, is not called revelation. The contents of revelation have already been given in the history of Jesus, that is to say Christ who is in his humiliation.

Secondly, therefore, whereas Barth asserts that the object of faith is given in subjective revelation, Kierkegaard asserts that the object of faith has already been given in the history of Jesus, that is to say Christ who is in his

humiliation. According to Barth, Jesus Christ reveals Himself only in the light of the resurrection. So there is no revelation which is not to be interpreted in the light of resurrection. Accordingly, for those who live after Jesus Christ, the object of faith is given in subjective revelation, in the Christ-history which takes place now. But for Kierkegaard the object of faith was already given in the past, for revelation is in the life of Jesus Christ who is in His humiliation. Because of this character of revelation, there is the possibility of offence. The reason why one is offended lies in the fact that the individual man Jesus asserts, suggests, and gives signs that he himself is God and that there is no way to know God besides through him. For Kierkegaard, if there is no such self-revelation of Jesus Christ, there is no Paradox. For if he does not reveal himself in his humiliation, there is no possibility of offence. Even though Jesus Christ sometimes does not directly say that he is God or he is the One who is promised to come, and only suggests that we should give attention to the signs which he gives, even in such an indirect suggestion he betrays that he is the object of faith. In the last analysis, the reason why Christ's revelation is an indirect revelation lies in the fact that the communicator appears as an individual man. As far as the content of revelation is concerned, revelation is not a wholly veiled one, even though it was sometimes communicated by parables and sign-givings. The reason why the God-given-condition is necessary lies in man's refusal to accept the object of faith, or rejection of the acceptance of the content of revelation. Man tries not to accept this fact[the paradox] which is given in our time and history; man refuses to accept "God in time." For he does not want to abandon or resign his use of Reason even in relation to God. Kierkegaard calls this refusal or rejection the sin of despairing of the forgiveness of sins, or the offence[1].

1. Cf. Sickness unto Death, p.244. See also chapter III of this study.

This means that for Kierkegaard the object of faith is already given before faith[2]. In this respect, Kierkegaard's God-given-condition is different from Barth's subjective revelation.

Thirdly, whereas for Kierkegaard man can have the assurance of the object of faith, for Barth there can be no assurance for man's faith. For, whereas for Barth what is certain after subjective revelation is only in God's hands and in God's time, for Kierkegaard the man who believes in God believes that God became an individual man in our time and history. Barth places all that is accomplished in Jesus Christ in God's time[3]. Therefore, for Barth, "certainty of faith means concretely certainty of hope"(CD I/1, p.530). That is to say, what is certain is not in our hands[4]. As we have seen, for Barth faith is to believe in spite of the limitedness of the expression of the revelation.

2. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, the knowledge of revelation or the knowledge-element in Christianity can be and must be transmitted directly, even though it cannot be understood or accepted. And if there were no knowledge of revelation based on the past historical life of Jesus, there would be no faith in Christian sense of the word at all. But for Kierkegaard the knowledge of revelation is not faith itself. Faith starts from the accepting the knowledge of revelation as truth and living according to it. Therefore, for Kierkegaard the knowledge of revelation or the object of faith has already been given before our faith.

In contrast to this, for Barth the knowledge of revelation is the result of faith; there is no knowledge of revelation before faith. Whereas for Kierkegaard the knowledge of revelation is not faith in the real sense of the word, for Barth the knowledge of revelation is the goal of faith. This point will be discussed in detail in chapter III.

3. By this attempt Barth has an inner consistency in his later theology. So the following observation of J.D.Bettis fits well with Barth's case: "For the twentieth century, the question is no longer how to limit reason in order to make room for faith, but how to limit faith in order to make room for reason Just as religion sought a home among the various mental activities in the nineteenth century, so theology seeks a home in the twentieth century --- as science, art, emotion, etc. The question is no longer about the role of faith in the rational life. It is about the role of reason in the existential situation." Joseph Dabney Bettis, "Theology in the Public Debate: Barth's rejection of Natural Theology and The Hermeneutical Problem," *SJT*, XXII (1969), p.386.

4. Cf. Robert E. Willis, *op.cit.*, p.79: [For Barth] "our knowledge of God and so the validity of our language about him, is real only as promise, never as possession. Its actualization takes place in the moment in which Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit speaks to the Church."

However, for Kierkegaard the "objective uncertainty" is an expression which is related only to the rationality of the reason. In the context of the Postscript, an objective certainty is a certainty which is verified by human reason: rational certainty. What fits this certainty is only the rational truth or eternal truth of reason. Yet what is given in revelation does not fit human reason which is in untruth. Therefore, for Kierkegaard the object of faith does not have objective certainty, but has objective absurdity. However, if one's reason "steps aside" in relation to God and His revelation, one is in a passive situation. In this sense, Kierkegaard calls faith a passion. And as a passion which is directed towards revelation, faith has a certainty. This certainty is of such a kind that it demands all of man's life and makes one live for and die for it (the truth of revelation). This certainty is different from objective certainty which has nothing to do with one's life. In this sense, Kierkegaard asserts that "faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity" (CUP, p.118). For Kierkegaard, the truth of revelation must be internalized into one's subjectivity. Only in this sense is subjectivity truth. But this subjectivity always stands against reason's effort to rationalize or reject the revelation. In this sense, Kierkegaard finds a way to overcome the reason's objective approach to revelation. However, Barth finds this kind of certainty to be only in God's hands[1]. As far as the man who is in our time is concerned, he cannot have a certainty which he has in his subjectivity. In this respect, Barth's subjective revelation is once again different from Kierkegaard's God-given-condition.

Up to now we have examined Barth's understanding of the indirect form of revelation and compared it with that of Kierkegaard. When we look at their discussion of this problem (1) from the point of view of the form of the indirect revelation and (2) from the point of view of the faith which is based

upon this indirect revelation, we find that their understanding of this problem is basically different from each other, even though we find some similarities. As we have seen, whereas Barth thinks that the object of revelation is given only in subjective revelation, Kierkegaard sees that the object of faith (the Paradox) exists in our time and history before man's faith. This is because whereas for Barth God's revelation has by nature an indirect form in relation to man who is in our time, for Kierkegaard the indirect form of revelation which is basically caused by God's love for the sinner, is itself revelation. Hence, whereas for Barth faith is to believe in God who transcends our time, for Kierkegaard faith is to believe the historical form of revelation with all one's subjectivity. That means that whereas for Barth revelation is basically in God's hands, for Kierkegaard revelation is in time and history and can be applied to all generations as the historical revelation.

1. Cf. Karl Barth, "No!", in Natural Theology, trans Peter Fraenkel (London: The Centebury Press, 1956), p.122: "The question whether we really believe, and as believers truly know God, and know God truly, is far too radical and shattering for us to be able to direct it seriously to ourselves." Therefore, even though Barth sometimes speaks of the possibility of assurance of salvation (Cf. CD IV/3, pp.565f.), it does not mean that assurance is given to us. As we have said, for Barth it is only in God's hands. In this sense, the assertion that Barth asserts the assurance of salvation in contrast to the Roman Catholic position (Cf. A.E.McGrath, "Justification: Barth, Trent, and Kueng," SJT, XXXIV (1981), pp.524f.) can not be sustained. Compare Hans Urs von Balthasar, op.cit., p.162: "There is no subjective experience of one's own election, no subjective certainty of salvation; this aspect of Calvinist doctrine must be totally revised(KD II/2, s.373)." In this context we can understand the following assertion of Barth: "I cannot make a sharp distinction between believers and unbelievers. I simply do not believe it when one tells me he is an unbeliever! Probably he is fighting the truth. We should speak to such people in solidarity, as an unbeliever for whom Christ died"(Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.63).

A considerable distance has been journeyed in reviewing the later Barth's understanding of revelation in relation to that of Kierkegaard. As a result of our consideration of this problem, we can now say that even though there are some similarities between the later Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard, and in this respect the later Barth's position on revelation is nearer to that of Kierkegaard than is that of early Barth, the later Barth is still different from Kierkegaard. This means that Barth, even in his later theology, does not overcome the absolute dualism which made his early understanding of revelation differ from that of Kierkegaard[1]. My particular concern in this concluding section is this specific problem of Barth's absolute dualism. To show that the later Barth still has an absolute dualism, we shall once again give our attention to some dualities which are present in the later Barth's understanding of revelation: the dualities of God's time and our time, of Christ-history (Geschichte) and our History (including the Historical Jesus),

1. Even though his viewpoint is slightly different from that of mine, Hans Urs von Balthasar also makes it clear that basically Barth's position has not changed: "Did the formal principles of his theology change? let me say right now that the answer is "no." Despite the continuing development of his work, Barth remains true to his original intuition. To be sure, it found expression in different forms of thought and different words, but all these vicissitudes served to clarify it, purify it, and preserve it"(op.cit., p.22). And again: "He [Barth] focussed on those elements which were necessary to preserve the basic insight of his first work and to answer its many critics. His later efforts are a paradoxical attempt to rehabilitate Romans; in them it becomes clear what Romans was trying to say"(p. 72). For a similar observation that even though there are some differences between the early Barth and the later Barth, basically his whole thrust (or, position) does not change, see G.C.Berkouwer,op.cit., pp.10f. See also Colm O'Grady,The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth, p.43. See again R.A.Veith,"Revelation and Religion in the Theology of Karl Barth," pp.1-22. And again Cornelius Van Til,The New Modernism, pp.212ff.,364ff. See also Joseph McLelland, "Philosophy and Theology --- a Family Affair," in Footnotes to a Theology: The Karl Barth Colloquium of 1972, ed., H.Martin Rumscheidt (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilgrid Lauvrien University, 1974), pp.30-52. See also John Macquarrie,Twentieth Century Religious Thought (London: SCM, 1971, revised version), p.323.

and of those things which are in God's hands and those things which are in our hands.

First, as we have pointed out, Barth differentiates between the temporality of God and our temporality, even though both of them have the same name, temporality. Therefore, when Barth says that revelation takes place in time, it does not mean that revelation, in its reality, takes place in our time. Of course, according to Barth, revelation takes place in relation to our time in two respects. First, "the life and death of the historical Jesus" which is in our time is related to revelation. For, Barth believes that the resurrection unveils the meaning of this life, so that in the light of the resurrection "the life and death of Jesus" is related to revelation. But this does not mean that "the historical life and death of Jesus" is revelation. Revelation takes place in relation to this history. However, Christ-history as revelation is not identical with this "life and death of Jesus". For the Christ-history is in God's time and as such cannot be in our time. It takes place today and will take place tomorrow as it took place yesterday. For God's time, in which the Christ-history takes place, is God's temporality and therefore the eternal time (CD I/2, p.60). And secondly, subjective revelation which actualizes objective revelation takes place in relation to our time. For the time of subjective revelation is the time of our faith, even though this faith is also in God's time. However, if there are believers and Christians, then, for Barth, it means that there has been subjective revelation. Therefore, subjective revelation takes place in relation to our time, for the believer who believes in God because of subjective revelation, is in our time. However, what is in our time is not identical with subjective revelation. Our experience of revelation, our knowledge of revelation, and whatever else which belongs to man, is not, in itself, revelation (CD I/1, pp.253f.). For revelation itself is not in our

time, but in God's time. Revelation is something which is beyond our time, and which cannot be present in our time. Of course, revelation takes place in time, it has temporality, and it has past, present and future. But this time, this temporality and this threefoldness of time-structure is not in our time, our temporality, and our past, present and future.

Therefore, even though the later Barth emphasizes the temporality of revelation, in contrast to his early position, revelation itself, for Barth, is still in God's time, God's temporality, and therefore in God's realm.[1] The dualism of time and eternity of the "Romans"(1922) is now changed into the dualism of God's time and our time. In its reality, God's time is not identical with our time; there are no common elements other than the nominal name, time.

The second duality which we have pointed out in our discussion of the later Barth's understanding of revelation is the duality between Christ-history and our History. This second duality has a close relation to the first duality between God's time and our time. For Christ-history is in God's time, and our History is in our time. In its comprehensive sense Christ-history implies all Heilsgeschichte and its basis or ground, the Covenant of grace or the decree of God. Therefore, the duality of Christ-history and our History is the duality of Heilsgeschichte and Historie. In the realm of Heilsgeschichte, there is the triune God, God's decree, covenant of Grace, creation, revelation, reconciliation, redemption, etc..[2] In contrast to this, in the realm of our History, there is nothing, non-being, or the endless flux of our time.[3] There is no point of contact between these two histories except the nominal name,

1. For a similar interpretation of this theme, see Colin E. Gunton, op.cit., p.183: "The upshot of all this is that despite Barth's attempt to see God's eternity as a kind of eminent temporality, the tendency to define eternity in opposition to time, and therefore, as a negation of the historical orientation of the understanding of revelation, is very marked." See also Balthasar, op.cit., p.153: "He [God] brings it [judgement] to his own truth, making it in eternity what it could not be in time."

history. This duality between Heilsgeschichte and Historie is more clearly expressed in Barth's theology than the somewhat ambiguous expressions about the duality of God's time and our time.

2. And in this realm everybody is saved, justified, and sanctified in Jesus Christ; there is no one who does not belong to this Heilsgeschichte (CD II/2, pp.417-29, 476, 480; IV/3,1, p.350). Balthasar, in his book on Barth, points this out: "It is clear from Barth's presentation of the doctrine of election that universal salvation is not only possible but inevitable Even in the ultimate judgment of death, man remains a being created and redeemed in the grace of Christ. While Barth tries to avoid talking about universal redemption, it is clearly built into the very ground work of his doctrine of creation"(op.cit., p.163). And, according to Balthasar's evaluation, this is the thinking which is operating from God's viewpoint (p. 169).

G.C.Berkouwer also makes a similar point: "There is no alternative to concluding that Barth's refusal to accept the apokatastasis cannot be harmonized with the fundamental structure of his doctrine of election"(op.cit., p. 116). See also Colin Brown, op.cit., pp.130-139. And also Donald Bloesch, op.cit., pp.60-71, 80, 93. See also Hans Kueng, Justification: The Doctrine of Karl Barth and a Catholic Reflection, pp.16-24, 332. And also Robert D. Preus, "Prolegomena According to Karl Barth: A study in His Ideas Regarding Theology and Dogmatics," Concordia Theological Monthly, XXXI (1960), p.174; "Justification and Reconciliation in the Theology of Karl Barth," Concordia Theological Monthly, XXXI (1960), pp.240-242.

J.D.Bettis argues that "Barth consistently rejects universalism as a doctrine, but he leaves open the possibility that within God's freedom all men may indeed be saved. But this possibility can never be the basis for a theological doctrine of universal salvation. Barth rejects the attempt to bridge the gap between the divine possibility and a theological statement of its actuality"("Is Karl Barth a Universalist?" SJT, XX (1967), p.427). But Bettis' actual argument shows only that Barth rejects the doctrine of universalism because the premise of its [the doctrine of universalism's] argument is that God's love is good because it saves all men, but does not show that for Barth there is no universal salvation. And he does not provide any direct negation of the universal salvation from the theology of Barth. Therefore, it follows that Barth's universalism is a universalism which is based on God's nature which is in itself good. That is to say, Bettis shows only that Barth's universalism is a different kind of universalism from the one which is understood generally.

3. Cf. A.B.Come, op.cit., p.104: "So the world is not the creation unless seen as God's good work in service of his purpose of fellowship". And, therefore, we find the reason why revelation, the incarnation, or the resurrection is not in our time in this dualistic thought-structure. According to Juengel's interpretation of Barth, if Jesus Christ is in our time, our History, and our world, then the incarnation means the end of God, God really leaving his deity behind and changing into a man. Cf. op.cit. p.385 in J. Thompson, op.cit., p.107. See again Karl Barth's Table Talk, p.29: "In this natural realm, there is no such thing as a creature or a Creator!"

Barth's discussion of creation, therefore, must be understood with this duality of Heilsgeschichte and Historie in mind. The contrast between creation and redemption is only in the realm of Heilsgeschichte. For, in so far as there is no Fall in Historie, we have to place Fall and God's No in the realm of Heilsgeschichte. Therefore the contrast which Barth really wants to get at is not the contrast between creation and redemption which are in the realm of Heilsgeschichte, but the conflict between God's realm and our realm (the concrete world which has nothing to do with God).[1] In this sense we do not find a real change in Barth's thought-structure from the position of the "Romans" (1922). From that time onwards, more than any body else, Barth tries to differentiate and contrast between God's realm and our realm.[2]

The third duality between what is in God's hands and those things in man's

1. However, as far as their [creation and redemption's] object is concerned, they have no other object than this concrete world. That is to say, there is no other world which God creates in God's time. Therefore, Barth makes a kind of compromise in his position on the relation between God's act and this concrete world. Cf. Credo, p. 33f.: "A sovereignty of chance, of fate, or of the world's own system of laws would be at variance with this truth [God's sovereignty]. That is impossible. Because God is the Creator of the world, therefore, it stands under His sovereignty, therefore there is a co-existence of Him and it [not only the world but also the sovereignty of chance, of fate, or of the world's own system of laws]." See also p.121.

2. According to Barth, all men are, in their totality (body and soul), in God's realm and at the same time all men are nothing to do with God's realm in man's realm; all men are justified and sanctified in God's realm and at the same time all men are sinners in man's realm. Cf. New Romans, pp.79-80. In this sense, Juengel draws the following conclusion from Barth's position: "It [Barth's theology] does make possible the comforting certainty that even the man who is most godless and far from God, is nearer to God than he is to himself" ("Keine Menschenlosigkeit Gottes," Evangelische Theologie, XXXI (1971), s.387. Cited in John Thompson, op.cit., p.106). For a similar observation, see A.E. McGrath, "Justification: Barth, Trent, and Kueng," SJT, XXXIV (1981), pp.523f. and Hans Urs von Balthasar, op.cit., pp. 103, 115. Hence, it is quite right to point out Kantian influence on Barth's theology. Cf. Dearne W. Ferm, "The Five Minimum Doctrines of Neo-Orthodoxy," Religion in Life, XXX (1960-61), pp.542f. And again Robert T. Osborn, "A New 'New Barth'?", Interpretation, XVIII (1964), pp.72-75. See also Cornelius Van Til, New Modernism, pp.242-244, 364-379; Christianity and Barthianism, pp.240-251, 395-412.

hands in revelation is a kind of a logical consequence of Barth's dualistic thought-structure which we have examined. Barth asserts with vehemence that there is God's revelation which is God Himself who is in his revelation and God's reconciliation and God's real Church in God's time. What is interesting here is the fact that there are some counterparts, or corresponding elements to those things which are in God's time and those things which are in our time. But Barth does not find any homogeneousness, similarities, or real correspondences between these two. From beginning to end, what is in God's hands is only in God, What is in man's hands is in man. What is a really interesting point is that even though there is this asymmetry or lack of homogeneousness, Barth tries to assert that there is a possibility that what is in man's hands can become the real revelation which is in God's hands in the Holy Spirit.[1] But where and when can we place the works of the Holy Spirit? Are they in our world, and in our time? In the last analysis, we cannot answer this question positively from the theology of Barth, even though he sometimes seems to hint at the possibility of a positive answer. For what is in our time, as we have seen, is only the traces of the works of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, we cannot but point out the absolute dualistic thought-structure of the theology of the later Barth.

We have mentioned the problem of the dualism which can be found in the thought of Kierkegaard in relation to Barth's dualism in the "Romans" in the

1. Cf. e.g., II/1, p.10. In this sense, the doctrine of the Holy spirit has a very important role in Barth's theology, in contrast to R.W.Jenson's argument that: "In general, Barth's discussions of the Spirit are not so convincing as his discussion of the Father and the Son One is even tempted to think that the incompleteness of the Church Dogmatics, with the eschatology and doctrine of the Spirit missing, is not merely a matter of chronology" (God after God, pp. 173f.). For an argument for the importance of the doctrine of the Spirit in the later Barth's theology, see Philip J. Rosato, The Pneumatology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1981). Esp., pp.17-20. See also Joseph D. Bettis, op.cit., pp.433f.

last chapter. As we have said, even though we can say that there is dualism in the thought of Kierkegaard, the dualism in Kierkegaard is overcome by God. According to Kierkegaard, God enters time, history, and our world in their ordinary sense of the words (i.e., our time, history, and our world). If we try to interpret Kierkegaard as telling us something other than this, the whole thrust of Kierkegaard's writings falls down. And because God really comes into time, man can have fellowship with God in our time in the real sense of the word. If that is not the case, we must say that the purpose of God, which Kierkegaard asserts, is not accomplished, in spite of God's entering time for its accomplishment. Therefore, Kierkegaard's dualism is not the absolute dualism which we find in Barth's theology. This point will be clearer when we consider in detail Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation in the next chapter.

Chapter III

Søren Kierkegaard on Revelation

The purpose of this chapter is to explore Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation. In order to compare it with Barth's position on revelation which we have discussed in the last two chapters, I shall discuss Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation through considering the following three questions which we have asked of Barth in our discussion of Barth: (1) How does Kierkegaard use 'Moment'? (2) How does Kierkegaard think about the relation between revelation and history? (3) How does Kierkegaard use the term Paradox? I shall consider in turn these three questions in the three subdivisions of this chapter.

During the course of our discussion of Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation, I hope that the point, which I have made in the last two chapters (i.e., that there is a considerable difference between Barth's understanding of revelation and that of Kierkegaard), will become clearer.

1

Turning first to a consideration of Kierkegaard's use of the word 'Moment', I shall make the point that for Kierkegaard the word Moment is used for a 'Moment in time.' Basically, there are two important Moments in time which relate to Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation: the Moment of Incarnation and the Moment of the New Birth.[1] I shall show that for Kierkegaard the Moment is a

1. There are very few scholars who differentiate these two Moments in Kierkegaard's writings. But this differentiation, as it is clear in this study, is very important. As far as I know, only T.H.Croxall and Mark C.Taylor differentiate these two Moments. Cf. T.H.Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary (London: James Nisbet, 1956), pp.178f.; Mark C.Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp.291-340.

'Moment in time' by showing that both of these important Moments are in time.

First, the Moment of Incarnation for Kierkegaard is a Moment in time. This statement has two implications in relation to the event of Incarnation. First, it implies that the event of Incarnation is an event in time. Secondly, it implies that because of this Moment of Incarnation, there was an Incarnate one in time. It is very important to consider the problem of Kierkegaard's use of the term 'Moment' bearing these implications in mind, for these implications stand and fall with the fact that the Moment of Incarnation is in time. That is to say, if the fact that for Kierkegaard the Moment of Incarnation is a Moment in time were to be denied, then for Kierkegaard there would be no Incarnation and the Incarnate one in time. And if there were no Incarnation and the Incarnate one in time, then for Kierkegaard there would be no Incarnation at all. Neither would there be any revelation. For, according to Kierkegaard, the Incarnate one in time is the Revealer [the Teacher]. Thus it is clear that for Kierkegaard the Moment of Incarnation is very important for his understanding of revelation. So it is good to start our discussion of Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation by considering the temporality of the Moment of Incarnation.

The temporality of the Moment of Incarnation is clearly expressed by Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of the Philosophical Fragments. His thought-experiment is concerned with the question: What is the situation of learning truth in which the Moment in time must have a decisive significance?[1] Therefore, the problem here is not whether the Moment of Incarnation is a temporal Moment or not, but how Kierkegaard uses the term temporality or time in relation to the Moment of Incarnation. That is to say, does Kierkegaard imply a new temporality or new time which can be applied to God, as does Barth in his

1. Cf. PF, pp.16-37

later theology? When we consider Kierkegaard's usage of time, it is hardly possible to think that Kierkegaard thinks of such a new temporality. Moreover, it is more difficult to think that the Moment of Incarnation, for Kierkegaard, is regarded as the eternal Moment, as in the case of Barth's Romans (1922).

However, there are some scholars who think that the later Barth's position can be regarded as a recent discussion of time that parallels Kierkegaard's position on time and Moment.[1] In connection with such an interpretation of Kierkegaard, we have to consider two important things: (1) When we consider the context in which Kierkegaard uses the term 'Moment,' it is impossible to interpret Kierkegaard's Moment as an eternal Moment. (2) Kierkegaard understands the event of Incarnation as an event of God's 'coming into existence.' It becomes clear that it is hardly possible to relate Kierkegaard's understanding of the temporality of Incarnation and of the Moment of Incarnation to that of Barth, when we consider these two things in turn.

First, let us consider in what context Kierkegaard uses the term 'Moment'. After mentioning the fact that God became an individual man to be the Revealer and the Saviour[2], Kierkegaard says:

1. Cf. e.g., Mark C.Taylor, op.cit., pp.297-302.

2. These two roles or functions are attributed to Jesus Christ throughout Kierkegaard's authorship. Here Kierkegaard finds the purpose of Incarnation: to redeem man and to teach man. Jesus Christ is always described as the Redeemer and the Teacher (the Revealer). In his later writings Kierkegaard calls Jesus Christ the pattern, the example, or the paradigm.(Cf. e.g., JFY, pp.75-79, 161-209; TC, pp.109-111). These names are not different from the name "Teacher" in the works of the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, for as we shall see in this chapter, what Jesus Christ teaches is the way of life, a mode of existing. What is important in Kierkegaard's understanding of the roles of Jesus Christ is the fact that Kierkegaard tries to hold together both of these roles (the Redeemer and the Revealer). That is to say, Kierkegaard does not suggest an Abelardian understanding of Christ. The Christ who is the Example without being the Redeemer cannot be regarded as the Absolute Paradox for Kierkegaard. The importance of the historical life of Jesus lies in the fact that He is the God-man. The reason why we follow Jesus Christ in our life is because He is our Redeemer who teaches the way of life which we have to follow as a disciple. Cf. Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: A Dialectic of the Christian Existence, p.171: "As man Christ is my model because He is my Redeemer." See also section 3 of this chapter.

"And now the Moment. Such a Moment has a peculiar character. It is brief and temporal indeed, like every Moment; it is transient as all Moments are; it is past like every Moment in the next Moment. And yet it is decisive, and filled with the Eternal. Such a Moment ought to have a distinctive name; let us call it the Fullness of Time"(PF, p.22).

How should we interpret this passage? Can we interpret this passage as follows? Even though it is a temporal Moment, in fact it is an eternal Moment. No, Kierkegaard does not give us room to interpret this passage in such a way.

If what took place in the event of Incarnation was not a happening in time, we should have to conclude that even though Kierkegaard uses temporal terminology, it was not a temporal Moment in the real sense of the word. But if what happened in this Moment of Incarnation was a happening in time, even though this Moment was filled with the Eternal, it must be a temporal Moment. Which is the case? It is true, of course, that this Moment is not every Moment in time. In this sense, it is a special Moment. Moreover, in this Moment, if it is the Moment of Incarnation, God (the Eternal) became an individual man. In this sense, this Moment is unlike any other Moment in time because it has a relation to the Eternal. Nevertheless, according to Kierkegaard, it is brief and temporal indeed, like every Moment; it is transient as all Moments are; it is past, like every Moment in the next Moment. As far as temporality is concerned, it is not a different time; it does not have a different temporality.[1]

'Kairos' is in 'chronos.'

Now, in relation to this, we have to consider Kierkegaard's understanding of 'coming into existence'. At the starting point of his thought-experiment

1. Cf. Edward John Carnell, The Burden of Søren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), p.52: "Kierkegaard marched boldly forward and declared that there was an absolute Instant (Moment) in history when the eternal God clothed himself with the limitations of human nature. Presumably this Christological dogmatism was introduced to help undergird the apologetic ministry of Paradox Christianity is supposed to be taken seriously because it posits an absolute gulf between God and man. Fellowship with God cannot become a reality until God, by his grace, takes the initiative and enters time."

Johannes Climacus says:

"Now if things are to be otherwise, the Moment in time must have a decisive significance, so that I will never be able to forget it either in time or eternity; because the Eternal, which hitherto did not exist, came into existence in this Moment." (PF, p.16, my emphasis).

What is presupposed in this passage is Kierkegaard's absolute distinction between time and eternity. According to Kierkegaard, only what is in time exists (in time). Existence has a very special meaning for Kierkegaard; existence can be applied only to the things which are in time. Rather, more specifically, it can be applied only to human beings who are in time. The latter (i.e., the point that the term 'existence' can be applied only to human beings) is the one which Kierkegaard wants to emphasize throughout his writings. But in some places Kierkegaard applies the term existence to all of the things which are in time.[1] Anyway, for Kierkegaard the term 'existence' or 'to exist' can only be applied to what is in time. In this sense Johannes Climacus says:

"God does not think, he creates; God does not exist. He is eternal. Man thinks and exists, and existence separates thought and being, holding them apart from one another in succession." (CUP., p.296, my emphasis).

What Kierkegaard wants to say is that we cannot think of 'God' as existing in the way in which we think of 'man' as existing. That is to say, God does not exist as man exists in time, for God is eternal.

However, what is important in this connection is the fact that the eternal God became an individual man in the Moment of Incarnation; God 'came into existence.' The term 'came into existence,' for Kierkegaard, cannot be thought of without thinking about concrete temporality. God came into existence to be as we ourselves are in time. This is the meaning of the expression that 'God became an individual man.' Hence, the Moment of Incarnation cannot but be a concrete temporal Moment. Of course, in the sense that only in that Moment did God become an individual man, the Moment is a very special Moment. However,

1. Cf.e.g.,PF, pp.90-93.

even though it is a very special Moment, it is a Moment in time.

Johannes Climacus compares God's "coming into existence," in the Moment of Incarnation with ordinary historical thing's "coming into existence," in the 'Interlude' of the Philosophical Fragments. As far as the fact that both of them are coming into existence is concerned, there is no difference between them at all. The only difference between them is What or Who comes into existence in the event of the coming into existence. In the case of God's coming into existence, God became an individual man. But in the case of ordinary thing's coming into existence the thing came into existence. However, after their coming into existence both of them are in time. In this respect, there is no difference between them.

The coming into existence of both of them is a matter of belief, not the object of knowledge. At the back of this statement there is Kierkegaard's epistemological presupposition: What comes into existence cannot be the object of knowledge. Climacus says:

"The historical cannot be given immediately to the senses, since the elusiveness of coming into existence is involved in it. The immediate impression of a natural phenomenon or of an event is not the impression of the historical, for the coming into existence involved cannot be sensed immediately, but only the immediate presence"(PF, p.100).

That is to say, the 'historical' cannot be sensed immediately. Of course, what is sensed immediately (therefore, what can be the object of knowledge) is the result of the coming into existence. But the coming into existence itself cannot be sensed immediately. The coming into existence, therefore, is not an object of knowledge, but an object of belief. For example,

"When the observer sees a star, the star becomes involved in doubt the Moment he seeks to become aware of its having come into existence"(PF, p.100).

The coming into existence itself is an object of belief. That is to say, if we see a star, we cannot think that in one Moment in the past there was a happening that the star 'came into existence.'

What is important here in relation to our discussion is that as far as 'coming into existence' is concerned, God's coming into existence in the Moment of Incarnation is not different from a star's 'coming into existence' in one Moment in the past. Both of the Moments of 'coming into existence' are Moments in time.

Of course, there are differences between them. As we have mentioned, what happens in the Moment of Incarnation has a different character from what happens in the Moment of a star's coming into existence. In the case of the Moment of Incarnation, God came into existence. So after this Moment in time, He [God] is in time; now He is the God-man or God in time. However, this does not mean that He [God] ceases to be God. Even though He is in time, He is still God. Johannes Climacus says:

"Behold where he stands --- the God! Where? There; do you not see him? He is the God; and yet he has not a resting-place for his head, and he dares not lean on any man lest he cause him to be offended. He is the God; and yet he picks his steps more carefully than if angels guided them, not to prevent his foot from stumbling against a stone, but lest he trample human beings in the dust, in that they are offended in him. He is the God; and yet his eye rests upon mankind with deep concern, for the tender shoots of an individual life may be crushed as easily as a blade of grass. How wonderful a life, all sorrow and all love: to yearn to express the equality of love, and yet to be misunderstood; to apprehend the danger that all men may be destroyed, and yet only so to be able really to save a single soul; his own life filled with sorrow, while each hour of the day is taken up with the troubles of the learner who confides in him! This is the God as he stands upon the earth, like unto the humblest by the power of his omnipotent love."(PF, pp.39f., my emphasis).[1]

What Climacus tries to say in this quotation is the fact that even though He [Jesus Christ] was an individual man on the earth, He was not merely an individual man, but at the same time God. He did not cease to be God in his existence in time; He is 'God in time.' Therefore, God's coming into existence, unlike a star's coming into existence, is related to the Eternal. Even after the coming into existence God is the Eternal; He is the Eternal in time. Here

1. See also TC, p.138.

is the absolute Paradox which we shall discuss in detail in the third section of this chapter. As we shall see, if He ceased to be God, He is not the absolute Paradox; only in the case that He is an individual man and at the same time God, is there the absolute Paradox.[1]

However, as the God-man He was in time. And this 'time' is not different, in a slightest degree, from the 'time' in which we live. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, Incarnation is not an eternal event or ever-happening event, but an event which was in time in the real sense of the word. Of course, Kierkegaard, like all other men, did not experience this Moment of Incarnation. And he does not know of it by his reason. He only believes that it was. But as far as its happening is concerned, his belief in this Moment of Incarnation is not different from his belief in any other historical fact. But this does not mean that he believes Incarnation as he believes any other historical fact. As we shall see soon, he says that the faith which is related to the Moment of Incarnation is faith in the eminent sense(PF, pp.108f.). But faith in the 'eminent' sense itself involves also faith in a direct and ordinary sense. Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, the man who does not believe the event of Incarnation in a direct and ordinary sense of the word does not and cannot believe it in the 'eminent' sense. For, as we shall argue in the next section, it is also an historical fact which takes place in time in the ordinary sense of the word. Hence, for Kierkegaard, the Moment of Incarnation, as far as its temporality is concerned, is not different from any other moment in time.

1. Therefore it is hardly possible to say that there is a kind of Kenosis-idea in Kierkegaard's Christology. The existence of the God-man presupposes not only the pre-existence of the Incarnate one, but also the perfect divinity of the Incarnate one. Therefore, the God-man is the true God and true man. He does not cease to be God in order to be an individual man. Kierkegaard, as we shall see, emphasizes this point in his doctrine of the absolute Paradox. For a similar interpretation of Kierkegaard's Christology, see Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p.148: "Kierkegaard never questioned Christ's divinity. For him even the idea of a kenosis, in which Christ through an act of total annihilation empties Himself of His divinity, is unthinkable."

We now turn to the discussion of the Moment of New Birth or of Faith. When we consider Kierkegaard's view of Faith, we also find that for Kierkegaard the Moment is a Moment in time. By the Moment of New Birth Kierkegaard means the Moment in time in which one becomes a believer or a disciple. This specific term 'the Moment of New Birth' does not mean, for Kierkegaard, every Moment in which one believes in God. It is true, of course, that one has to believe in God in every Moment; there must not be a Moment in which one does not believe in God; if one is a disciple or a believer, one must believe in God in every Moment. Kierkegaard, however, does not call every moment, in which we believe in God, the Moment of New Birth. The Moment of New Birth, for Kierkegaard, has a very specific meaning.

The Moment in time in which the one who has not believed in God until now first believes in God is the Moment of New Birth of which Kierkegaard speaks. Before the Moment he was not a believer, but after the Moment he is a believer or a disciple. Before the Moment he did not believe in God in a real sense (even though he may have had a belief in God in his own way) or could not believe in God, but after the Moment he not only believes in God, but also cannot but believe in God. In that Moment he has changed. Such a Moment is the Moment of New Birth for Kierkegaard. In that Moment, "He becomes another man; not in the frivolous sense of becoming another individual of the same quality as before, but in the sense of becoming a man of a different quality, or as we may call him: a new creature"(PF, p. 23).[1] In this passage Climacus speaks of the change of quality or qualitative transition. What is important in this connection is that there is a qualitative change, so that it cannot be repeated. If there is a need for a second, third, etc. qualitative change, the first

1. In The Works of Love Kierkegaard speaks of this change of quality in relation to becoming a Christian: ".... He must surely be able to remember how he was before he became a Christian, and consequently know what change took place in him --- if this change consisted in his becoming a Christian"(WL, p.22).

qualitative change is not a qualitative change in the real sense of the word. The qualitative change can only take place once. The Moment of New Birth, therefore, is in time. And this Moment is a very special Moment; because of this Moment, the qualitative change in man takes place. And because of this Moment in which a qualitative change happens, one can believe in God in every Moment.[1]

In this sense the qualitative change which takes place in the Moment of the New Birth is to be compared with the qualitative change which took place in the Fall. According to Vigilius Haufniensis, the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Dread, "the Fall is the qualitative leap"(CA, p.48). To discuss this interesting point let me quote some passages from The Concept of Dread.

"That the first sin signifies something different from a sin (i.e., a sin like many others), something different from one sin (i.e., no.1 in relation to no.2), is quite obvious. The first sin constitutes the nature of the quality: the first sin is sin. This is the secret of the first. The new quality appears with the first, with the leap, with the suddenness of the enigmatic"(CA, p.30).

Therefore, for Haufniensis, "through the first sin, sin came into the world"(CA, p.31). And Haufniensis contrasts the first sin of Adam and the first sin of every man to clarify the secret of the first:

"The first posits the quality. Adam, then, posits sin in himself, but also for the race. However, the concept of race is too abstract to allow to positing of so concrete a category as sin, which is posited precisely in that the single individual himself, as the single individual, posits it. Thus sinfulness in the race becomes only a quantitative approximation. Still this has its beginning with Adam. Herein lies the

1. In this sense we can say of the qualitative difference between a Christian and the natural man. For a discussion of this difference, see Frithiof Brandt, Søren Kierkegaard, p.76: "The Christian differs radically from the natural man. As a basis for his view of life he has the revelation given in the Bible. It may be said that the Self [regarded as it is] is given to the natural man by the hand of Nature. To the Christian it is given by the hand of God." Therefore, it is impossible to interpret the phrase "to become a new creature" or "the New Birth" as merely "a radical change in self-conscious" as John W. Elrod does. Cf. Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp.216f. Because the change of quality which Climacus speaks of is more qualitative than a moral change or the change of self-consciousness.

great significance of Adam above that of every other individual in the race, and herein lies the truth of the above expression"(CA, p.57, my emphasis).

As sin came into the world by the first sin of man, faith comes into the world by the first faith of man. 'The first,' both in the case of sin and faith, is connected with the change of the quality. What is important here is that this change of quality, in the case of both sin and faith, takes place in time and history. In The Concept of Dread Vigilius Haufniensis makes it clear that it is impossible to think that Adam is outside history.[1] What Haufniensis tries to speak of is that the change of quality which takes place in the fall is in history and cannot be regarded as myth. Haufniensis' emphasis on the importance of the relation between the change of quality and 'the first' can be interpreted in the following two ways.

The first possible interpretation is that the change of quality in the fall takes place in the first sin of every individual man. This is certainly one of the points which Haufniensis tries to emphasize in his book. Haufniensis says:

"At every Moment the individual is both himself and the race if the individual has a history, then the race also has a history. Adam is the first man. He is at once himself and the race. He is not essentially different from the race, for in that case there is no race at all; he is not the race, for in that case also there would be no race. He is himself and the race. Therefore that which explains Adam also explains the race and vice versa"[2]

But this does not exclude the possibility of the second interpretation that even though Adam and every individual man falls into sin through their own first

1. Cf. CA, pp.25-29.

2. CA, p.28f. The reason why Kierkegaard speaks in this way is to emphasize everyone's responsibility for their own sin. Cf. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, trans. Geogre L. Stengren (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.356f.: "Against Hegel's interpretation of the account of fall in Genesis as a myth, Kierkegaard maintains that this account quite precisely says everything that, on the whole, can be said about the matter, namely that sin came into the world through a sin. Since the human race does not begin anew with each individual, then the sinfulness of the race acquires a history (as has been traditionally maintained) When the individual by the qualitative leap participates in this history, then responsibility follows with, so to speak, a qualitative leap."

sin, there is a difference between Adam and other individual men. For, according to Haufniensis, the first sin of Adam was not only the first sin of Adam in which Adam himself fell into sin, but also the first sin in the world through which "Creation sank into corruption" (CA, p.58). Such an interpretation presupposes the reality of the the historical Adam. In this sense, this second interpretation is different from the first interpretation. However, this second interpretation does not deny that for Haufniensis the change of the quality takes place in everyone's first sin. The only difference lies in the question of whether one can see an objective reality of the historical Adam or not. We can find some places in which Haufniensis differentiates the situation of Adam and the situation of the subsequent individual. For example, there is dread both in Adam and the subsequent individual man. However, for each subsequent individual, dread is more reflective:

"The more anxiety[Dread], the more sensuousness. The procreated individual is more sensuous than the original, and this "more" is the universal "more" of the generation for every subsequent individual in relation to Adam." [1]

And Haufniensis calls Adam the first man (CA, p.29) and asserts that he and his sin must be regarded as a man and something past (CA, p.26). And Haufniensis emphasizes that Adam also had original sin because of his first sin. Therefore, for Haufniensis, even though the fall has a direct relation to each individual's first sin in time, it also has an indirect relation to the first sin of Adam in the sense that Adam's first sin is the starting point of sin's coming into existence in the world. Such an interpretation can be defended by the fact that Haufniensis does not equate his doctrine of original sin with the doctrines of

1. CA, p.72. See also p.61. See again Niels Thulstrup, "Adam and Original Sin," in Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, p.134: "Adam's significance is that with him sin began One difference between Adam and every succeeding human being is that the latter has more [dread] in relation to Adam, because there has been a quantitative increase of the sin in the history of the race."

Pelagianism or Socinianism.[1] And it can also be defended from Haufniensis' anti-Hegelian stance. Reidar Thomte, in one of his notes on The Concept of Anxiety, contrasts the views of Hegel and Kierkegaard as follows:

"According to Hegel, the incidents of the myth of the fall 'form the basis of an essential article of the creed, the doctrine of original sin in man and his consequent need of succour' (Hegel's Logic, section 24 Zusatz 3). Kierkegaard maintains that Hegel treated the story as a "myth of the understanding." Such a myth is based on the assumption that it adequately expresses the eternal in temporal qualities and that its truth can be grasped by the understanding. Over against Hegel's position, Kierkegaard's affirms the paradoxicality of Christian truths, including that of hereditary sin[original sin], which involves a transcendence that is incapable of being grasped by reason." [2]

Even though Thomte does not think that Kierkegaard recognizes the historicity of Adam, when we consider the context of The Concept of Dread, we can say, as Thulstrup does, "SK [Kierkegaard] does not exclude the possibility of the historicity of Adam." [3]

As we have mentioned, such an interpretation does not deny the point that

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1. See CA, pp. 28,34,37,59,186.
 2. Reidar Thomte, "Notes", in The Concept of Anxiety, p.233 n.22.
 3. Niels Thulstrup, "Adam and Original Sin," p.135. The recognition of the historical Adam also presupposes the historical creation which is almost denied in modern theology. For Kierkegaard, creation is neither myth nor saga, but history which is not different from one's own existence.

In relation with this [even though it is not quite relevant] Walter Lowrie makes an interesting point: "Brandes conjectured that if Kierkegaard had lived in his [Brandes'] time, he [Kierkegaard] might have been perverse enough to reject Darwin's celebrated theory of evolution. In fact, he [Kierkegaard] did emphatically reject it [the theory of evolution] in advance. ... Exactly the same argument was urged by Benjamin Warfield, who was my teacher of theology in 1890. In those days it [Warfield's argument] was scoffed at or ignored, but in the end it brought that theory of evolution into disrepute" (note in Training in Christianity, p.30 n.1).

And this point can be considered in relation to Kierkegaard's view of the Second Coming of Christ. In a sense, it may be correct to say that Kierkegaard dispenses with salvation-history. However, for Kierkegaard, Creation, Incarnation, and the Second Coming of Christ are historical events. Kierkegaard does not want to develop the doctrine of the history of salvation; but what he knows is the events of Creation, of Incarnation and of the Second Coming. For an argument that for Kierkegaard the Second Coming of Christ and the resurrection on the last day are real in its literal sense, see Per Loenning, "Kierkegaard as a Christian Thinker," Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, pp.167f.

for Haufniensis the change of quality takes place in everyone's first sin. But such an interpretation emphasizes the historical reality of the first sin of mankind. According to this second interpretation, what Haufniensis tries to emphasize is that there was a first sin of Adam which is the first sin of mankind and through which the sinfulness of Adam is posited; but that each subsequent individual does not fall into sin automatically --- each subsequent individual also falls into sin by his own first sin. By emphasizing this point, Haufniensis tries to prevent the possibility of an assertion that we, as subsequent men after Adam, have no responsibility for our own sin for sin was posited before us. Therefore, it seems to me that, for Haufniensis, both the first sin of Adam and the first sin of each subsequent man are in time and history. However, even if one were to deny that that the first sin of Adam, for Haufniensis, is in time and history[1], my thesis in this section (that the change of quality takes place in the Moment in time) is still valid. For even though one denies the historicity of the first sin of Adam, it is still the case for the man who denies the historicity of Adam that for Haufniensis, the change of quality to sin is in time and history.

What is important in relation to this study is that for Kierkegaard the change of quality in the fall is in the time and history which are not different from the time and history in which we now live. As the fall into sin and, therefore, the positing of the sinfulness of man is in time and history, the New Birth in which one becomes a new creature is in time. In the Moment of New Birth which is only one Moment in each disciple's life and therefore cannot be repeated. One turns round the direction of his life: before the Moment one "was constantly in the act of departing from the truth" (PF, p.23), but in the Moment of New Birth the course of life has been given an opposite direction, so

1. It is quite impossible interpretation of the Concept of Dread, at least for me, for one finds a certain emphasis of the objective result of Adam's sin in this book. Cf. esp., pp.55-60.

that one has changed. Climacus proposes: "Let us call this change conversion(PF, p.23). When he uses this term he relates it to repentance and faith. That is to say, after the Moment of New Birth (or, conversion) one cannot help but become "aware that his former state was a consequence of his guilt"(PF, p.23) and that it must be repented of. In a word, now he has sin-consciousness which is qualitatively different from a simple feeling of guilt. As far as consciousness of guilt is concerned, Socrates, for example, who is the example of religiousness A can have it. But "the consciousness of guilt still lies essentially in immanence, in distinction from the consciousness of sin"(CUP, p.474).[1] With the consciousness of sin now he [the one who has the consciousness of sin] is in faith.[2] For the man who has a real consciousness of sin does not and cannot despair of the forgiveness of sin, nor abandon Christianity, declaring it to be falsehood.[3] For the real consciousness of sin is after the New Birth or becoming a new creature; the real consciousness of sin comes with faith. After the New Birth one is aware that his former state was sin, has a sense of sadness in the real sense, and has faith in the forgiveness of sins.

Now he has been qualitatively changed: "A change takes place within him like the change from non-being to being. But this transition from non-being to being is the transition we call birth. Now one who exists cannot be born; nevertheless, the disciple is born"(PF, p.23). This qualitative change takes

1. But this consciousness of guilt which cannot reach the consciousness of sin does not only exist in paganism, but also in Christendom, as religiousness A can be in Christianity also. For Kierkegaard, that which has the name Christianity, in fact, is not New Testament Christianity, but must be called religiousness A (or, it can be called Christendom). Cf. CUP, p.495: "Religiousness A can exist in paganism, and in Christianity it can be the religiousness of everyone who is not decisively Christian, whether he is baptised or not."

2. Cf. TC, p.71: "Only through the consciousness of sin is there entrance to it [Christianity], and the wish to enter in by any other way is the crime of lèse-majesté against Christianity."

3. Cf. SUD, pp.244ff, 255ff.

place in the Moment which is in time. Climacus emphasizes that this change happens within oneself. The New Birth to become a new creature does not take place in another realm beyond time and history.[1] It happens within us. After this change of quality, therefore, we can be aware that this qualitative change has taken place within us. The Moment of New Birth, thus, is in time and it is a Moment in time.[2]

Up to now we have considered the temporal character of the two Moments of Incarnation and of the New Birth. For Kierkegaard, if these two Moments were not temporal Moments, then it would follow that Jesus Christ was not incarnate in the real sense of the word and that the disciples or the believers would not be the disciples or believers in a real sense. If Incarnation is really the Incarnation, for Kierkegaard, it must be in time; the Moment of Incarnation is a Moment in time. And if the New Birth is a New Birth, it must be in time; the Moment of the New Birth is a Moment in time. We can draw out some implications of this, which will be very important for our further discussion of

1. Cf. Louis Dupré, *op.cit.*, p.100: "He [Kierkegaard] insists that the forgiveness of sin was not promised for the world to come, for eternity, but takes place in time, in the present."

2. Therefore, it is hardly possible to interpret Kierkegaard's Moment in the way in which Allen does: "The 'Moment' at which the individual stands might be symbolized by the point at which a descending line impinges on one running horizontally The Moment is not a section of time, but an atom of eternity. It is crisis --- a judgment on time" (E.L.Allen, *Kierkegaard*, p.145 cited in Mackintosh, *op.cit.*, p.210). Such an interpretation has a tendency to evaporate the Moment, so that there is no Moment in time, but only the eternal Moment which can be found in the early Barth. Moreover, Allen does treat the term 'Moment' within the context of Religiousness A (or, at least does not clearly differentiate between Christianity and Religiousness A in his discussion of the Moment). Cf. E.L.Allen, *op.cit.*, pp.135-164. In contrast to this interpretation, David F. Swenson says: "His [Kierkegaard's] view of the decisiveness of the Moment in time is again an illustration of how he stresses change." (*Something about Kierkegaard* (Mineapolis: Augsburg Publishing Co., 1948, third edition), p.249). See also Kenneth Hamilton, "Kierkegaard on Sin," *SJT*, XVII (1964), p.296: "It [the Moment] is a decisive, actual instance of time experienced by an individual man. This is in complete contrast with the vision of the speculative thinker, for he, believing truth to be timeless, turns away from the temporal"

Kierkegaard's understanding of revelation

First, the Moment of Incarnation and the Moment of the New Birth cannot be equated with one another. It is true, of course, that they have the same characteristics: both of them are temporal Moments but filled with the Eternal. However, as temporal Moments, they are different Moments in time. If revelation, therefore, was given by the One who became incarnate in the Moment of Incarnation, then, even though we can accept the revelation only at the Moment of New Birth, revelation itself has already been given by the one who became incarnate in the Moment of Incarnation.

The second implication of the fact that the Moment, for Kierkegaard, is the Moment in time is that if Incarnation takes place in one Moment, it cannot take place in any other Moment in time. The same is true in the case of the Moment of the New Birth. As Incarnation was only in the past, in one Moment in time and, therefore, it does not happen again and again. The New Birth cannot be repeated again and again in one disciple's life. It only takes place once. If it is not once in life, all discussion about the change of quality is useless or, rather, makes no sense. In relation to this, it will be good to quote a passage from the Postscript: "That an eternal happiness is decided in time through the relationship to something historical was the content of my experiment[i.e., the Philosophical Fragments] and what I now call Christianity. To avoid distraction again, I do not wish to bring forward any other Christian principles; they are all contained in this one, and may be consistently derived from it, just as this determination also offers the sharpest contrast with paganism."(CUP, p.330).

The third implication of the temporality of the Moments of Incarnation and of the New Birth is that because of those decisive Moments there was an Incarnate one in history and in time[1] and there is a new creature in time and history. Incarnation took place in the Moment. But the Incarnate one did not

merely exist in the Moment; but because of the Moment of Incarnation, the Incarnate one was in time and history. As far as the Incarnate one as the Teacher [Revealer] was in time and history, therefore, revelation also is in time and history. That is to say, the happening of revelation itself is in time and history. Similarly, because of the Moment of New Birth which is in time, there is a new creature in time and history. The new creature and therefore his repentance and faith are in time. The man who does not become a new creature in time cannot be a new creature in the life after death or the coming age. Eternal blessedness or salvation is decided in time (Cf. CUP, p.330), because the Moment of New Birth is a Moment in time.

The main point which I have made in this section is that for Kierkegaard, the Moment is the Moment in time. The three implications which have been drawn out here are to be clearly contrasted to the early Barth's use of the 'eternal Moment', which we have discussed in the first chapter of this study.

The differences between Barth and Kierkegaard, however, do not lie in their understanding of the Moment. The difference between the Moment in time [Kierkegaard's Moment] and the eternal Moment [Barth's Moment] leads to the difference between their understandings of the relation between revelation and history. To make this clearer it will be good to turn our attention to Kierkegaard's understanding of history's relation to revelation in contrast to Barth's understanding. This is the task which we shall pursue in the next section.

1. Hence the Paradox of 'God in time' is not only to be found in the Moment of Incarnation, but also in the life time of Jesus, as we shall see in detail in section 2 and 3. See also AR, p.79: "Christianity is the paradoxical truth that the eternal has once come into being in time And, indeed, the paradox itself did not exist for very many years; it existed when Christ lived and since that time it only exists every time one is offended and or truly believes."

What I want to argue in this section is that, for Kierkegaard, revelation which is related to the Incarnate one, is an historical and temporal revelation; the eternal revelation (or, the eternal historical revelation), as we shall see, for Kierkegaard, is not the Christian concept of revelation and cannot be regarded as Christian revelation.

The most important materials for a discussion of this problem (i.e., the relation between revelation and history for Kierkegaard) are the books which were published under the pseudonyms of Johannes Climacus and of Anti-Climacus. It will be useful therefore, to examine briefly the characteristics of these books, before we discuss our major problem of the relation between history and revelation. The thing which we shall consider in this preliminary part of this section is Johannes Climacus' concept of objective thinking or, the objective approach to Christianity, in contrast to Christian thinking (a special form of subjective thinking). But the discussion of the difference between ordinary subjective thinking and Christian thinking, must be placed before our discussion of the difference between objective thinking and Christian thinking. So in the preliminary part of this section I shall consider (1) the difference between ordinary subjective thinking and Christian thinking and (2) the difference between the objective approach to Christianity and Christian thinking.

In a sense, Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus is an objective observer who emphasizes subjective thinking.[1] That is to say, Johannes Climacus knows that if there is truth, it must be actualized or realized in one's own life and only

1. Cf. Peter Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction to His Life and Philosophy, trans. Alan Moray Williams (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), p.101: "In his earlier pseudonymous writings (especially in his writings under the name Johannes Climacus) Kierkegaard approached the Christian faith as an outsider and sought to define Christianity philosophically by a deductive process."

in that case can it be called truth for him; and that Christianity asserts that the Revealer was in time and history and one can have eternal happiness only through a personal relation to this historical fact. But he himself is not yet a Christian; he only asks the question, "How may I, Johannes Climacus, participate in the happiness promised by Christianity?" (CUP, p.20). His major concern, as he himself declares clearly, is the question, "How to become a Christian?" [1]

What Climacus tries to attack from the start is the attitude that we can be a Christian by understanding what Christianity is. He calls such an attitude the objective approach to (or objective thinking about) Christianity. His major thesis is that it is possible not to be a Christian even though one knows what Christianity is. [2] Misunderstanding of this assertion leads to thinking that for Climacus and his understanding of Christianity, the objective element is only in our subjective decision and there is no objective element apart from our subjectivity. So Kierkegaard is often spoken of as a subjectivist. It is true that Johannes Climacus attacks objective thinking, or the objective approach to Christianity. But this does not mean there is no objective element in his understanding of Christianity. He indeed wants to be a subjective thinker and he thinks that in order to be a Christian in a real sense, one must be a subjective thinker. However, not all subjective thinkers, for Climacus, are Christians. Lessing and Socrates, for example, whom Climacus takes as examples of subjective thinkers are not Christians in Climacus' sense of Christian. For

1. The reason why Kierkegaard uses such a strategy can be explained in relation to his doctrine of indirect-communication. For further discussion of Kierkegaard's doctrine of indirect-communication, see Robert Comming, "Existence and Communication," Ethics, LXV (1955), pp.79-101. See also Harry S. Broudy, "Kierkegaard on Indirect-Communication," The Journal of Philosophy, LVIII (1961), pp.225-233.

2. Cf. C. Stephen Evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), p.123: "Kierkegaard clearly admits that a person can understand what Christianity is without being a Christian. What is denied is that a person can know what it is to be a Christian without being one."

Johannes Climacus, to be a subjective thinker is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition of being a Christian.

There are two salient differences between ordinary subjective thinker and the Christian of whom Johannes Climacus speaks. First of all, they are different in regard to their starting point: ordinary subjective thinker starts from the presupposition that subjectivity is truth, whereas a Christian thinker starts from the statement that subjectivity is untruth.[1] Accordingly, for ordinary subjective thinker, truth is within oneself from eternity, whereas for a Christian, men are in untruth after the Fall. Johannes Climacus says: "Let us now call the untruth of the individual Sin He is not born as a sinner in the sense that he is presupposed as being a sinner before he is born, but he is born in sin and as a sinner. This we might call Original Sin." (CUP, p.186).

Their [Christian thinker and ordinary subjective thinker's] different presupposition leads to the second difference between their views of revelation. For ordinary subjective thinker, if there is revelation, it must be an eternal revelation and, therefore, it can be understood by human reason which is also

1. CUP, pp.183ff. See also Journal, 809: "... truth from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it), but in a revelation which must be proclaimed."

See also Gregor Malentshuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, eds. and trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.288: "Climacus stipulates the first level of the appropriation [of the truth] with the words: 'Subjectivity, inwardness is truth.' Climacus begins with a substantiation of this proposition, ascribing it to Socrates, after which by means of painstaking dialectical reflection he leads the existing individual through many levels of existence to a final confrontation with Christianity, where it is acknowledged that 'subjectivity is untruth.'" See also N.H.Soe, "The Development of Kierkegaard's View of Christianity: The Period up to the Postscript," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, I, eds. Niels and Marie Thulstrup (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1978), p.78: "To Socrates the basis was the thesis that Subjectivity is truth. The opposite is true for Christianity, namely that subjectivity is untruth, it is even polemical against truth, and it is so because of its own guilt, because it cannot be so as a result of the God, its Creator." See again Ingvar Horgby, "Immediacy-Subjectivity-Revelation," Inquiry, VIII (1965), pp.84, 112-114; E.L.Allen, Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought (London: Stanley, 1935), pp.175, 180; and Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, p.375.

eternal. Of course, ordinary subjective thinker, in contrast to the objective thinker, speaks of paradox. For Socrates,

"when the eternal truth is related to an existing individual it becomes a paradox. The paradox repels in the inwardness of the existing individual, through the objective uncertainty and the corresponding Socratic ignorance For without risk there is no faith When Socrates believed that there was a God, he held fast to the objective uncertainty with the whole passion of his inwardness, and it is precisely in this contradiction and this risk, that faith is rooted"(CUP, pp.187f., my emphasis).

However, the Socratic Paradox lies in the relation between the eternal and time. And the eternal is only a hidden or a forgotten thing. In this sense, the eternal is opposite of time. Therefore, in the last analysis, "in the Socratic view, each individual is his own center, and the entire world centers in him, because his self-knowledge is a knowledge of God"(PF, p.14).

For the Christian, on the contrary, revelation is given to us in a certain time, and was not in us from eternity. Here is the Absolute Paradox or the absurd. This point will be discussed in detail in the next section. Here it is sufficient to note that contrasting the Socratic paradox with the absolute Paradox, Climacus says: "What now is the absurd? The absurd is --- that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth..."(CUP, p.188, my emphasis). And this incarnate one, according to Philosophical Fragments, is the Teacher or Revealer of the eternal truth.

When we consider these two qualitative differences between ordinary subjective thinking and Christian thinking in Climacus' writings, we cannot equate them. Christian thinking, in contrast to ordinary subjective thinking, has an objective element which is in time and history .[1] That is to say, there must be the historical fact that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth, to be the Teacher or the Revealer to man. This is called the Absolute Paradox by Kierkegaard. And "the how [how to become a Christian] can only correspond with one thing, the Absolute Paradox"(CUP,

p.332).

Up to now, we have considered that Christian thinking must not be confused with ordinary subjective thinking, even though it [Christian thinking], according to Kierkegaard, has a subjective element as well as an objective element. In Climacus' understanding of Christianity, therefore, there is an objective element which exists independently of our subjective appropriation; he is not a subjectivist in his understanding of Christianity.[2]

Now we turn to the second problem which we have said that we should discuss in the preliminary part of this section. That is, the problem of the difference between objective thinking and Christian thinking. What is objective thinking or the objective approach which Climacus attacks with vehemence? The most simple example of objective thinking or the objective approach to Christianity is that one thinks that he is a Christian because he knows the objective element in Christianity. According to Johannes Climacus, even though one knows or even seems to believe the objective element in Christianity, one is not yet a Christian.[3] Such a simple example of objective thinking often introduces even more dangerous forms of the objective approach to Christianity than the simple example. There are two kinds of dangerous form of the objective approach to Christianity. One of them is a positive one, and the other is negative. However, both of them are dangerous approaches to Christianity.

The positive objective approach to Christianity which is dangerous, starts

1. Cf. Valter Lindstroem, "The Problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in Kierkegaard," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p.230: "Kierkegaard's thought is not, in fact, exclusively dominated by the argument in favor of subjectivity and against opinions that unduly emphasize objectivity. On the contrary, he tries to do justice the objective element of Christianity whenever possible." See also Edward John Carnell, The Burden of Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 110-111: "Let it be asserted for all to hear that Kierkegaard did not separate himself from the traditional orthodox claim that the data of Christianity are objective in the sense of existing 'out there.' What disturbed him, rather, was the way professing Christians substituted intellectual assent to these data for the decisive state of being Christians."

with the intention of defending Christianity. But this motive itself is, for Climacus, not Christian. Climacus, for example, scorns the learned theologian who "has completed the task [of proving the inspiration of the Scriptures by critical method] and has drawn the conclusion: ergo, now you can base your eternal happiness on these writings"(CUP, p.27, my italics). According to Climacus, this theologian thinks falsely that our faith can be based on his proof; he does not know that his proof is only an approximation. Of course, this does not mean that the result of his proof is always untruth. He can prove the thing as it is in reality. However, even if he had succeeded in this proof, his proving is only an approximation. That is to say, even though we know his

2. Cf. Journal, 528: "In all that is usually said about Johannes Climacus being purely subjective and so on, people have forgotten, in addition to everything else concrete about him, that in one of the last sections he shows that the curious thing is: that there is a 'how' which has this quality ... that it is the 'how' of 'faith.'"

For interpretations which also see the importance of the objective element in Kierkegaard's religious thinking, see (1) Paul Edward, "Kierkegaard and the Truth of Christianity," p.105: "...if there were no God or no God of the kind the Christian believes in or if Jesus never lived or if he lived but was in fact another human being, the passion of the Christian believer would also be misdirected or 'aberrant.'"; (2) James Brown, Subjective and Objective in Modern Theology, p.58: "Subjectivity is neither intellectual nor ethical solipsism. His [Kierkegaard's Subjectivity] is not the Identity Philosophy of a Schelling in which the Subject posits the Object, the ego produces the non-ego, spirit objectifies itself in matter in a polarity which constitutes nature."; (3) Per Loenning, The Dilemma of Contemporary Theology (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), p.83: "Subjectivity is an open attitude Here Kierkegaard's concern differs radically from all the ideologies usually listed in the large school of 'subjectivism.' Subjectivism itself is neither more or less than a kind of 'objectivism,' making subjectivity an object, a theory, a competitor to other systems claiming universal validity."; (4) Louis Dupre, Kierkegaard as Theologian, pp.129-134, 183; (5) N.H.Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox," in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp.207-227; (6) Valter Lindstroem, "The Problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in Kierkegaard," pp.228-243; (7) Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, pp.38f.; (8) Robert C. Roberts, "Thinking Subjectively," International Journal of Philosophy, XI (1980), pp. 71-92, esp., p.76; and (9) Paul L. Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Religious Propositions," The Journal of Religion, XXXV (1955), pp.135-146.

3. Cf. CUP, pp.511-512: "The objective interpretation of Christianity is misleading or misled when it conceives that by learning to know objectively what Christianity is (as an investigator learns it by the way of research, scholarship, learning), one thereby becomes a Christian (who bases his blessedness upon this historical witness)."

proof, we are not yet Christians.[1] One cannot come to believe God's revelation through such an objective inquiry alone. Climacus says:

"I assume that the critics have succeeded in proving about the Bible everything that any learned theologian in his happiest moment has ever wished to prove about the Bible [that is, 'the canonicity of the individual books, their authenticity, their integrity, the trustworthiness of their authors'(CUP, p.26)]. These books and no others belong to the canon; they are authentic; they are integral; their author's are trustworthy"(CUP, p.29).

But this is only a quantitative approximation. To believe them or not is a qualitatively different problem. Even though one proves all these things, it is possible that he does not believe them and does not live according to them. What is important here is that what Johannes Climacus attacks is the attitude which starts from an agnostic view-point, studies all the materials, by this study completes his task of proving and says that 'ergo', now you can believe. According to this attitude [the positive objective attitude], the things which must be believed cannot be a sufficient basis for eternal happiness before one has finished the task of proving; only after he has finished the task of proving can it be the basis of our eternal happiness. So he says: ergo you can believe. This attitude, in fact, does not believe in God, but in himself, his own scientific capacity. This attitude of scientific hubris is the object of Climacus' attack. Therefore, Climacus says:

"Whoever defends the Bible in the interest of faith must have made it clear to himself whether, if he succeeds beyond expectation, there could from all his labor ensue anything at all with respect to faith, lest he should come to stick fast in the parenthesis of his labor, and forget, over the difficulties of scholarship, the decisive dialectical claudatur"(CUP, p.29).

The negative dangerous form of objective thinking also has a relation to

1. Cf. Robert Merrihew Adams, "Kierkegaard's Argument against Objective Reasoning in Religion," The Monist, XL (1977), p.232: "It is clear that historical beliefs can be objectively probable; and in the Approximation Argument, Kierkegaard does not deny that Christian historical beliefs can be objectively probable. His thesis is, in effect, that in view of an infinite passionate interest in their subjective matter, they cannot be advantageous, even if they are objectively probable."

Christianity. But it transforms or distorts Christianity after having learned from Christianity.[1] Johannes Climacus speaks of the men who approach Christianity in this way as follows:

"They learn something from Christianity, misunderstand it, and by way of additional misunderstanding use it against Christianity. If in olden times the fearful thing was that one might be offended, now the fearful thing is that there is nothing fearful any more, that in a trice, before the individual has time to look around, he becomes a philosopher who speculates over faith Speculative philosophy accepts, on the contrary [contrary to the modern mythical allegorizing tendency which declares out and out that the whole of Christianity is a myth], the paradox, but does not stand still at this position. Nor is there any need of standing still, for when a man persists in holding the paradox fast as a believer, more and more profoundly exploring existentially the inwardness of faith, he does not stand still"(CUP, pp.192f.,195).

Now such people are trying to understand the content of revelation by their reason. And such an attempt changes the content of revelation into something which fits human reason. So the content of revelation becomes rational knowledge. In his writings Climacus uses the term knowledge in this restricted

1. Therefore, in this case the knowledge itself is distorted; the knowledge becomes an incorrect knowledge. For Climacus, there is a clear distinction between correct knowledge and a false knowledge of Christianity. The negative form of objective thinking is wrong in two ways: it is not to actualize the truth in one's life and moreover it does not have a correct knowledge or it distorts the correct knowledge (it changes the correct knowledge into a false knowledge). In this respect I agree with R.C.Roberts' assertion: "If someone proposes that I believe that Jesus is the Redeemer but tells me in the same breath that in all probability the documents witnessing to Him [Jesus Christ] are fabrications of a sixth century jokester, he is perhaps asking me to take leave of my senses. Or, if he tells me that Jesus is the Christ but then claims that all the biblical material that would add up to a claim that Jesus is the Christ is a mythological adornment of history by the pious imagination of the primitive Church, then perhaps he means something different by the expression "Jesus is the Christ" than the apostles and most Christian thinkers and Kierkegaard mean by it." R.C.Roberts, "Thinking Subjectively," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, XI (1980), pp.81f. See also Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, pp.375,379: "Speculation has misconstrued what it means to be human, since it understands man, at least the speculative man, as simply eternal, which no existing man is or can be. Quite in the same way it has misunderstood what Christianity is, since speculation wishes to conceive the conceivable." "Certainly speculative thought recognized guilt and sin, but not as existentially crucial elements, only as relative components in the all-relativizing system, where nothing is stable, where every thing is in flux."

sense. That is to say, what Climacus calls 'knowledge' in his writings is the knowledge which is understood by human reason. Because of this special way of speaking Climacus is often misunderstood as being against reason. But this is not a valid understanding. Even though he does not use the term knowledge, in Christianity there is something objective.[1] In this juncture, we can quote one relevant passage:

"There is no lack of information in a Christian land, something else is lacking, and this is something which the one man cannot directly communicate to the other. ... [But] if there were any one who did not know it [the information about Christianity] I might perhaps be in danger of being dislodged from my position of equilibrium by the thought that I might be in a position to communicate to someone the needful preliminary knowledge"(CUP, pp.542, 181. note).

According to this quotation, there are two things which are related to Christianity [2]; the one is a thing which can be directly communicated (the preliminary knowledge) [3] and the other is a thing which cannot be directly communicated (what it means to live according to the truth). The second one is not to be without the first one (the preliminary knowledge).[4] It is impossible, however, to emphasize only the preliminary knowledge.

1. In the following discussion I shall differentiate between knowledge in a broad sense of the word and knowledge in the restricted sense of the word (the knowledge which can be comprehended by human reason; what is 'rational' in the Kantian and Hegelian sense of the word) and relate them to objectivity in a broad sense and objective thinking or the objective approach to revelation respectively. Of course, we do not find a clear differentiation (like the one I have made in this argument) in the writings of Kierkegaard. However, without this differentiation it is easy to misunderstand Kierkegaard. Hence, I venture to make this differentiation clear in my study, in spite of Kierkegaard's ambiguity. R.M.Adams tries to differentiate these two objectivity in his interpretation of Kierkegaard. Cf."Kierkegaard's Argument against Objective Reasoning in Religion," The Monist, XL (1977), pp.228-243. Esp., p.228.

2. One finds a similar assertion in one of Kierkegaard's Journal entries: "That there is an element of knowledge is particularly true for Christianity; a knowledge of Christianity must certainly be communicated in advance. But it is only a preliminary."(SKJP, I, 653)

3. According to Climacus, at the back of this objective information, there is an objective historical fact which was in time and history. For Climacus, if there were a believer who believed what was not in concrete time and our history, he would have the 'aberrant inwardness' of the fanatic and a 'subjective madness.' Cf.CUP pp.32, 174f.

Objective thinking which Climacus attacks with vehemence, is related to the attitude which emphasizes only the preliminary knowledge, and moreover, tries to understand it by human reason. Objective thinking is either the attempt to see only objectivity or to understand the content of revelation by human reason. The first of these is related to dead orthodoxy and the second is related to Hegelian philosophy and theology. For Johannes Climacus, therefore, there is something objective (or, something historical), which is called the Absolute Paradox, which must be communicated and believed if one is to speak of a Christian in the real sense of the word. But the mere knowledge of the objective or the object of faith itself is not yet faith. It can be called 'objective faith' (CUP, p.193) or historical faith. But such a faith, for Climacus, is not yet faith in a real sense. What is communicated to us must be appropriated subjectively in our own life; we must live according to the truth which is communicated to us. However, without the objective element of the historical revelation, there is no Christianity and no Christian faith. Kierkegaard says:

"Christianity exists before any Christian exists, it must exist in order that, one may become a Christian, it contains the determinant by which one may test whether one has become a Christian, it maintains its objective subsistence apart from all believers, while at the same time it is the inwardness of the believer. In short, here there is no identity between the subjective and objective. Though Christianity comes into the heart of never so many believers, every believer is conscious that it has not arisen in his heart, is conscious that the objective determinant of Christianity is not a reminiscence No, even if no one had perceived that God had revealed himself in a human form in Christ, he nevertheless has revealed himself" (AR, pp.168f.).[5]

Up to now we have discussed (1) the difference between ordinary subjective thinking and Christian thinking and (2) the difference between objective thinking and Christian thinking (a special kind of subjective thinking). Now we

4. Cf. Henry E. Allison, "Christianity and Nonsense," p.557: "It is not true that it does not matter what one believes as long as one believes it with sufficient inwardness, for the only thing that can really be believed, i.e., truly appropriated with the 'passion of the infinite' is the Absolute Paradox."

can discuss the main problem of this section, that of the relation between revelation and history, on the basis of this preliminary consideration.

What I shall argue in the main part of this section is that for Kierkegaard revelation took place in time and history, even though men do not accept it because of their sin. To show this I shall consider (1) Climacus' discussion of the problem of revelation and history. After considering the main argument of Climacus, I shall compare it with Lessing's view. Through this consideration, I shall make it clear that for Climacus, God's revelation takes place as an historical fact, even though it is the absolute fact. (2) After considering the understanding of revelation in the works of which Kierkegaard published under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, I shall compare this understanding with the understanding of Kierkegaard's other pseudonymous authors, especially with Anti-Climacus' special concept of 'history.' Here I shall show that by 'world history' Anti-Climacus means a special kind of interpretation of the process of history (so-called Hegelian world history), so that it is not history in the sense of that which takes place in time. In a word, I shall conclude that there is no difference between Climacus' understanding of the relation between revelation and history and that of Anti-Climacus. That is to say, revelation takes place in history, even though men try to distort this revelation. (3) And this point will be supported by examination of the other writings of Kierkegaard.

5. In this sense, I can give my assent to the following observation of James Collins: "What Kierkegaard tries to emphasize is that the most complete subjectivity coincides with the most complete objectivity" ("Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard," The Journal of Religion, XXXVII (1957), p.19. See also Vernald Eller's distinction between the subjectivism of kerygmatic-existentialist theology and the subjectivity of Kierkegaard, in his "Fact, Faith, and Foolishness," in The Journal of Religion, XLVIII (1968): pp. 54-68. esp., p.61-62. See again, H.R. Mackintosh, op cit., p.215: "By inwardness is meant the personal appropriation of divinely presented truth, its apprehension with and through passion." C. Stephen Evans also makes a similar point in his book, Subjectivity and Religious Belief (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), pp.4-9.

(1)

Let us start with the consideration of Climacus' understanding of the relation between revelation and history. As we have seen, even in Johannes Climacus' understanding of Christianity, there is the objective element which must be communicated before we can be Christians. Climacus sometimes calls this objective element "something historical," "the historical fact," or "historical datum"(Cf. CUP, pp.508-519). By "something historical" and "the historical fact" Johannes Climacus means that "the Deity, the Eternal came into being at a definite moment in time as an individual man"(CUP, p.512). For Johannes Climacus, this is an event which is in time and history. Even though, it is a very special event in time and is, therefore, different from other historical facts, this event, as far as its happening is concerned, is an historical fact; it is in a time which is not different from any other time in which other historical facts take place. Therefore, it cannot be called "an eternal historical fact"(CUP, p.513; PF, pp.124ff.). Of course, it is the absolute fact. "But the absolute fact is also an historical fact"(PF, p.125). It is not an eternal fact or the eternal historical fact. For Climacus, to say that it is an eternal fact or an eternal historical fact is to make this historical fact "an eternal becoming"(PF, p.513). It is impossible, for Climacus, to think that the Incarnation is an eternal becoming or an ever-happening event.[1]

1. I am wondering why Mark Taylor and James Brown who are so careful observers do not distinguish an eternal fact and the absolute fact, which are clearly differentiated in Philosophical Fragments. Cf. Mark Taylor, op.cit., p.297: "The historical event of Incarnation is an eternal fact [et evigt Faktum] or an absolute fact [et absolute Facktum]." See also Journey to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (London, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p.129. See also James Brown, op.cit., p.69: ".... the Incarnation of God. This last is 'an eternal fact,' incommensurate with 'history'." If this fact were to be an 'eternal fact', then for Kierkegaard, there would be no Absolute Paradox; there would be only a Socratic Paradox, which consists in the relation between what is eternal and the existing individual.

What is important here is that when Johannes Climacus calls the Incarnation the historical fact (as the absolute fact) the word 'the historical' is not different from any other ordinary historical fact. The event of Jesus Christ, for Johannes Climacus, does not belong to eternity; nor does it belong to a special time and history. It is in the time and history in which we live.

In fact, the subject-matter of Philosophical Fragments is closely related to this point, that the Incarnation is the historical fact which is the object of our faith.[1] On the title-page of Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus asks: "Is an historical point of departure possible for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure have any other than a merely historical interest; is it possible to base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge?"(PF, title-page).[2]

Behind this quotation is Lessing's famous statement: "Accidental truths of history can never become proof of necessary truths of reason." [3] What matters for Lessing, according to this statement, is not whether Jesus Christ was in history or not, but whether this historical fact can be the proof of the eternal truth. At the back of this assertion there is an epistemological presupposition that there are two kinds of truth: the eternal truths of reason and the accidental truth of experience. Whereas the eternal truths of reason can be

1. Cf. Leroy Kay Seat, "The Meaning of Paradox: A Study of the Use of the Word Paradox in Contemporary Theological and Philosophical Writings with Special Reference to Soren Kierkegaard," unpublished doctoral thesis (The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1967), p.98: "How is it possible to take seriously the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation in the face of the Greek-oriented philosophy which viewed the historical as a limitation rather than as a salutary situation? This is the perplexing issue Kierkegaard confronted with his Philosophiske Smuler."

2. Throughout this study I will assume that by the expression, "the eternal happiness" Kierkegaard means 'salvation' in a Christian sense. For an excellent discussion of this terminology, see Abraham A.Khan, "Salighed (happiness) in Kierkegaard's Religious Works," Studia Theologia, XXXVI (1982), pp.47-62. See also David Swenson's "Letter to Dr. Lowrie, August 12, 1935," in Something about Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1948, the third edition), pp.216ff.

demonstrated [viz., an a priori demonstration of eternal truths is possible], the accidental truths of experience cannot be demonstrated, but only have historical proofs [viz., a posteriori proofs]. That is to say, even though there are historical proofs of historical facts, the historical facts, as far as they are historical facts, cannot be regarded as eternal facts of reason. Here, it is well to quote D. Strauss's quotation from Lessing's Ueber den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft:

"If I have no historical objections to Christ's resurrection from the dead, must I therefore (dogmatically) hold to be true that precisely this resurrected Christ has been the Son of God? That the Christ, against whose resurrection I cannot bring any historical objection of importance, has on these grounds claimed to be the Son of God and that his disciples have therefore regarded him as the Son of God --- this I willingly and cordially believe, for these truths, as truths of one and same class, follow quite naturally from each other. I can easily believe that he said so, and that His disciples believed him. But now from this historical truth to leap over into an entirely different class of truths and to require me to reformulate all my metaphysical and moral concepts to conform to it, and to require me, because I cannot present any believable witness against Christ's resurrection, to change all my fundamental ideas of the nature of God accordingly --- if this is not metabasis, then I do not know what Aristotle understood by this word. But now, then, one answers: but this very Christ, who, you must admit, in the historical sense awakened from the dead and arose, has himself said that God has a son, like unto God in essence, and that he was this son. This would be good enough, if it were only historically certain that Christ said this. If one pressed me further and said: it is even more than historically certain, then all this is a forbidding, deep chasm which I cannot cross over, however frequently and seriously I have attempted the leap." [4]

According to this quotation, Lessing cannot believe that Jesus Christ is actually the Son of God, even though he knows and believes that Jesus Christ himself said that he is the Son of God and that the disciples of Jesus believed

3. G.E. Lessing, Theological Writings, edited and translated by Henry Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) p.53. See also p.55: "If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly have tried to make the leap."

4. G.E. Lessing, Ueber den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, cited in D.F. Strauss, Die Christliche Glaubenslehre, I (1840), translated into Danish by Hans Broechner, pp.148-150 cited in Niels Thulstrup's "Commentary" to FF, pp.150f. Cf. Chadwick's English translation edition, pp.54-55.

that. This does not mean that Lessing is not a religious thinker; Lessing himself has no difficulty in being a religious thinker, for he has a 'rational revealed religion' which has no direct relation to historical revelation. For Lessing, religious truth is not the sort of thing that is dependent on historical events for its validity. "This is why Lessing always tries to divorce the question of the truth of Christianity from the question of the potential facticity of historical revelation. For Lessing, Christianity is true, not because of certain external, factual, and altogether accidental idiosyncracies that set it off from our rationality, but because of its rational 'inner truth' that is binding even upon the will of God." [1] Therefore, the Christianity which Lessing regards as true, because of its rationality, is the Christianity which is interpreted by his rationality. As R. Campbell pointed out that "for him [Lessing], reason in each of us furnishes us with the essentials of religion, which are simply to recognize God, forming only the noblest conceptions of Him, and bearing these in mind in all thought and action." [2] What is important for Lessing is not what is in history, but what can be shown to be valid by human reason. [3] Therefore, there is no necessity for Lessing to cross the ditch between the realm of reason and the realm of history. However, for Johannes Climacus, without the leap across the ditch, there is no true Christianity.

In fact, the leap has, for Climacus, two meanings. The most frequent interpretation of this leap is that it is the leap of faith. Climacus asserts that if one wants to be a Christian, one must cross over the ditch with a leap of faith which Lessing avoids. However, before this leap of faith there must be

1. Cf. G.E. Michalson, Jr., "Lessing, Kierkegaard, and Ugly Ditch: A Reexamination," The Journal of Religion, VIX (1979), p.328.

2. Richard Campbell, "Lessing's Problem and Kierkegaard's Answer," Scottish Journal of Theology, XIX (1969), p.45.

3. Lessing's position on this problem is well expressed in his The Education of the Human Race. See Lessing's Theological Writings, pp.87ff.

a different kind of leap. In contrast to Lessing, who thinks that religion is basically rational, Climacus sees that New Testament Christianity cannot be understood by human reason. That is to say, according to Climacus' understanding of Christianity, Christianity is not a rational religion which can be comprehended by human reason. In this sense, for Climacus, Christianity is non-rational (not irrational).

This point can well be understood when we consider Climacus' contrast between faith within Christianity and the 'subjective madness' which is well expressed in the case of Don Quixote (Cf. CUP, pp.174f.). Therefore, it is the right interpretation of Climacus' understanding of Christianity that Christianity is in a special category to which human reason cannot be applied.[1] This is the basic difference between Lessing's understanding of Christianity and that of Climacus. Because of this difference, whereas there is no leap of faith in the case of Lessing, there is a leap of faith in the case of Climacus. For Climacus, the character of Christianity demands the leap of

1. It seems that such thinking is similar to that of Kant and his epistemology. There are some scholars who try to relate Kierkegaard's thinking and that of Kant. Cf. Jerry H. Gill, "Kant, Kierkegaard and Religious Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVIII (1967-1968), pp.188-204; Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, part I; Louis Mackey, "Kierkegaard and the Problem of Existentialism, I," The Review of Metaphysics, IX (1956), pp.575,608; Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p.50 n.32; Merod Westphal, "Kierkegaard and the Logic of Insanity," Religious Studies, VII (1971), pp.196-198; George Price, The Narrow Pass (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

However, it is impossible, it seems to me, to identify Kierkegaard's epistemology with that of Kant, and (moreover) Kierkegaard's ontology with that of Kant. It is true that Kierkegaard also does not think rational treatment of God and His revelation is possible. But he does not think, like Kant, that God and His revelation must be sanctioned by human reason. (Cf. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason alone (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp.175f. See also pp.82, 94, 100, 158-163). The reason why we cannot understand God and His revelation by our reason, for Kierkegaard, is closely related to sin which is not explained in such a way in the system of Kant's philosophy. Moreover, Kierkegaard does not think that the limit of our recognition is also God's limit (or, God's limitation). That is to say, even though we do not recognize God and His revelation by our reason, for Kierkegaard, God came into the realm of time and history.

faith. To emphasize this point once again, the understandings of Christianity of Lessing and Climacus are different from one another. To understand Christianity as something to which reason cannot be applied is itself a kind of leap. But this leap is a different leap from that of faith. That is to say, this leap is the presupposition of the leap of faith; the reason why we must dare to leap lies in the fact that Christianity is not a thing which we can understand by our reason. The character of Christianity, that it is not a thing which can be understood by our reason, precedes the leap of faith. In this connection, it will be good to think about the 'offense', which we shall consider in detail in the next section. What is contrasted to the leap of

For Kierkegaard, God is not confined to the realm of eternity and His time. He can break through the limit of human reason, even though man in sin cannot think of God and His revelation. Basically, for Kant religion in its real sense must be within the limits of our reason (especially practical reason), whereas for Kierkegaard religion in its real sense implies all parts of human life. For these several reasons it is impossible to relate Kant's epistemology to Kierkegaard's thinking. In a word, there is no possibility of the Absolute Paradox in Kant's epistemology. Whereas in the thought of Kierkegaard, even though we cannot accept the Absolute Paradox, it confronts our reason. That is to say, their difference is more basic than Jerry H. Gill thinks when he writes:

"The most obvious difference is that in the face of the impossibility of religious knowledge, Kant merely 'posits' the existence of God and immortality in a tentative fashion, while Kierkegaard 'leaps' beyond and accepts the paradox that knowledge of God is nonetheless possible, in a decisive fashion. This is a difference in their responses to the epistemological situation, and in their analysis of the nature of that situation. It could be maintained that both are inconsistent; Kant because he smuggles God in after exiling Him, and Kierkegaard because he actually takes back with one hand the decisive quality of the particular which he had offered with the other." ("Kant, Kierkegaard and Religious Knowledge," p.204).

If there were no revelation in time and history, then Kant would be regarded as right by Kierkegaard. However, the existence of revelation in time and history, which Kierkegaard recognizes, makes Kierkegaard depart from Kant. Even though his opinion is not exactly the same as mine, Robert L. Perkins also makes a similar point in his "For Sanity's Sake: Kant, Kierkegaard and Father Abraham," in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1981), pp.43-61, esp., p.54. Stephen Evans also points out that the difference between Kant and Kierkegaard can be found in Kierkegaard's assertion that the historicity of the Incarnation has decisive religious significance. See his Subjectivity and Religious Belief, p.76 n.3.

faith, for Climacus, is 'offense.' But in order that there is a possibility of offense, there must be 'something historical' or the Absolute Paradox which is objectively there before our faith or offense. If there were not some objective element in Christianity to which reason cannot be applied, then there would be no possibility of offense. And if there were only eternal facts in Christianity, then there would be no possibility of offense. If, on the contrary, there is the possibility of offense, that means that there is some objective element in Christianity to which human reason cannot be applied. And according to Climacus, the objective element in Christianity is what happened in time and history.[1]

Therefore, we can conclude, in the followings two respects, that for Climacus Christianity is not, as Lessing believes, a rational religion. First of all, it is related to something historical to which reason cannot relate. For, as we have seen, for both Lessing and Climacus, an historical fact cannot be an eternal truth of reason. Secondly, the historical element in Christianity, for Climacus, is not only an historical fact, but the absolute fact, which is different from any other historical fact. And according to this absolute fact, man is in sin. And this absolute fact is a special fact to which reason cannot be applied. Therefore, this absolute fact is called the Absolute Paradox which, a point which we shall discuss in the next section.

This comparison between Lessing and Climacus sheds an important light on

1. Cf. H.R.Mackintosh, op.cit., p.233: "Now we stand upon the very peak of truth. It is the essence of Christianity that eternal Truth once came forth in history, a personal presence in the God-man. Christ was not the effulgence of human-nature, but the breathing of Eternity into time. See also Per Loenning, Dilemma of Contemporary Theology, pp.75f.: "Christianity is presented as the 'Paradox,' it is said to be contrary to reason; facing 'the possibility of offense'; man has to admit as a historical fact that eighteen hundred years ago God walked in our streets and our lanes, looking exactly like the rest of us, and to accept the judgment which this fact passed upon us: we needed such a really extraordinary event in order to be delivered from our falsity and corruption."(My emphasis).

the problem of the relation between revelation and history. From this comparison we can see the importance of the 'historical fact' for Climacus' understanding of Christianity. For Climacus, if there were not this 'historical fact,' then there would be no Christianity.[1] If there were not this 'historical fact' in time and history, then Christians would not be different from Don Quixote. But if there was this historical fact, they are different from not only Don Quixote, but also from Socrates and Lessing (ordinary subjective thinkers). And according to Climacus, this historical fact is closely related to revelation, for the historical fact is related to the Revealer (the Teacher).[2]

As we have pointed out, this historical fact started from the moment of the Incarnation. There was the Revealer in time and history. As far as the Incarnation took place in order that God reveal Himself to man, what was in time and history, in relation to this individual man, is revelation. According to Philosophical Fragments, the man who is regarded as the Incarnate one is 'the God as Teacher and Saviour.' (PF, pp.28-45). And these two concepts (Teacher and Saviour) are parallel to the concepts our 'example' and 'Redeemer' which are used in Kierkegaard's later writings.[3] Therefore, revelation is related to

1. Cf. Niels Thulstrup, "Theological and Philosophical Kierkegaardian Studies in Scandinavia, 1945-1953," Theology Today, XII (1955), p.299: "Christianity teaches that the eternal at a determinate point in time has entered the historical, the sphere of existence and change. There with Christianity becomes inexplicable and unintelligible, demanding the categories of paradoxicality."

2. In relation to this, it will be good to quote one of Kierkegaard's Journal entries which compares true Christian concepts and the concepts of contemporary theology [theology which was contemporaneous with Kierkegaard]: "And now Christianity, how has it been treated! all Christian concepts have become so blurred, so totally dissolved in layers of fog that they are past all recognition. The concepts of faith, Incarnation, tradition, inspiration, which within the Christian sphere are traceable back to a certain historical fact, have now been given by the philosophers a quite different meaning, whereby faith becomes the immediate consciousness which, in fact, is nothing but the vital fluid of life, its atmosphere" (Papirer I A 328, pp.141f. cited in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, p.92).

what the Teacher teaches and what He does. And behind these two elements [(1) what he teaches and (2) what he does], there is who he is. The Person and the Works of the Incarnate one are regarded as revelation.[4], And the person of the Incarnate one is the person who is in the time and history in which we live. He is the God-man in time and history, not in eternity or in a special history.[5] And this is the point where Kierkegaard's view of Jesus Christ is different from that of Barth.

When we consider Climacus' understanding of the relation between history and revelation, we are confronted with one important problem: that we try not to accept the historical fact of the Incarnate one as revelation. That is to say, even though the historical fact of the Incarnation was in time and history, we do not accept it as revelation, but misunderstand it or distort it and make it into something else. What is the reason for this? Is it because this historical fact actually does not belong to time and history (as in the case of

3. Cf. TC, pp.232, 270; JFY, pp.209,215; Journals, 698, 889.

4. We know it through Jesus' self-assertion. Cf. Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, p.88: "... the self-attestation of Jesus in the first place draws the attention of mankind to the fact and presence of revelation; secondly, it imparts the necessary knowledge for the understanding of it; and, thirdly, at the same time, it claims to be able to demand authoritatively the decision against scandalisation."

5. Cf. PF, p.137: "It is well-known that Christianity is the only historical phenomenon which in spite of the historical, nay precisely by means of the historical, has intended itself to be for the single individual the point of departure for his eternal consciousness, has intended to interest him otherwise than merely historically, has intended to base his eternal happiness on his relationship to something historical." W. von Kloeden has shown what the problem is for Kierkegaard here: "... the important question for SK [Kierkegaard] is how God can be fitted into history without vanishing into pantheism, that is, how is the revelation of God to remain independent, and not to be subordinated to a faith in history. In other words, how is God to become man without at the same time abandoning his majesty, or young Kierkegaard's recurring question: How is Christianity to be protected so that it does not like Judaism, with its strong emphasis on the theory of history, sink to the level of a traditional religion. The problem involved is that of ordering God's authority and His revelation" ("The Development Kierkegaard's View of Christianity: The Early Period (Including 1840)," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, pp.94f.).

the early Barth)? Is this historical fact a different kind of history (as in the case of the later Barth)? Is it because revelation is not the historical fact itself, but that which is beyond this historical fact and stands in relation to this historical fact (as in the case of Barth)?

It seems to me that it is impossible to answer these questions affirmatively. For, according to Climacus, the reason why we do not accept this historical fact as revelation lies not in the historical fact itself, but in our own state. It is true that Climacus asserts with vehemence that we cannot be disciples or Christians simply through being eyewitnesses to this historical fact. And this is the very point where Climacus differs from Lessing who thinks that if he can see the historical fact with his eyes, then he could believe not only the historical fact, but also that this historical fact is true. But Climacus says:

"... though a contemporary learner readily becomes an historical eyewitness,, [this] does not make such an eye-witness a disciple"(PF, p.73).

Therefore, according to Climacus, no one by himself can believe that the one who exists in this historical fact is the God-man, and that what comes from him is revelation. Of course, this does not mean that it is absolutely impossible to infer that he is the Saviour, Redeemer, and Revealer. Even though we can infer that he may be the Saviour and Revealer from the signs he gives as to who he is, there is no one who can believe it by himself.

In this sense, faith, for Climacus, is not 'a form of knowledge'(PF, p.103). What is interesting in relation to this problem, is that Climacus thinks that doubt likewise is not a problem of knowledge but a problem of will. That is to say, doubt is the "refusal to give assent": "The Greek sceptic did not doubt by virtue of his knowledge, but by an act of will (refusal to give assent --- metriopathein)."(PF, p.103). Therefore, as far as knowledge is

concerned, it is there for both the one who gives assent to this knowledge and the one who refuses to give his assent. In this sense, faith is not a 'form of knowledge,' for it is possible not to believe although one has the knowledge. Therefore, faith is close to an act of will. But in so far as the object of faith is the Absolute Paradox (as we shall see in the next section where we shall be concerned with the Absolute Paradox), we do not will to accept the Absolute Paradox in the same way as we believe other historical facts. In this sense, Christian faith is not "an act of will," either.[1] For we, as natural men who are in sin, do not will to believe in God and His revelation.[2]

Therefore, the reason why we do not accept or recognize God's revelation as such does not lie in the character of the revelation itself, but is the result of our state. As far as the historical form of revelation is concerned, we know it ("the historical element in Christianity"); in a sense, it is an objective one. Everyone can have access to this object. But even though the fact of revelation is accessible to us in the God-man, we do not give our assent to his assertion that he is God. To us, as natural men, what is important is our own rationality and our own will. According to our rationality, God cannot become an individual man. Yet the God-man in time asserts that he is God. We cannot but call this assertion absurd, for it does not fit our rationality. Our will also does not approve this absurdity that an historical individual asserts that he is God [this is our unwillingness to accept the Gospel].

Therefore, if there is a believer or a disciple, this means that he

1. Cf. PF, p.77: "Faith is not an act of will."

Therefore, it is unfair to Kierkegaard to interpret him as a man who emphasizes faith as an act of will as does Mark C. Taylor (op.cit., pp.315-318). Of course, faith implies an act of will. However, we cannot believe the thing which we must believe before we are changed qualitatively by God. We have lost the power to believe it by our own will.

2. Per Loenning expresses this well when he speaks of "Man's unwillingness to accept the Gospel." Cf. "Kierkegaard as a Christian Thinker," op.cit., p.177.

believes something which he cannot accept by his reason and by his own will. Human reason and human will are not appropriate to relate to the object of faith. The believer or the disciple is the one who accepts what he cannot accept by his reason and his will. The only way to interpret this phenomenon is to say that God lets the man accept the historical revelation. Climacus speaks of the God-given condition which is given that man may accept the Absolute Paradox.[3] And this God-given-condition is related to man's change. For Climacus, the idea of the God-given-condition and the idea of New Birth or of a New Creation imply one another. To say that God gives us the condition to understand the Truth is not different from saying that God recreates us, so that there is a qualitative change in man. Now the man can accept the Absolute Paradox: even though it still does not fit his own rationality; this does not matter for the man who is in faith. He has been changed.

As the one who has been changed, he does not seek to find God's revelation in any other realm or any other history (i.e., Geschichte). What was in history before he was changed has not been changed, but the one who has been changed finds God's revelation in the one who was in history (Jesus). Even though he does not comprehend the relation of the two natures of Jesus Christ, he accepts this fact and learns from Jesus; now he is a disciple. Now, for him, Jesus Christ is the Saviour and the Revealer; the one who recreates him and the one whom he must follow and take as the example for his own life. Of course he cannot explain how he comes to believe. The only thing he can say is that God has changed him.[4] What seemed to be absurd before is now the Truth (even though it is still the Absolute Paradox); what seemed to be foolish before is

3. PF, p.17: "Now if the learner is to acquire the Truth, the Teacher must bring it to him, and not only so, but he must also give him the condition necessary for understanding it. For if the learner were in his own person the condition for understanding the Truth, he need only recall it." See also p.80: "The God gave to the disciple the condition that enables him to see him, opening for him the eyes of Faith."

now true. Now he can accept God's revelation which was and is in history.[5]

Thus we can conclude that for Climacus the Revealer was in time and history. Also revelation was in history; history which is not different from any other history. As far as its happening is concerned, there is no difference between the historical existence of the Incarnate one and any other historical fact. Almost at the end of the Philosophical Fragments Climacus says:

"It is well-known that Christianity is the only historical phenomenon which in spite of the historical, nay precisely by means of the historical, has intended itself to be for the single individual the point of departure for his eternal consciousness, has intended to interest him otherwise than merely historically, has intended to base his eternal happiness on his relationship to something historical (PF, p.137).

"The historical" in the writings of Climacus is the historical fact that God was in time as an individual man.[6] As far as his existence in time is concerned, this historical fact is not different from any other historical fact. But in so far as this historical fact is concerned with God, it is different from other historical facts. Climacus calls this historical fact the absolute fact. This is the historical fact which is absolute for every generation. And that this is an historical fact does not change. There is no possibility of accepting this

4. Cf. Jerry H. Gill, op.cit., p.199: "Thus, it is only by means of a 'leap' that the knower is able to transcend the ego-centric predicament. He cannot know how he has obtained knowledge, but he can know that he has obtained it. He cannot understand it, but he can experience it."

5. Cf. Philip Merlan, "Must We Reinterpret Kierkegaard?," The Journal of Religion, LIII (1975), p.59: "The most obvious [in the writings of Kierkegaard] is the one in which Kierkegaard reminds his readers that Christianity does not come into existence by its doctrines being believed in; on the contrary, Christianity presupposes that events took place which afterward can be described in the form of doctrines. ... There is no Christianity unless the objective events of the Incarnation (and Crucifixion) have taken place; and no amount of subjective certainty could create Christianity unless these events have taken place."

6. Cf. CUP, p.290: ".... the object of faith is hence the reality of the God-man in the sense of his existence. ... The object of faith is thus God's reality in existence as a particular individual, the fact that God has existed as an individual human being." See also E.J. Carnell, The Burden of Kierkegaard, p.111: "In like manner, the Absolute Paradox (the Incarnation, that is) may have existed as an historical fact, and thus be objective according to the common sense norm."

historical fact more easily. One cannot change this historical fact through interpretation. This historical fact, even though it is historical, or rather because it is historical, is the absolute fact. Though the Absolute is declinable in all the casibus of life, it remains itself ever the same; and through it enters continually into relations with other things, it constantly remains status absolutus(PF, p.125). When Climacus emphasizes the absoluteness of this historical fact, he makes it clear that there is nothing else which can likewise be called the Absolute Paradox. It is a special fact. But Climacus warns us that we must never forget that the absolute fact is an historical fact: "The absolute fact is an historical fact, and as such it is the object of Faith. The historical aspect must indeed be accentuated"(PF, p.125). This is the very point which makes this fact differ from an eternal fact(Cf. PF, pp.124ff.).

Therefore, the absolute fact is a kind of historical fact. In so far as the absolute fact is not an eternal fact, we have to emphasize the point that for Climacus even though the fact of revelation is the absolute fact, it is so as an historical fact. Hence, it is impossible to distinguish the element which is in the realm of the eternal and the element which is in the realm of time in this absolute fact. This absolute fact is in time and history; it does not belong to the realm of eternity. The fact that we cannot recognize the special meaning of this fact and we cannot receive it as God's revelation, does not make this fact transcend the realm of time and history. Even though we do not accept it as God's revelation, it was and is in time and history. If that were not the case, there would be no Absolute Paradox. So in my opinion, it is impossible to interpret the event of Incarnation as Mark Taylor does:

"By virtue of his manhood, Jesus participates in profane history, and by virtue of his divinity, he participates in sacred history."[1]

Mark Taylor tries to find a relation between Kierkegaard's understanding and Rudolf Bultmann's understanding of the relation between revelation and

history.[2] According to Mark Taylor, to understand Kierkegaard's understanding's Paradox, Bultmann's analysis is helpful. Bultmann writes:

"The Paradox of Christ as the historical Jesus and the ever present Lord, and the Paradox of the Christian as an eschatological and historical being is excellently described by Eric Frank (The Role of History in Christian Thought, pp.74f.):

'.... to the Christians the advent of Christ was not an event in the temporal process which we mean by history It was an event in the history of salvation, in the realm of eternity, as eschatological moment in which rather this profane history of the world came to its end. And in an analogical way, history comes to its end in the religious experience of any Christian who is 'in Christ.' In his faith he is already above time and history. For although the advent of Christ is an historical fact which happened 'once' in the past, it is, at the same time, an eternal event which occurs again and again in the soul of any Christian The advent of Christ is an advent in the realm of eternity which is commensurable with historical time"(History and Eschatology, pp.151-153)."[3]

Taylor's failure to distinguish between the eternal fact and the absolute fact which I have pointed out above [see p.204.n.1.], makes him interpret Kierkegaard in this way. For Kierkegaard, the absolute fact cannot be regarded as an eternal fact or even an eternal historical fact.(Cf.PF, pp.124f.;CUP, pp.512f.). The fact that Jesus is the God-man cannot be analyzed in a dualistic way. On the contrary, the existence of the God-man is the existence which overcomes the dualistic structure of eternity and time, even though we, as men, cannot overcome the paradoxicality of this fact. The God-man is the God-man in time and history; he cannot be regarded as a mere man because he is in time and history. If he is the God-man in a realm which is beyond the realm of time and history, then there would not be Absolute Paradox, but only the Socratic Paradox, the crisis between the realm of time and the realm of eternity. For Kierkegaard, the attempt to place the God-man only in a realm which is beyond time and history, is an attempt to take away Absolute Paradox from this world of time and history. The event of the Incarnation did not take place in a special

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1. Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, pp.303f.
 2. Ibid, p.301.note 81.
 3. Ibid, pp.300f.

history or a special realm. For Climacus, it took place in the time and history in which we live. And as a fact which took place in time and history, it can be the absolute fact which is the same distance from every generation. But that this fact is the absolute fact does not make it an eternal fact. For as far as its happening is concerned, it is not different from any other historical fact.

Up to now I have drawn out Climacus' understanding of the relation between history and revelation. I have shown that for Climacus, the Revealer was in the time and history in which we live, as an individual man; but this fact is the absolute fact as an historical fact. Therefore, it is at the same distance from every generation, for it is the absolute. But this does not mean that it is in eternity, nor that it is an eternal fact or an eternal historical fact. Here, I make one more point: that the difficulty of accepting this fact is the difficulty of accepting it as God's revelation, or as the absolute fact, not the difficulty of accepting it as an historical fact. The fact that even for immediate contemporaries it is impossible to accept this historical fact as the fact which is related to the Revealer, makes it clear that the impossibility of accepting this fact is not the impossibility of accepting the historicity or the historical form of it, but that of accepting this fact as the absolute fact or as revelation. Even though we are eyewitnesses to this historical fact, we do not accept this fact as the revelation of God. The reason why we do not accept this fact, therefore, does not lie in the fact that this fact is revelation, but in the fact that we try to reject this fact.

(2)

We now turn our attention to the works of Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Training in Christianity and The Sickness unto Death. When we look at these works, we find the same understanding of this problem (the relation between revelation and history). The major thesis which we find in these works is also

that, even though revelation is not merely an historical fact, it is also an historical fact which is the absolute fact. For Anti-Climacus, like Climacus, the God-man was in the time and history in which we live; the existence of the God-man is not in another time or history, but in the time and history in which other historical facts take place. To show this point I shall examine Anti-Climacus' use of secular history and sacred history. For if we did not consider the context in which Anti-Climacus uses these terms, we would think that, for Anti-Climacus, revelation did not take place in the time and history in which we live. But Anti-Climacus' concept of secular history (or world-history) is not the 'history that takes place in time,' but 'interpreted history, history interpreted from a certain standpoint.' In a word, Hegelian history, history which is interpreted in the light of Hegelian philosophy or Hegelian theology. This is the point which I shall try to argue here.

Let us start by quoting some passages which, if we see them without considering the context in which these quotations appear, can be the cause of misunderstanding, such that one thinks for Anti-Climacus, revelation is not in the history in which we live.

"He [Jesus Christ] is not, and for nobody is He willing to be, one about whom we have learned to know something merely from history(i.e., World-history, secular history, in contrast to sacred history); for from history we can learn to know nothing about Him, because there is absolutely nothing that can be 'known' about Him"(TC, p.26)

"'History,' says faith, 'has nothing whatever to do with Christ'"(TC, p.33).

If we consider these passages without considering the context, we might think that for Anti-Climacus, Jesus Christ is not in the history in which we live. However, it is necessary to consider what Anti-Climacus means by history, before we come to any conclusion about this problem. To find the meaning given to history in Training in Christianity, it will be useful to quote the whole context of the passages which I have just quoted. The context of the first

quotation is as follows:

"[In the sense, namely] that the Inviter is and insists upon being the definite historical person He was 1,800 years ago, and that as this definite person, living under the conditions He then lived under, He uttered those words of invitation ["Come hither unto me"]. --- He is not and for nobody is He willing to be, one about whom we have learned to know something merely from history (i.e., world-history, secular history, in contrast to sacred history); for from history we can learn to know nothing about Him, because there is absolutely nothing that can be known about Him. --- He declines to be judged in a human way by the consequences of his life, that is to say, He is and would be the sign of offense and the object of faith. To judge Him by the consequences of his life is merely mockery of God; for seeing that He is God, His life (the life which he actually lived in time) is infinitely more decisively important than all the consequences of it in the course of history"(TC, p.26).

What we can infer from the context of this quotation, is that in 'world-history' or 'secular-history' Jesus Christ is judged by the consequences of his life. If this inference is right, then we can say of 'world-history', 'secular-history,' or 'profane-history' in the Training in Christianity that they denote a kind of attempt to interpret the history which happens in time. For example, people say:

"Is it not 1,800 years since Christ lived, is not His name proclaimed and believed on throughout the whole world, triumphantly permeated all relationships --- and in this way has not history abundantly, and more than abundantly, established who He was, namely, that He was God?"(TC, p.29).

When he is speculating about such an interpretation being given to the life of Jesus, Anti-Climacus criticizes such an attempt; he says that it is impossible. The history from which we can learn nothing about Jesus, is such an attempt of interpretation which tries to interpret Jesus in the light of the development of 1,800 years. Anti-Climacus laments:

"Strange! people are eager by the help of history, by considering the consequences of his life [the history of the 1,800 years], to reach by logical inference the ergo, ergo He was God. ... Strange! and they want above all things to make use of history to prove that Christ was God"(TC, pp.32, 34).

Why cannot Anti-Climacus endure this kind of interpretation of the historical life of Jesus? Because, this interpretation is an attempt to take away the possibility of offense caused by the revelation in Jesus Christ; and because this interpretation supposes that one can reach the logical conclusion that an individual man, in time, is God from the consequences of his life. Anti-Climacus makes two things clear: one cannot draw the conclusion that He is God from the consequences of his life[the history of the 1,800 years] and one has to confront the God-man who actually was in time and history.[1] Therefore, what Anti-Climacus tries to emphasize is not different from what Climacus speaks of in the case of the last generation of secondary disciples.(Cf. PF, pp.117-123). Climacus also raises the question of the advantage of the consequences of the 1,800 years to the one who lives after 1,800 years, and says that there is no advantage. For the historical fact of revelation cannot be naturalized as in the case of other things, because it is always the Absolute Paradox. Climacus says:

"The advantage of the consequences would seem to lie in a gradual naturalization of this fact. If such is the case, i.e., if such a thing is conceivable, the later generation has even a direct advantage over the contemporary generation; and a man would surely have to be very stupid if he could speak of the consequences in this sense, and yet rave about how fortunate the contemporaries were. Under the assumption of the naturalization, it will be possible for a later generation to appropriate the fact without the slightest embarrassment, without sensing anything of the ambiguity of the aroused attention, from which offense may issue as well as faith. However, this fact disdained naturalization, whether under the protection of a king or a professor"(PF, pp.119f.).

1. In this sense, I agree with N.H.Søe's interpretation of this matter: "If the expression 'outside history' [in Training in Christianity] is taken in a strictly literal sense it would ultimately imply a kind of docetic Christology. This interpretation, however, is clearly wrong. ... When SK [Kierkegaard] asserts that the life of Jesus Christ falls outside history, he undoubtedly also intends to include the historicity of His Passion. ... Moreover, SK [Kierkegaard] occasionally attempts to view Christ 'simply as a man,' that is, as an ordinary man belonging to history. Christ was also true man, a fact which Kierkegaard never overlooked" ("Christ," in Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, V, p.65f.). See also Hermann Diem, op.cit., pp.106f: "Kierkegaard is by no means ... an unhistorical thinker."

Naturalization of the 'historical fact of Jesus', for Climacus, is an impossible thing. Likewise, for Anti-Climacus, the attempt to draw out the logical conclusion (ergo) that Jesus was God from the consequences of history, is impossible. For both of them, what is important is not the consequences of His life, but His life itself. According to Anti-Climacus, "His life (the life which he actually lived in time) is infinitely more decisively important than all the consequences of it in the course of history"(TC, p.26). Therefore, according to Anti-Climacus, Jesus Christ lived in time that is not different from the time in which we live. What matters for him is the attempt to draw out the logical conclusion that the one who lived in time was God, because he is the greatest man and the consequences of his life are amazing. Hence, we cannot discover a basic difference between Climacus' view of the relation between revelation and history and that of Anti-Climacus. And that this historical fact is the absolute fact does not change. Here we find the reason why Anti-Climacus emphasizes the necessity of seeing Jesus Christ in His humiliation. For the one who exists in the absolute fact is Jesus Christ who is in his state of humiliation. Mentioning Jesus' invitation ["Come hither, all ye that labour and are heavy laden..."], Anti-Climacus says:

"Who is the inviter? Jesus Christ. Which Jesus Christ? The Jesus Christ who sits in glory at the right hand of the Father? No. From the seat of His glory he has not spoken one word. Therefore, it is Jesus Christ in His humiliation, in the state of humiliation, who spoke these words. Is then Jesus Christ not always the same? Yes, He is the same yesterday and today, the same that 1,800 years ago humbled Himself and took upon Him the form of a servant, the Jesus Christ who uttered these words of invitation. In His coming again in glory He is again the same Jesus Christ; but this has not yet occurred. ... Jesus Christ is the same; but he lived 1,800 years ago in his humiliation and becomes changed first [for us] with His coming again"(TC, pp.26-27).

According to this passage, until the time of the second coming, Jesus Christ must be understood as the one who is in His humiliation. Therefore he and the historical fact of his existence in time do not change as history progresses. Even though there are many Christians in the world, this does not make this

historical fact more rational or natural. This historical fact is still paradoxical and unnatural. Yet the paradoxicality of this fact lies in the fact that God became an individual man, he existed in time and still is the God-man.[1]

Therefore we can conclude that even to Anti-Climacus, the historical fact of the historical life of Jesus is important.[2] What he tries to attack is not history in the sense of the historical happening of the Incarnation, but the deduction of who he is from the consequences of his life. Anti-Climacus does not deny the fact that Jesus Christ lived in time and history and that he was and is the God-man in time and history. On the contrary, he emphasizes this fact.[3]

(3)

1. Cf. J. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), p.113: "Training in Christianity takes up the themes of Paradox and offense in a sharper and more polemical way. The point that Kierkegaard wished to emphasize was the offense and risk of believing in One whose humiliation during His life on earth was a terrible reality."

2. In relation to this problem, cf. the following observation of David Swenson on Training in Christianity: "A rejection of the Jesus of History must be carefully distinguished from a rejection of the historical Jesus. The latter would be a repudiation of the God-man, by making the second half of the synthesis unreal. Otherwise the paradox disappears. The Paradox is the unity of God and an individual man in distinction from other men; and the particular individual is the historical individual" (Something about Kierkegaard, p.242). For further discussion of the problem that Kierkegaard does not differentiate the historical Jesus and Jesus Christ in any sense of the word, see Thomas J. Heywood, "The Relevance of Kierkegaard to the Demythologising Controversy," SJT, X (1957), pp.239-252. See also Vernald Eller, "Fact, Faith, and Foolishness," The Journal of Religion, XLVIII (1968), pp.56ff. See again N.H. Sørensen, "Kierkegaard's doctrine of the Paradox," p.215: "It is significant that Kierkegaard never for a moment seriously considers depicting Christ's life and deeds in a way different from that of the Gospel."

3. I agree with Michael Plekon that Kierkegaard tries to find the object of faith and the real shape of faith in the history of Jesus. Cf. "Protest and Affirmation," pp.46f. And I also agree with W.von Kloester that by the concept of 'contemporaneity' Kierkegaard tries to emphasize the question, "whether the historical event is of decisive importance for my personal existence. The historical Jesus is of equal importance for any human being." (Kierkegaard's view of Christianity, p.105).

The point which we have drawn from the works of Climacus and of Anti-Climacus, namely that the Revealer was in the time and history in which we live, is clearer when we compare it with Kierkegaard's other writings. The last part of this second section will be concerned about Kierkegaard's other writings to show this point (that for Kierkegaard, revelation takes place in concrete time and concrete history) more clearly.

In The Book on Adler Kierkegaard says:

".... it is important above all that there be fixed an unshakable qualitative difference between the historical element in Christianity and the the history of Christianity, the history of its follows, etc. The fact that God came into existence in human form under the Emperor Augustus: that is the historical element in Christianity, the historical in a paradoxical composition." (AR, pp.58f.).[1]

What is held in common between the historical element in Christianity and the history of Christianity, is that both of them are in time and history. But the historical element in Christianity must not be confused with the history of Christianity. The historical element in Christianity does not change; it is the absolute, even though it is in history. It is this point which Kierkegaard tries to emphasize throughout the whole of his authorship.

Kierkegaard knew well that the realm of history is regarded as a realm of relativity. Nevertheless, he says that revelation takes place in a time and history which is not different from the time and history in which other historical facts take place; the Incarnation took place in time and history; the God-man was in history. This is one of the reasons why the God-man was and is misunderstood and misinterpreted by man. The most dangerous misunderstanding of Him, according to Kierkegaard, is to think that one can understand Him. To think that one can understand Him is to make Him into something which is

1. For an excellent discussion of Kierkegaard's view of revelation, based on On Authority and Revelation, see Joe R. Jones, "Some Remarks on Authority and Revelation in Kierkegaard," The Journal of Religion, LVII (1977), pp.232-254.

rational and natural. For what we can understand is that which fits our reason. Misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the God-man (including the attempt to understand Him by reason) are offenses against Him. What is interesting at this point is that Kierkegaard says that the attempt to rationalize the God-man and the historical fact of revelation is also an offense, or rather, the sin against the Holy Ghost. On the last page of The Sickness unto Death Anti-Climacus says:

"The last form of offense is that about which we are speaking in this chapter, the positive form [of the offense]. It declares Christianity is a falsehood and a lie, it denies Christ (that He existed and that He was what He claim to be) either docetically or rationalistically, so that Christ either does not become a particular man except apparently, or He becomes only a particular man, so that He either becomes docetically, poetry and mythology which make no claim to reality, or rationalistically, a reality which makes no claim to be divine. In this denial of Christ as the Paradox there is naturally implied the denial of everything Christian: Sin, the forgiveness of sins etc."(SUD, p.262).

By 'rationalistic denial of Christ' Anti-Climacus means the attempt to interpret the God-man as the union of humanity and divinity. So what is important is not the fact of whether one speaks of the importance of Jesus Christ or not, but what his real intention is when he speaks of the importance of Christ. If what he tries to do is, in fact, to elevate man, then his emphasis on Christ is in vain. Even though one does not directly say that "Christianity is falsehood and a lie," if he actually denies the historicity and the absoluteness of Jesus Christ as the Revealer and Saviour, then he cannot be regarded as a Christian. Even though a person emphasizes the absoluteness of Jesus Christ, if he does not really acknowledge the historicity of His existence in our time and history, then he has nothing to do with Christianity.

It is true that those who try to interpret Jesus Christ and revelation in Him in a human way use the same terms, the same material, and in a sense are confronted by God's revelation. They, however, change the God-man and Christianity, so that Christianity in the real sense of the word is, by their

alteration of Christianity, indirectly declared a falsehood and a lie. What is interesting here is the fact that Kierkegaard acknowledges the alteration of revelation by man. And this alteration of revelation and Christianity is possible because revelation and Christianity are in time and history. Barth and Kierkegaard differ here. For Barth, in order to remain the revelation which cannot be altered by man, revelation is not directly in time and history, for the things which are in time and history are incomplete and can be altered. However, for Kierkegaard, revelation itself is in time and history and it can be altered by man. How could the revelation of God be altered by man? Is revelation so powerless? Kierkegaard at first gives an affirmative answer to this question. Anti-Climacus calls Jesus Christ "this poor revealed God" (SUD, p.247). God's revelation is powerless before a strong man who, in a real sense, does not know himself and thinks that he is right. (1) Placed before revelation he does not recognize it as God's revelation. Moreover, he is not concerned with this revelation. He says: "I do not presume to pass any judgment; I do not believe, but I pass no judgment" (SUD, p.260). (2) Or he feels, to be sure, that it is impossible to ignore Christianity (which is based on revelation), it is impossible to let all things about Christ remain in doubt (SUD, p.261), but he does not believe. (3) Or he changes Christianity and revelation into something else which, in fact, is not Christianity and revelation, even though the same terms, the same structure of doctrines, and the same sources are used. Among these three examples, according to Anti-Climacus, the third one is more dangerous than the others. For, those who are not concerned with revelation and do not believe it can still have the opportunity to become believers, whereas the one who tries to change Christianity and revelation into something else is in a different situation: "there is no forgiveness to this kind of sin" (SUD, p.253). The only word he can say to the one who does this is that "in the meanwhile thou canst do whatever thou wilt, but the judgment is to come." (SUD,

p.253).

Up to now we have considered Kierkegaard's view of the relation between revelation and history. What I have shown is that according to Kierkegaard, one must acknowledge the historicity of revelation, even though he cannot understand it by his reason. This is the only way one can respond to God's revelation as one should. Of course, this cannot be done by natural man; to respond in this way a person must be changed. Without such a qualitative change, no right response to God's revelation is possible. However, even though man does not respond to God's revelation, God's revelation itself is in time and history. It is this which Kierkegaard tries to emphasize throughout his writing. It seems that Kierkegaard says what is impossible. So there is the paradoxicality of revelation which we shall discuss in the next section.

Before we turn our attention to the concept of paradox, it will be useful to compare briefly Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation between revelation and history with that of Barth.

The difference between Kierkegaard and the early Barth in this regard is clear. For in his early period, Barth, as we have seen in chapter I, does not acknowledge the historicity or temporality of revelation; what is in history cannot be identified with that which belongs to God. Only in the light of the Resurrection is revelation given. And the moment is the eternal moment which is not in time and history. In contrast to such a view, Kierkegaard emphasizes that since the moment of the Incarnation is the moment in time, the Incarnate one was in our time as the Revealer and Redeemer. Therefore, revelation also was in time and history, even though we do not accept this fact.

The positions of Kierkegaard and of the later Barth seem to be close in that they both emphasize the Incarnation and historicity of revelation. However, as we have seen in chapter II, for the later Barth, Christ-history (Geschichte) is not the history which is understood as that which took place in our time and history. For the later Barth, the time in which revelation is given is not our time, but God's time. Therefore, revelation itself, even though he says that it takes place in time, does not belong to our time and history, but only to God's time. However, for Kierkegaard what is in time and history as God's indirect-communication is the revelation itself. For Kierkegaard, revelation, as in the case of Barth, is not above or below the realm of time and history; what is in our time and our history is God's revelation.

Secondly, Kierkegaard and the later Barth are similar in that they assert that man by himself cannot be concerned with revelation. However, for the later Barth, this is because revelation itself is not in our time and our history, whereas for Kierkegaard, it is because, firstly, man is in sin, and secondly, even though we know what revelation is, it is not faith itself; for Kierkegaard, faith is more than mere historical knowledge and it implies living according to the truth and following Jesus Christ.

Basically, there is a difference between their understandings of history and revelation. According to the later Barth, our history is not the realm in which revelation takes place; whereas, according to Kierkegaard, there is no other realm in which God's revelation takes place except the realm of our history. That is to say, for Kierkegaard, there is no other temporality and history except our temporality and our history. In a sense, the later Barth's 'Christ-history' seems to be similar to Kierkegaard's contemporaneity with Jesus Christ. However, whereas for Barth, the Christ who is in Christ-history is the

one who is exalted, for Kierkegaard the Christ who is contemporary with us is the one who is in his humiliation. That is to say, for Kierkegaard, the history of Christ is the absolute fact as an historical fact, whereas for Barth, the historical fact itself is not God's revelation itself. Moreover, the 'Christ-history' of Barth is an ever-happening event, whereas the contemporaneity with Christ of Kierkegaard is a contemporaneity with Christ who was in his humiliation and therefore the fact of the Incarnation does not take place again and again.

The fact that for Kierkegaard Christianity is closely related to the historical fact of revelation is very important in relation to this present study. For, according to Kierkegaard, 'the historical' cannot be regarded as a rational and therefore a necessary thing in any sense of the word. If the fact that God became an individual man took place as an historical fact, then it cannot be regarded as a rational thing or a necessary thing. According to Kierkegaard, 'the historical' is a 'coming into existence.' And "the change involved in coming into existence is actuality; the transition takes place with freedom. No coming into existence is necessary. It [the 'coming into existence'] was not necessary before the coming into existence, for then there could not have been the coming into existence, not after the coming into existence, for then there would not have been the coming into existence" (PF, p.93). Therefore, what comes into existence is not necessary in any sense of the word. This is the reason why Kierkegaard does not regard revelation, which took place as an historical fact, as a rational or necessary revelation. Barth also speaks of the historicity of revelation and emphasizes that it is God's act of freedom. However, as we have seen, for Barth, in the last analysis, revelation must be understood as rational revelation and it has a necessary relation to God's inner life. Moreover, given Creation, God cannot but become

In this section we shall examine Kierkegaard's use of the term Paradox. Our main concern is with the Absolute Paradox; (1) the content of the Absolute Paradox, (2) the cause of the Absolute Paradox, and (3) the reason why Kierkegaard emphasizes the Absolute Paradox. But it is necessary to start from the Socratic Paradox, for Kierkegaard himself starts from the Socratic Paradox and compares it with the Absolute Paradox.

What is the Socratic Paradox? The dialectic or the tension between the realm of eternity and the realm of time, especially the eternal truth and an existing individual is the content of the Socratic Paradox. The eternal truth itself, of course, is not a Paradox. But when an existing individual tries to relate to the eternal truth, there is a Paradox. In the Postscript Climacus says:

"The eternal and the essential truth, the truth which has an essential relationship to an existing individual because it pertains essentially to existence ... is a paradox. But the eternal essential truth is by no means in itself a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical by virtue of its relationship to an existing individual. The Socratic ignorance gives expression to the objective uncertainty attaching to the truth, while his inwardness in existing is the truth"(CUP, p.183).

"The socratic Paradox consisted in the fact that the eternal was related to an existing individual"(CUP, p.186).

When we think of the theory of recollection, we can understand these quotations more easily. According to the theory of recollection, we have already possessed the eternal truth; but we have forgotten it, because we live in the realm of time. However, we have 'Reason' by which we can recollect the eternal truth. Yet Socrates, while suggesting the possibility of recollection, did not come to any conclusion, but was always in ignorance (Socratic ignorance). That is to say, he held fast to the objective uncertainty with the passion of inwardness. For example,

incarnate as Jesus Christ, for Jesus, according to Barth, was before the Creation as the basis of the Creation.

The difference between their views on revelation and history is clearer when we see the difference between their understanding of the content of faith. According to Barth, a believer believes that God acts and reveals Himself in God's time, which stands in relation to what is in our history and our time. Therefore, a believer believes that even though what is in history and our time is not identical with God's revelation itself, it becomes God's revelation in God's act. Whereas for Kierkegaard a believer believes that God became an individual man in our time and our history, to be our Revealer and the Redeemer. Therefore, a believer believes that what was in our time and our history is God's revelation. Now he believes the thing, which he abandoned as absurd, to be God's revelation; what was in history is not changed, but he himself is changed. Now he as a changed man confesses that the reason why he did not accept God's revelation is not that God's revelation is not in our time and our history, but that he as a sinner tried to reject it as absurd. For Kierkegaard, what is in history is the absolute fact. It does not take place again and again; nor is it changed from relative to absolute in the moment of subjective revelation.

"When Socrates believed that there was a God, he held fast to the objective uncertainty with the whole passion of his inwardness, and it is precisely in this contradiction and this risk, that faith is rooted" (CUP, p.188).

There is the object of faith, but for Socrates the object of faith is an objective uncertainty. For the object of faith is not in time, but in the realm of eternity. When an existing individual tries to have a relation to the thing which is in the realm of eternity, there is a Socratic Paradox. The difference between Plato and Socrates, according to Climacus, is that whereas Socrates has an awareness that he is an existing individual, Plato tries to speculate about all things. The difference between them starts from their view of the theory of recollection:

"This proposition [that all knowledge is recollection] is not for Socrates a cue to the speculative enterprise, and hence he does not follow it up; essentially it becomes a Platonic principle. Here the way swings off; Socrates concentrates essentially upon accentuating existence, while Plato forgets this and loses himself in speculation. Socrates' infinite merit is to have been an existing thinker, not a speculative philosopher who forgets what it means to exist" (CUP, p.184).

Therefore, for Plato, even the things which are in the realm of eternity can be speculated about by human reason and they can be regarded as objective certainties. However, for Socrates, the eternal truth can be related to an existing individual, and this forms a Paradox. Of course, Socrates also thinks the things which are in the realm of eternity by his reason; but he never forgets the fact that he is an existing individual. That is to say, Socrates is aware of the fact that even though he can think of things which are in the realm of eternity, the things which he can think of, cannot be regarded as objective certainties, for he is an existing individual in time. One of the differences between Socrates and Plato lies in the fact that whereas in Plato's system what can be thought can exist independently of our subjective appropriation, in Socrates' thought truth must be lived out. In this respect, Climacus praises Socrates; his "everlasting merit was to have become aware of the

essential significance of existence, of the fact that the knower is an existing individual. For this reason Socrates was in the truth by virtue of his ignorance, in the highest sense in which this was possible within paganism"(CUP, p.183). Because there is an existing individual, there is a paradox: "By virtue of the relationship subsisting between the eternal truth and the existing individual, the paradox came into being"(CUP, p.187).

Now let us turn our attention to the Absolute Paradox. Kierkegaard tries to move away from the Socratic Paradox to the Absolute Paradox.

"The Socratic Paradox consisted in the fact that the eternal was related to an existing individual, but now existence has stamped itself upon the existing individual a second time. There has taken place so essential an alteration in him that he cannot now possibly take himself back into the eternal by way of recollection Viewed Socratically, the knower was simply an existing individual, but now the existing individual bears the stamp of having been essentially altered by existence. Let us now call the untruth of the individual Sin" (CUP, p.186).

Therefore, for the man who is in untruth, it is impossible to recollect the eternal truth. In order to be confronted with the truth, the truth must come into existence in time. Here we have the absurd or the Absolute Paradox.[1]

"What now is the absurd? The absurd is --- that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth"(CUP, p.188).

The absurdity, or the paradoxicality (in the strict sense of the word) of this fact is that the individual man in time is God.[2] The individual man, Jesus of Nazareth is the Revealer. He is the God-man, so that the historical life of Jesus is the Paradox. In a word, for Climacus, Paradox is in history, not in the light of the resurrection. If the God-man were not in our time and our history, he would not be the Absolute Paradox. If he were in the realm of eternity, he would be at most a Socratic Paradox in the relation between Him and

1. For a discussion of the difference between the Socratic paradox and the Absolute Paradox, See Mark C. Taylor, op.cit., pp.258-260; Leroy Kay Seat, "The meaning of Paradox," pp.102f., 144-147; Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, pp.46-50, 60-66.

the existing believer. However, for Kierkegaard, it is impossible to think that Jesus Christ as the God-man was not in our time and our history. Even if He is not accepted, He is the Absolute Paradox who was there in our time and our history.

Now we can answer the questions which were raised at the start of our discussion of Paradox. First, what is the content of the Absolute Paradox? The God-man or God in time is the Absolute Paradox. And in this answer the "-" between "God" and "man" or the "in" between "God" and "time" have literal meanings; they ("- " and "in") indicate the real relation between "God" and "man" or "God" and "time." Therefore, as soon as we suppose that there is no real relation, the Paradox disappears. The Absolute Paradox is there after the moment of the Incarnation.

The Absolute Paradox reveals not only the activity of God in which he became an individual man, but also the real state of man, who is in sin.[3] In Philosophical Fragments Johannes Climacus says:

2. Cf. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, p.361: "The Absolute Paradox in Philosophical Fragments is not merely a category of thought, but a philosophical definition of a single person, Jesus Christ, who as God is absolutely different from man, and who as man is different from every other man in that He was sinless." Vernard Eller paraphrases Kierkegaard's Absolute Paradox as follows: "If the proposition claims a situation in which the superhistorical being, God, has revealed himself within history, then the very nature of the case dictates that the matter will have to be essential paradox. Thus Kierkegaard finds paradox to be the characteristic mark of the entire biblical account" ("Fact, Faith, and Foolishness," The Journal of Religion, XLVIII (1968), pp.56f.). Therefore, God's revelation is not in God's history or in God's time, but in our time and our history, if it is the Absolute Paradox.

3. Cf. Per Loenning, The dilemma of Contemporary Theology, p.82: "The dogma of the 'God-man' and of a general human corruption are, as clearly seen in Philosophical Fragments, inseparable from one another, and in their mutual dependency they are simply constitutive of Christianity. If they are omitted, we remain with Socrates: man himself is the depository of truth, and 'revelation' is basically excluded." Mark Taylor also points out that Kierkegaard virtually sees the sum of Christian dogma to be in these two doctrines: the Incarnation and sin. Cf. Mark Taylor, op.cit., pp.267f.

"In order to be man's Teacher, the God proposed to make Himself like the individual man, so that he might understand him fully. Thus our Paradox is rendered still more appalling, or the same paradox has the double aspect which proclaims it as the Absolute Paradox; negatively by revealing the absolute unlikeness of sin, positively by proposing to do away with the absolute unlikeness in absolute likeness"(PF, pp.58f.).

The Absolute Paradox reveals that man is a sinner who is qualitatively different from the Holy God.[4] This difference consists not only in the difference between God the Creator and the creature man. It is true that the difference between the Creator and the creature is a qualitative one, for man, through a quantitative accumulation, cannot be God. However, according to Climacus, as far as the Creator and man the creature are concerned, if there were no sin, "in so far they are akin"(PF, p.58). And he does not call the difference between God the Creator and man the creature the absolute difference. The absolute difference between God and man is due to man: " ... the unlikeness, the absolute unlikeness is something that man has brought upon himself"(PF, p.58. See also pp.18f.). That is Sin.[5]

This point is clearer when we look at one of Kierkegaard's discourses. In "The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air" Kierkegaard, referring to Ecclesiastes 5:2, says:

"If the difference is infinite between God who is in heaven, and you who are on earth: the difference is infinitely greater between the Holy and the sinner."[6]

For Kierkegaard, the difference between God the Creator and man the creature is

4. Cf. Ingvar Horgby, "Immediacy-Subjectivity-Revelation," p.112: "The fact of historical revelation implies that the eternal, the truth, is not immanent in subjectivity The eternal Truth is not inside man, in his subjectivity, but outside him in an external historical fact. Subjectivity is outside truth, that is, subjectivity is untruth."

5. For a discussion of Kierkegaard's concept of sin, see David Swenson, "Kierkegaard's Treatment of the Doctrine of Sin," in Something about Kierkegaard, pp.178-181; Kenneth Hamilton, "Kierkegaard on Sin," SJT, XVII (1964), pp.289-302; Mark C. Taylor, op.cit., pp.268-290; Louis Dupre, op.cit., pp.39-70.

6. Christian Discourses and The Lilies of The Field and the Birds of the Air and Three Discourses at the Communion on Friday, trans. Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p.369.

not the same difference as that which exists between the Holy God and man the sinner.[1] If there were no sin, even though there were a qualitative difference between God and man, this difference would not be a difference such that one should exclude the other. As Climacus says, God and man, as far as man is not in sin, "are akin." (PF, p.58). Without sin, man has the condition to understand God's revelation. Climacus says:

"In so far as the learner exists he is already created, and hence God must have endowed him with the condition for understanding the Truth. For otherwise his earlier existence must have been merely brutish, and the Teacher who gave him the Truth and with it the condition was the original creator of his human nature" (PF, p.18).

That is to say, if man did not have the condition to understand God's revelation before his sin, it would mean that the created one was not a man. That would mean that only when God recreated Him, would he become a man for the first time. But this is not the situation. Man was created without sin and, therefore, with the condition necessary to understand God's revelation. If man remained as he

1. I cannot but wonder how H.R.Mackintosh interprets Kierkegaard on sin as follows: ".... our whole existence in time, the relativity in which we live as creatures who are not God, is per se guilty. Such a position could be distinguished only by the narrowest margin from down right Manicheism; and it has been held, with less justification, that traces of a similar hyperbolic aberration can be detected in earlier statements of Karl Barth" (op.cit., pp.228f.). Here Mackintosh does not differentiate the difference between the Creator and the creature, and that of the Holy God and the sinner. However, for Kierkegaard, the fact that we are creature does not make us sinners. According to Kierkegaard, if that is the case we do not have any responsibility for being sinners, for creation itself makes us sinners. Therefore, this is an impossible interpretation of Kierkegaard on sin. For a discussion of the difference between the difference of the Creator and the creature, and that of the Holy and the sinner, see Mark C.Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p.259: "For the Absolute Paradox to be effected, the Eternal God must actually enter time (become incarnate), thereby establishing a relationship with a self whose qualitatively difference from God lies not in his creatureliness but in his sinfulness." See also p.286: "With the recognition that the difference between God and man is sin, man's predicament is altered. No longer is his task only to recognize his ontological dependence upon God, the Creator and Sustainer. Man must now acknowledge that he himself has disrupted his relation to God by failing to be his own self. He must admit not only that he is a creature, but that he is a sinful creature." See also Perry D.LeFevre, The Prayers of Kierkegaard, p.206: "Because man is a sinner there is a infinite qualitative difference between him and God."

was created, there would be no absolute difference between the Holy God and the sinner, but only the qualitative difference between God the Creator and the creature. But now the man who is in sin is absolutely different from God and has lost the condition for understanding God's revelation. The state of sin is not merely a passive state. The man who is in sin is actively in sin.[1] "Error (or, Untruth, Sin) is then not only outside the Truth, but polemic in its attitude toward it; which is expressed by saying the learner has himself forfeited the condition, and is engaged in forfeiting it"(PF, p.19). Not only does he not know the Truth and God's revelation, but also distorts the Truth and God's revelation. Moreover, the man who is in sin does not know that he is in sin. He does not consider that he is a sinner; he does not have a sin-consciousness. Therefore he cannot understand why God became an individual man. For the man who does not recognize his sin before God does not feel the need for the Saviour. Accordingly, he does not accept the Absolute Paradox that God became an individual man to be the Redeemer. However, this is the situation in which the event of the Incarnation took place. Because of man's sin there is the event of the Incarnation. The problem of sin and the existence of Jesus Christ are closely related in Kierkegaard's writings.

This is expressed in those writings for which Kierkegaard uses the pseudonymous name Climacus as the problem of knowing and living the Truth, whereas in the writings under the pseudonym, Anti-Climacus this problem is expressed as the problem of becoming a self. Let us consider this more closely.

According to Anti-Climacus, the man who does not have a right relationship with God is not yet a self. And not to be a self is called sin by Anti-Climacus. To be a self is, first of all, to have a right relationship with God. According to Anti-Climacus, "by relating itself to its own self and by

1. Cf. PF, pp.17f.; SUD, pp.227-231.

willing to be itself the self is grounded transparently in the power which posited it [God]"(SUD, p.216). And to put it a different way, as does Sylvin Fleming Crocker, "to be the self which an individual fundamentally is requires two things: knowledge (insight into the true self), and power to act (in order to become that self)."[1] If man is not in sin, he has these two requirements and can use them, for God gave the condition to understand God's revelation when He created man. But the man who misused these capacities, does not have a right relationship with God any more, and therefore does not have knowledge and power to be a self in a real sense. Basically, there are two ways in which man fails to be a self: 'not willing to be a self' and 'willing to be a self by oneself.' Both of them are called 'despair' by Anti-Climacus.[2] "Not to will to be oneself is called 'the despair of weakness'"(SUD, pp.182-200). In a sense, this kind of despair can be found in the way one exists in the aesthetic stage. Anti-Climacus calls the one who has the despair of weakness "the immediate man"(SUD, p.184). This despair "is pure immediacy, or else an immediacy which contains a quantitative reflection. --- Here there is no infinite consciousness of the self, of what despair is, or of the fact that the condition is one of despair; the despair is passive, succumbing to the pressure of the outward circumstance, it by no means comes from within as action"(SUD, p.184). And

1. Sylvin Fleming Crocker, "Sacrifice in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling," Harvard Theological Review, LXVIII (1975), p.131.

2. And according to Anti-Climacus, the 'despair' is universal. That is to say, everyone who does not have a right relationship with God is in 'despair.' Cf. Frithiof Brandt, op.cit., p.73: "The fundamental theme of this book [The Sickness unto Death] is despair. According to Kierkegaard, it is no rare occurrence. On the contrary, practically every individual is to a greater or lesser degree in despair. But frequently he is unaware of his despair." See also Perry D. LeFevre, op.cit., pp.167f: "Every aesthetic view of life is despair, and whether one knows it or not, if one lives aesthetically, one is in despair Consciousness of one's despair and willingness to accept one's self as despairing are not enough To become conscious of one's despair as sin before God would be the deeper understanding. Such an existential understanding of the true nature of despair at once involves the categories of the Christian life itself."

Anti-Climacus continues:

"This form of despair is: despair at not willing to be oneself; or still lower, despair at not willing to be a self; or lowest of all, despair at willing to be another than himself; wishing for a new self. Properly speaking, immediacy has no self, it does not recognise itself, so neither can it recognize itself again, it terminates therefore preferably in the romantic"(SUD, p.186).

But, there is also the despair of strength or the despair of manliness.(Cf. SUD, pp.200-207). The classic form of this despair is the thought of Stoicism.

The way one exists in the ethical stage is this despair.

"In this form of despair there is now a mounting consciousness of the self, and hence greater consciousness of what despair is and of the fact that one's condition is that of despair. Here despair is conscious of itself as a deed, it does not come from without as a suffering under the pressure of circumstances, it comes directly from the self. And so after all defiance is a new qualification added to despair over one's weakness"(SUD, p.201).

The fact that the Religiousness A is also a form of this despair can be seen in the fact that, for Socrates, there is no sin-consciousness in the real sense of the word other than a simple guilt-consciousness. Anti-Climacus says:

"Socrates therefore never really gets to the determinant we know as sin, which is surely a defect in a definition of sin. Why is this? For if sin is indeed ignorance, then sin properly does not exist, since sin is definitely consciousness. ... So then, if the Socratic definition is correct, sin does not exist. ... Precisely the concept by which Christianity distinguishes itself qualitatively and most decisively from paganism is the concept of sin, the doctrine of sin; and therefore Christianity also assumes quite consistently that neither paganism nor the natural man knows what sin is"(SUD, p.220).[1]

Therefore, despair, whatever kind of despair it may be, is related to sin.[2]

But the man who is in despair does not know that he is in sin. So for the man who is in sin, there is no possibility of being a self without the forgiveness of sins. In such a situation [being in sin], there is the possibility of being a self only in relation to Christ. Anti-Climacus states:

1. In this respect, Edward John Carnell makes a good observation: "The critical difference [between a Christian and a pagan] is that the Christian acknowledges his sickness [sin], whereas the pagan desperately clings to the optimism that all is well. The pagan may pass through the valley and shadow of melancholy, but he sees no connection between this experience and personal sin."(op.cit., p.79).

"A self face to face with Christ is a self potentiated by the prodigious concession of God, potentiated by the prodigious emphasis which falls upon it for the fact that God also for the sake of this self let Himself to be born, became man, suffered, died"(SUD, p.244).

Now in the situation of being in sin the only way to be a self is to be in relation to Christ who forgives our sins. This is what Anti-Climacus tries to say in his The Sickness unto Death. Of course, the opening section of The Sickness unto Death does not mention the existence of the Mediator as necessity for being a self in relation to God. But the man who failed to be a self in relation to God, and the man who tried to be a self by himself, cannot directly relate to God and become a self any more. God wanted man to become a self in relation to God, when he created man. If God did not create a beast, but a man, then the created one has the possibility of being a self. But this possibility is also the possibility of despairing. Now the one who is in despair does not have the possibility of being a self.

In this sense, a condition which God gave in the creation, of which Climacus speaks, is not different from a possibility of being a self in relation to God. In the situation of sinlessness the man can accept God's revelation; he can be a self in relation to God. For God who created a man as man, not as a beast, gave a condition to understand the revelation which God gives.

But now that we have lost the condition, we also have lost the possibility of being a self in relation to God. In this situation, there is no way accepting God's revelation by ourselves; there is no way to be a self in relation to God. Only when God changes our quality, can we accept God's revelation; only in relation to Christ can we be a self in relation to God.

2. Cf. Perry D. LeFevre, op.cit., p.171: "The despair which is Sin is disobedience; it is man's wilful failure to ground himself transparently in God."

Therefore, the existence of the Incarnate one is related to man's sin. However, this does not mean that, for Kierkegaard, the sin of man is the ultimate cause of the Incarnation. If we assert this, then we are asserting that God is conditioned by man. The reason why God became an individual man is related to man's sin. But God might leave us in our sin; God might give men up to their uncleanness, vile affections, and reprobate mind. There is no necessity for the Incarnation.

If, nevertheless, there was the event of the Incarnation in our time and history the only way to describe it, is to say that it was because of God's love. Kierkegaard emphasizes with vehemence the fact that the cause of the Incarnation is only God's love. Here, we must make two points clear.

First, God's love was given to the man who was in sin. However, this did not mean that before man's sin God did not love man. But the love which is referred to as the cause of redemption is the love which loves man inspite of his sin.

Secondly, this does not mean that if God does not decide to redeem man, He is not love. That is to say, it is not the case that because God redeems man, God is love. Even if God does not redeem man who are in sin, it would be impossible to say that He is not love. If we think that if God does not redeem us, He is not the God of love, then we try to determine what God is and what love is by ourselves. Of course, we learn what love is in God's act of redemption, but we cannot determine God's love by ourselves. We cannot say that God is love only in the case that He loves us. What Kierkegaard wants to emphasize, when he speaks of God's love, is that love is love only in the case that there is the actual possibility of not loving. If that is not the case, love becomes a necessity or a principle which determines all which follows.

Up to now we have discussed the content of the Absolute Paradox and the reason why the Incarnation (the Absolute Paradox) happened. What we can conclude from our discussion is that the Absolute Paradox is related to God's revelation, the special form of revelation in which God became an individual man in time and history to be the Revealer and the Redeemer. And this fact takes place because of God's love in taking away man's sin. Therefore, to emphasize the point once more, the Absolute Paradox consists in the fact that God became an individual man who was born, grew up, suffered, and died in time and history. This is the Paradox sensu strictiori (CUP, p.201). In contrast to the Socratic Paradox, the Absolute Paradox involves an historical fact which has an absolute character. In the Socratic Paradox, the Paradox is the relation between the eternal truth which is in the realm of eternity and an existing individual who is in the realm of time, whereas in the Absolute Paradox, there is a Paradox because the God (the Eternal) is in time in the real sense of the word. When Kierkegaard speaks of the Absolute Paradox, he tries to emphasize the historicity and the temporality of God's revelation.

Now, let us consider this problem in more detail by considering the question: Why does Kierkegaard emphasize the Absolute Paradox? I shall suggest two reasons for this. Both reasons relate to the fact that Kierkegaard wishes to stress the temporality and the historicity of revelation.

First, for Kierkegaard, the content of the Absolute Paradox (God in time, or the God-man) seems to be a contradiction and to be absurd to man's reason.[1] According to our reason, the idea that God became an individual man is impossible; it does not fit our reason; it is a self-contradiction within the structure of our reason. According to our reason, if One is God, One cannot be in our time and our history as an individual man; and if one is an individual man in time, One cannot be God. There is no possibility, within our logic, of

God's becoming an individual man. Jesus Christ's assertion that he is the Son of God is foolishness to our reason. To our reason, God's existence in time as an individual man is a self-contradiction.[2] It is impossible within the structure of the logic of our reason that the Eternal is in our time; God is God and man is man; there is no possibility of the God-man. So the existence of the God-man in time and history is regarded as a logical-contradiction.[3]

However, for Kierkegaard, even though it is a logical contradiction and absurd, there is the fact that God became an individual man to be the Revealer and the Redeemer. When Kierkegaard calls this fact the Absolute Paradox, his intention is not to deny the reality and the actuality of this fact in time and history, but to emphasize the reality of this historical fact.[4]

1. Cf. Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p.197: "As against the speculative project that would reconcile faith with absolute knowledge, Climacus offers a dialectician's intrepid definition of the Absolute Paradox which cannot be grasped by philosophic reason."

2. For a similar interpretation of Kierkegaard's Paradox, see Robert E. Larsen, "Kierkegaard's Absolute Paradox," The Journal of Religion, XLII (1962), p.36: "The Paradox states that God is both absolutely other than man and not absolutely other than man. We have what certainly looks like a logical contradiction: a compound statement of the form S is P and S is not P; God is absolutely other and is not absolutely other." See also J. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp.120-122. Heywood Thomas asserts that there is no basis "for saying that the Absolute Paradox is not a contradiction" (p.120). His conclusion is that nothing "refutes the assertion that logically speaking the Paradox is a contradiction" (p.122). In this sense, it is impossible to say that "the paradox of Christianity (and this is the Paradox Kierkegaard stresses) is a paradoxicality of interests and values." (E.D.Klemke, "Logicity versus A-Logicity in the Christian Faith," Journal of Religion, XXXVIII (1958), p.109). For the Absolute Paradox first of all confronts human reason, as Climacus emphasizes in Philosophical Fragments and Postscript.

3. According to the standard of our reason, there is no difference between the Absolute Paradox and the logical contradiction of the diagram called the "square of opposition" by traditional logicians. Reason's rejection of the Absolute Paradox is based on Reason's reasoning that the content of revelation which is asserted in the Scripture is the logical-contradiction like the "square of opposition" or "sheep-man." However, for Kierkegaard, there is a difference between the "square of opposition" or "sheep-man" and the Absolute Paradox. Kierkegaard makes it clear that the Absolute Paradox is a special kind of Paradox. This is the reason why, for Kierkegaard, one has to accept the Absolute Paradox, even though it is a logical-contradiction.

Kierkegaard's assertion is not that we should not believe this fact, because it is a logical-contradiction and absurd according to the standard of our reason, but that even though it is a logical contradiction and absurd from the view-point of our reason, one must believe that the Incarnation took place in time and history if one wants to be a Christian.[5] This fact [the Incarnation] cannot be understood and cannot be accepted by our reason. If one can accept it, comprehend it, and explain it by one's reason, there is no need to believe it, for one can know it. But "the God-man is the paradox, absolutely the Paradox; hence it is quite clear that the understanding must come to a stand-still before it"(TC, p.85). To human reason the content of revelation is not rational nor coherent in any sense of the word.[6] In relation to the revelation, the only thing which we have to do is to abandon the attempt to apply the logic of our reason to it.[7] Of course, "it is equally difficult for

4. Cf. H.R.Mackintosh, *op.cit.*, p.234: "Thus the person of Jesus Christ is a logically preposterous entity against which, in Kierkegaard's vivid phrase 'reason beats its brow till the blood comes.' Yet the absurdity is fact, and with it the Gospel stands or falls." (my emphasis) See also Edward John Carnell, *op.cit.*, p.83: "God became man: this is the Absolute Paradox. Such an awesome event simply could not happen; yet what could not happen did happen. Thus the uniqueness of Christianity turns on what was neither anticipated before it took place, nor understood after it did. The Incarnation is a shattering mystery."

5. Cf. CUP, p.191: "Christianity has declared itself to be the eternal essential truth which has come into being in time. It has proclaimed itself as the paradox and it has required of the individual the inwardness of faith in relation to that which stamps itself as an offense to the Jews and a folly to the Greeks --- and an absurdity to the understanding." See also Paul Edwards, *op.cit.*, p.92: "The contradiction that God has existed in human form is from a rational point of view quite absurd, but it is precisely such an absurdity that the true Christian must believe. ... Christianity requires of its adherents faith in something that is an offense to the Jews and a folly to the Greeks." See again Howard Albert Johnson, "The Deity in Time: An Introduction to Kierkegaard," *Theology Today*, I (1945), p.530: "A theophany, that I could understand. A docetic appearance, even that, perhaps I could accept. But if you tell that the Deity has appeared in time in flesh and blood, I will tell you that you are talking nonsense. This is more than paradoxical. This is absurd. To this the Christian assents. Indeed it is absurd, and yet 'the foolishness of God is wiser than man.'" See also J.Heywood Thomas, *Subjectivity and Paradox*, pp.128f: "Because it is Paradox that we have here we are confronted with something we cannot understand, something we must accept."

every man to relinquish his understanding and his thinking, and to keep his soul fixed upon the absurd"(CUP, p.495). However, only after giving up our understanding can we say that we believe in God's revelation. Unless we abandon the attempt to apply the logic of our reason to revelation, there can be no faith. It is true, of course, that reason can perform a negative role to clear the way for faith. That is to say, our reason recognizes that here is a human person who says that he is God. However, in this recognition our reason asserts that God becoming an individual man is absurd.[8] Reason cannot accept this historical fact.[9] However, without this historical fact, there is no absurdity in the real sense of the word.[10] As Climacus says, reason's assertion that revelation is absurd, is a reflection of the reality and actuality of revelation:

"While therefore the expressions in which offense proclaims itself, of whatever kind they may be, sound as if they came from elsewhere, even from

6.Cf. Paul Edwards,"Kierkegaard and the 'Truth' of Christianity,"Philosophy, XLVI (1971), p.91: "In fact religious doctrines are 'absurd,' 'impossible,' 'inconceivable' ---- i.e., if we followed reason we would have to reject them and not merely suspend judgment or arrive at a tentative endorsement." See also Kai E.Jordt Joergensen,"Karl Barth in the Light of Danish Theology,"Lutheran Church Quarterly, VI (1931), p.177: "The offense must come because the Son of God who became man and who was crucified is a Paradox for human thought."

7. Cf. CUP, p.337: "... faith requires a man to give up his reason." See also CUP, p.159: "In my God-relationship I have to learn precisely to give up my finite understanding, and therewith the custom of discrimination which is natural to me...." I shall not develop this theme in this interpretation of Kierkegaard. I shall simply say that the suspension of reason is for Kierkegaard related to the suspension of ethics, which is understood in Hegelian and Kantian terms a universal duty. For further discussion of the problem of the relation between the suspension of reason and the suspension of ethics, see Gwilym O.Griffith,"Kierkegaard on Faith,"The Hibbert Journal, XLII (1943-44), pp.58-63.

8. Cf. PF, p.59: "The Reason will doubtless find it is impossible to conceive it, could not of itself have discovered it, and when it hears it announced will not be able to understand it, sensing merely that its downfall is threatened." See also N.H.Soe,"Kierkegaard's doctrine of the Paradox," p.209: "Kierkegaard in fact asserts that the concept of 'the absurd' is the 'negative criterion of that which is higher than human reason and human knowledge.' The task of reason is to demonstrate that such is the case --- 'and then to leave it to each individual to decide whether he will believe it or not'(Papirer, X6 B80)."

the opposite direction, they are nevertheless echoings of the Paradox. This is what is called an acoustic illusion ... the offended consciousness can be taken as an indirect proof of the validity of the Paradox; offense is the mistaken reckoning, the invalid consequence, with which the Paradox repels and thrusts aside. The offended individual does not speak from his own resources, but borrows those of the Paradox; just as one who mimics or parodies another does not invent, but merely copies perversely"(PF, p.63).

Therefore, reason's reaction to revelation is a perverted reflection of the existence of revelation. This means that offense expresses the actuality of revelation which took place in time and history. Accordingly, to believe the revelation is to believe the thing which reason abandons with the assertion that it is absurd. As we have said, the content of faith was there before our faith and was rejected by our reason.[1] Hence the man who believes the Absolute Paradox as God's revelation does not regard it as absurd. Kierkegaard, in one of his Journal entries, says:

9. However, this impossibility, even though it is a universal one, cannot be regarded as a right one. In this respect, I agree with John W.Elrod that it must be regarded as an egoistic reasoning or egoistic rationality: "When human reasoning falls so completely under the sway of egotism, it is unreasonable to expect that it will develop politically and religiously in a non-egoistic manner. Kierkegaard's purpose in criticizing the glorification of reason in science, philosophy and politics was not to glorify an untrammelled subjectivity so much as it was to counter polemically the rise of an egoistic rationality in these dimensions of the modern state. Training in Christianity is especially crucial in this respect; nowhere else does Kierkegaard more persistently attack the egoistic character of theological reasoning in nineteenth-century Denmark."(Kierkegaard and Christendom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.204ff. my emphasis). See also Harry S. Broudy, "Kierkegaard's levels of Existence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, I (1940-41), p.309: "Can we go beyond Socrates? This according to Kierkegaard is the decisive question for Christianity. Kierkegaard raises this problem in the Brocken and concludes that to go beyond Socrates, we must deny the self-sufficiency of man --- truth must come to him from above."

10. Therefore, as we have mentioned, the Absolute Paradox is the Absolute Paradox because of its historicity. Cf. Papirer, VII 2B66: "The fact that God revealed Himself in suffering constitutes the Paradox." cited in N.H.Søe, "Christ," Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, p.62. Per Loenning also points out that: "After all, his [Kierkegaard's] paradox cannot be reduced to something merely psychological; the historical fact as such is a constitutive part of it. If the crucial point was not an historical event, ... then the matter would not be a 'paradox' according to Kierkegaard's terminology"(Dilemma of Contemporary Theology, p.77).

"When the believer has faith, the Absurd is not the Absurd ---Faith transforms it."[2]

"When I believe this or that by virtue of the fact that for God all things are possible, where then is the Absurd? The Absurd is the negative determination which secures that I had not overlooked one or another possibility which still lay within the compass of the purely human. The Absurd is the expression of despair: humanly it is impossible."[3]

According to these entries the absurdity of the revelational fact will be removed for the man who believes it to be God's revelation. According to Kierkegaard, the object of faith is not an absurdity; on the contrary, it is the only thing one must believe to be saved. In this respect, it is worthwhile to quote Benjamin Daise's consideration:

"From Climacus' initially pagan point of view the Paradox appears absolute. But we need not suppose that because of that the Paradox is absolute from all perspectives or even that it is a Paradox from all perspectives. Thus what appears to be purely irrational, i.e., absolutely paradoxical, appears so from a certain perspective, namely, idealism. And what looks like irrationalism in Kierkegaard is seen to be anti-idealism --- once the Paradox is understood as a Paradox."[4]

1. Cf. Perry D.Lefevre, The Prayers of Kierkegaard (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.166: "Faith is the belief that the absurd [Incarnation] has really happened. We all have the same opportunity; we are all presented with the same absurdity, the same offense, and we must all decide." See also Kai E.Jordt Joergensen, op.cit., p.178: "The Passion of Faith will appropriate what reason rejects."

2. SKJP, I, 10

3. Papirer, X6 B78. cited in C.Fabro, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard's Dialectic," p.182. See also Perry D.Lefevre, op.cit., p.186: "Thought rejects it [the Absolute Paradox]; it is a scandal, an offense to the ordinary mind and to the speculative mind alike until one realizes that he is a sinner before God and that he needs the forgiveness offered by Christ. Then he believes that what the Paradox asserts is true, and he believes it with his whole being, not just with his mind." In relation to the entry which I have just quoted above, Fabro says:

"The object of faith is the absurd, the Paradox, which is the inevitable cause of scandal, but only for whoever sees this object from the outside, i.e., for him who has no faith [But] for the believer, for the man of faith, this object is neither absurd, nor paradoxical: by virtue of faith his criterion is God, for whom all things are possible; in the light of faith he sees that this absurd, far from being a contradiction, is the one truth which saves ..."(p.179).

4. Benjamin Daise, "Kierkegaard and the Absolute Paradox," Journal of History of Philosophy, XIV (1976), pp.67-68.

That is to say, when Climacus calls revelation Paradox, he sees it from the perspective of Idealism. Therefore, from the perspective of Idealism to believe that historical revelation is to believe the Absolute Paradox. But for the believer, it is not to believe the Absolute Paradox.[1]

However, to believe the thing which was rejected before (the Absolute Paradox), it seems to me, does not mean that now one can regard the content of revelation as rational. In fact, this problem (of whether the object of faith can be regarded as rational or not) is a much discussed problem in Kierkegaard-interpretation. There are some scholars who think that for Kierkegaard the object of faith (what is revealed in time and history) is, for the believer, a rational or intelligible one. The person who asserts this view most strongly is Alastair McKinnon. His main thesis is that Kierkegaard is not an irrationalist in any sense of the word. He says:

"... the real Kierkegaard assumes that the believer, he who has come to believe, can and does revise his concepts so that claims which once seemed contradictory no longer seem to be so. ... He assumes that faith provides a basis for the revision of our concepts and, in contemporary terms, renders our claims conceptually intelligible ... the real Kierkegaard conceived both Christianity and the life of belief as in principle logically coherent He knew that it was possible to achieve coherent belief, and that is precisely why he was prepared to lavish such exquisite care upon an authorship concerned mainly to describe and lead his reader to this state." [2]

According to McKinnon, for the believer, revelation and Christianity are not logical contradictions, but are in fact perfectly coherent and intelligible.[3]
In a sense, McKinnon has a good insight into Kierkegaard's intention in using

1. According to Per Loenning, Torsten Bohlin also interpreted Kierkegaard's Paradox in this way: "According to Bohlin the paradox does not have its source in Kierkegaard's personal faith, but in the 'Hellenistic-Socratic distinction between time and eternity, presuming these to be of infinitely different qualities, which has in his [Kierkegaard's] thinking established an alliance with Augustine's doctrine of human nature as being totally corrupted by sin" (Per Loenning, The Dilemma of Contemporary Theology, p.89).

2. Alastair McKinnon, "Barth's Relation to Kierkegaard," p.34, my emphasis.

pseudonyms in his authorship. However, in the last analysis, it is not clear whether Kierkegaard regards the content of revelation or the object of faith as perfectly coherent and intelligible.

The attempt to answer this question as to whether Kierkegaard regards the object of faith as logically coherent and perfectly intelligible, is closely related to the problem of Kierkegaard's understanding of reason. If there is any hint of the possibility of a change in the role of reason in Kierkegaard's writings, we can give our assent to McKinnon's interpretation.[4] In a sense, Kierkegaard has to say that there is a change in the role of our reason, for he speaks of the New Birth which implies the qualitative change of man, the sinner. However, when we examine Kierkegaard's writings, it is hard to conclude that he suggests the possibility of a change in the role of our reason. According to Kierkegaard, even to the man who has faith, the content of revelation is not a rational one; even though we accept the Absolute Paradox, it cannot accord with our reason.[5] That is to say, even though we accept or believe in God's revelation, we cannot comprehend it. In this sense, revelation is not rational even to the believer. For if we can comprehend God's revelation, then there is

3. McKinnon considers this in detail in his "Kierkegaard's Paradox and Irrationalism," Journal of Existentialism, XXVII (1967), pp.401-16; "Believing the Paradox: A Contradiction in Kierkegaard?" Harvard Theological Review, LXI (1968), pp.633-636; "Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited," International Philosophical Quarterly, IX (1969), pp.165-176.

4. For other scholars who, like McKinnon, try to interpret Kierkegaard in this way, cf. C.Fabro, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard's Dialectic," pp.156-206; Benjamin Daise, "Kierkegaard and the Absolute Paradox," pp.67-68; Louis P.Pojman, "Kierkegaard on Justification of Belief," International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, VIII (1977), pp.75-93; James Collins, "Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard," The Journal of Religion, XXXVII (1957), pp.10-19.

5. However, as we shall see, it is impossible to conclude that for Kierkegaard there is no difference between the object of faith in the Christian sense and other logical contradictions, as do G.Schufreider and R.Popkin. Cf. Gregory Schufreider, "Kierkegaard on Belief without Justification," International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, XII (1981), pp.149-164; Richard H.Popkin, "Kierkegaard and Scepticism," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed., Josiah Thompson (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1972), pp.342-372.

no need to believe it. However, this does not mean that there is no notitia in our faith.[1] Without the object of faith or the content of revelation, there is no faith. This content of revelation was there in time and history before our faith; and we have refused to accept and to believe it before. The content of revelation or the object of faith is not given at first when we believe.

Therefore, in the broad sense of the word 'know,' we can say that we know the object of faith or the content of revelation, for it is in time and history. But this knowledge is not called 'knowledge' (in the restricted sense of the word --- 'rational knowledge' which is comprehended by reason) by Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, what is called 'knowledge' (in the restricted sense of the word) or what is known by reason, is what is comprehended by reason. Thus only rational things can be known by reason. But this does not mean that there is no such thing as historical knowledge. As we have mentioned, without historical facts and therefore without historical knowledge, there is no faith at all. However, in the realm of history, for Kierkegaard, it is not enough to have knowledge (in the broad sense of the word --- in this case 'historical knowledge'). It is necessary to give assent to the historical knowledge. Hence, in the realm of history, two different things are necessary: (1) historical knowledge and (2) giving assent to it. It is not enough to know what takes place. Moreover, faith in the Christian sense is also not like faith in ordinary historical facts. In faith in the Christian sense of the word, there

1. Cf. Marie Mikulova Thulstrup, "Studies of Pietists, Mystics and Church Fathers," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, p.60: "SK [Kierkegaard] went through a ripening process concerning the deepening and clarification of the principal interest which bears the whole of his authorship: what is Christianity? Even though the question was not posed noetically by SK, but existentially, with regard to carrying it out in life as a double question (What is to become a Christian? and What is it to be a Christian?), it contained a noetic element all the same, which was entailed, so to speak, secondarily. It could not have been otherwise, since SK declared his own subjective (and therefore, according to his own principles, true) conception to be generally valid."

are three things which are needed. First, one has to come across the historical fact of revelation. That is to say, one has to have an historical knowledge of the event of revelation which was in time and history. However, knowledge of a historical fact is not faith at all, yet alone 'not faith in the Christian sense'. Secondly, one has to give one's assent to this historical fact. But in the case of the Incarnation or the fact of revelation, it is impossible for anyone to give assent to this historical fact by himself, for man has lost the condition for accepting the revelation (for man is in sin). In this respect, this historical fact is different from any other historical fact to which we can give assent by ourselves. In order to give one's assent to this historical fact, one has to be changed by God. There is still a third condition for being a Christian. The third condition which is needed for faith to be faith in the Christian sense is to live according to the Truth, or to follow Jesus Christ.[1] In this respect, the difference between belief in ordinary historical facts and belief in the historical fact of revelation is clear. In the case of ordinary historical facts, it is possible to have a relation to the historical fact without considering one's life. For example, to believe that a star has come into existence (on the basis of the knowledge that a star is there) has nothing to do with our life. There is no difference between before and after believing the star's having come into existence. It is possible to believe it without changing our way of life. But in the case of believing the historical fact of revelation, the situation is different. In this case, it is impossible to say that we believe this fact without living according to the truth which the revelation teaches us; it is impossible to say that we believe it without being followers of Jesus Christ.[2] In this sense faith, in the Christian sense of the word, demands not only historical knowledge and giving assent to it (as in the case of ordinary historical facts), but also living the truth, or following Jesus Christ. So without following Jesus Christ, there is no faith.[3] What is

important here is that Kierkegaard relates following Jesus Christ to the historical life of Jesus: "To be a follower means that thy life has as great a likeness to His [Jesus Christ's] as it is possible for a man's life to have" (TC, p.108). Without the historical life of Jesus in our time and history, there is no 'example' or 'pattern' to be followed. So the historical life of Jesus in our time and history is important for Kierkegaard once again in this respect.[4] In fact, the core of the theme of contemporaneity with Christ is an emphasis upon following Jesus Christ.[5]

However, for Kierkegaard, even for the man who follows Jesus Christ, the content of revelation or the object of faith is not a rational one, even though it is not regarded as an absurdity and accepted as such. This can be related to

1. But to follow Jesus Christ, in fact, is not the condition of faith but the result or effect of faith. Cf. Papirer, X4 A284: "Luther rightly arranged it [faith and its result] thus: Christ is gift --- to this corresponds faith. Besides, He [Jesus Christ] is exemplar --- to this corresponds imitation. But more accurately one could say: 1) imitation tending toward a decisive action by which the situation originates for becoming a Christian; 2) Christ as gift --- faith; 3) imitation as fruit of faith." cited in Louis Dupré, op.cit., p.171. However, there is no way of seeing whether one has faith or not, except the way of life which is the following of Jesus Christ. Of course, faith is an inwardness, but it, according to Kierkegaard, must be expressed in one's outward life. Therefore, without "following" Jesus Christ in one's outward life, there is no faith; the man who has faith in his inwardness must follow Jesus Christ. Cf. Jeremy Walker, "Kierkegaard's Concept of Truthfulness," Inquiry, XII (1968-69), p.216: "The way of life and death of the martyr is that which expresses Christian charity, Agape. This way of life is also the expression for the absolute commitment characteristic of faith." But it is not possible to say that in emphasizing the following of Jesus Christ or Imitatio Christi, Kierkegaard is closer to Roman Catholic theology. On the contrary, Kierkegaard regards the following of Christ as the gift of God, as he thinks faith is the gift of God. Cf. Kierkegaard's criticism of monasticism in CUP, pp.362-370. See also Louis Dupré, op.cit., pp.156-181. And again Louis Mackey, op.cit., p.243: "It is going too far to say that he [Kierkegaard] was a latent Catholic, or that he might have become a Catholic openly had he lived longer."

2. In this sense, Kierkegaard emphasizes that "the Truth consists not in knowing the Truth, but in being the Truth" (TC, p.201), or, "It becomes untruth when knowing the Truth is separated from being the Truth" (p.201). Therefore, "to preach Christianity without existing in the same categories is nonsense and a deception, for it fails to give the decisive expression to what one preaches" (FSE, pp.36, 78).

Kierkegaard's attitude to Apologetics[6]. According to Kierkegaard, to attempt to defend Christianity and God's revelation by human reason in the traditional sense of Apologetics is not different from rationalizing Christianity and revelation. As we have seen, to believe revelation is to abandon the attempt to apply the logic of our reason to it [revelation]. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, to defend Christianity by reason is to make Christianity plausible, and "to make Christianity plausible is the same as to misinterpret it"(AR, p.59).

If there is a way of writing Apologetics it is to make it more difficult to be a Christian, but not more difficult than it is[7]. That is to say, it is to

3. The meaning of following Jesus Christ is best described in Training in Christianity and The Works of Love. In fact the title of The Works of Love itself is related to faith, for it is taken from Gal. 5:6 in which faith and the works of love are closely related: "For in Jesus Christ neither circumcision availed anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith which worketh by love"(K.J.V.) Taylor tries to explain that the Imitation idea and the theme of suffering come from Kierkegaard's later writings through a change in Kierkegaard's thought, following Valter Lindstroem.(Cf.op.cit., pp.337f. n.137). However, this assertion cannot be sustained. For further discussion of the fact that Kierkegaard's Imitation-idea and the theme of suffering have their roots far back in Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings, see Marie Thulstrup, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Imitation," in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp.266-285.

4. SKJP, 273: "Christ's whole life in all its aspects must supply the norm for the life of the whole Church. One has to take every particular aspect of Christ's life, straight from his baptism to his resurrection and show correspondence in the Church." See also Christopher M.Brookfield, "What was Kierkegaard's Task," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XVIII (1962), pp.33-35: "Kierkegaard chose to view Christianity as what it claims to be --- man's ultimate measure. His standard of measurement was the absolute standard of life lived in Jesus Christ."

5. Cf. Kai E. Jordt Joergensen, op.cit., p.178: "Kierkegaard wants to teach us to become contemporary with Christ, that is, to follow him in suffering and humiliation, ... by a personal appropriation of him in his humility, by frankly admitting distance from the ideal in order to flee to grace."

6. For an interesting discussion on Kierkegaard and Apologetics, see Malcolm L.Diamond, "Kierkegaard and Apologetics," Journal of Religion, XLIV (1964), pp.122-132, esp., p.122: "Christianity is not plausible. Kierkegaard insisted upon this throughout his career. At its heart stands the incredible claim that the man, Jesus of Nazareth, was God. The effort to clarify the nature of this claim and the attitude appropriate to the Christian who would affirm it, was the focus of his voluminous literature." See also Per Loenning, "Defending Christianity," in Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, pp.214-217.

transmit the historical fact itself as itself. There are two important reasons why Kierkegaard sustains such a position. First, the historical fact of revelation as an historical fact does not admit of being changed. If it was the Absolute Paradox and the possibility of offense at the time of Jesus Christ, it remains as such without change in relation to the stream of time and history. This fact is the absolute fact. Therefore, it cannot become a more plausible thing after a considerable time because of its effects on or results in history. Of course, it can affect the course of history and leave its result in history. But these are only relative. The difficulty of believing this historical fact as God's revelation is the same for the man who lived at the same time as Jesus Christ as for the man who lives after him. Secondly, according to Kierkegaard, the man who has a right relation to this historical fact of revelation, as we have said, is following Jesus Christ and living the Truth. In the course of following Jesus Christ, there is no room to rationalize Christianity. The attempt to defend Christianity does not fit the theme of suffering.

Therefore, it is difficult to find any hint of a rational revelation, or the possibility of rationalizing one's belief, in Kierkegaard's writings. We cannot be sure, thus, that Kierkegaard makes room for the operation of a changed reason in the realm of faith. Although he says of "the sphere of faith" that in this sphere "the absurd is not the absurd --- faith transforms it," he also makes it clear that "in every weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him" (SKJP, I, 10). Perhaps this is an existential confession of Kierkegaard's

7. Cf. CUP, p.495: "My purpose is to make it difficult to become a Christian, yet not more difficult than it is and qualitatively difficult, and essentially difficult for everybody equally ..." Therefore, even though Kierkegaard attacks Apologetics in the traditional sense of the word, his works are a kind of Apologetics in the sense that it makes the characteristics of Christianity clear. Cf. H.R.Mackintosh, *op.cit.*, p.213: "The youth [the young Kierkegaard] resolved to give all his powers to the defence of Christianity in what he felt to be a virtually pagan world."

own experience. Therefore, Kierkegaard did not develop a theology, but only witnessed to the content of revelation and the necessary implications of revelation. In this sense, we can give our assent to the following observation of S  e:

"Kierkegaard is fully aware that the believer can reflect on the thought-content of his faith. In this sense, Christianity's teaching can perfectly well become 'his own thought,' but always only in the sphere of faith. These thoughts are even such that he can easily explain them to the uninitiated. According to Kierkegaard, they are in no way complicated. But the uninitiated will reject them as absurd, and as soon as the passion of faith is weakened the believer himself will also consider them absurd." [1]

However, it is one thing to assert that the object of faith cannot be regarded as rational and it another thing to assert that to be a Christian one must believe blindly. [2] For Kierkegaard, the object of faith or the historical fact of revelation cannot be regarded as rational, as that which can be comprehended by our reason. But to believe revelation is different from believing any other thing. To believe the Absolute Paradox is clearly different from Socrates' belief in God, for to believe the Absolute Paradox is the how of being a Christian. Climacus says:

"The thing of being a Christian is not determined by the what of Christianity but by how of the Christian. This how can only correspond with one thing, the Absolute Paradox..... to believe is specifically

1. N.H.S  e, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox," p.223.

2. For a similar interpretation of Kierkegaard, see Vernard Eller, "Fact, Faith and Foolishness," pp.59f.: "A few observations regarding the nature of this leap of faith are in place here. Notice, first of all, that this is not a blind leap in the dark - as Kierkegaard often has been misunderstood. Prior to the leap, reflection has been at work to determine that what one confronts is a true and essential Paradox and not a situation which reflection itself is competent to handle A leap that goes beyond reason and understanding there most certainly is, but a leap in the dark it is not." See also Merold Westphal, "Kierkegaard and the Logic of Insanity," Religious Studies, VII (1971), p.211: "So Kierkegaard leaves us with 'the most frightful act of decision.' The choice is between unbelief, which sees sheer madness in the affirmations of faith, and belief, which sees in that madness the divine wisdom. If Kierkegaard's analysis of inference and evidence robs the latter of the security of objective proof, his analysis of the absurd, the paradoxical and the contradictory robs the former of the security of easy dismissal on the grounds that the content refutes itself."

revelation to be absurd. Hence, to become a Christian is not easy. This point can be related to the second reason why Kierkegaard emphasizes the Absolute Paradox.

The second reason why Kierkegaard emphasizes the fact that revelation is the Absolute Paradox, is to emphasize the possibility of offense. And the possibility of offense owes to the historicity of revelation. Let us consider this more closely.

What is the offense? In a word, the offense is the misrelation to the Absolute Paradox. Without the paradox, there is no offense.[1] Therefore, the possibility of offense is also related to the historical life of Jesus.

However, what we are concerned with is not the possibility of the offense which has to do with Christ "as a mere human individual who comes into collision with the established order." (offense 'A') Of course, such a possibility of the offense is also important, for it makes clear that Jesus was an historical person. But 'the essential offense', the offense that one takes at Christ, has to do with his claim to be the God-man (offense 'B'). Anti-Climacus takes the term offense from Jesus' assertion 'Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me' (Matt 11:6, Lk 7:23, Jn 6:61).[2] He says:

"Christ says of Himself that He is the living bread, 'whosoever eateth this bread shall live' ... Thus an individual man, to all appearances

1. For a discussion of the close relation between the Absolute Paradox and the offense, see PF, pp.61ff; CUP, pp.188ff. See also John W. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, pp.211f.

2. Cf. TC, pp.96-104. The term offense comes from Scripture, as we can see from these Biblical passages and Paul's assertion in I Cor. 1:20-23. Cf. Frithiof Brandt, Søren Kierkegaard, p.93: "It was St. Paul who uttered the renowned words about Christianity being 'a scandal[offense] to the Jews and a folly[or a foolishness] to the Greeks.' A substantial part of Training in Christianity may be understood as a brilliant paraphrase of these words, which Kierkegaard reminds us of with approval in various passages in his writings. The fact was that Kierkegaard considered that the individual confronted with the teaching of Christianity must either be scandalized by it or believe in it."

different from all other appropriation and inwardness. ... This formula fits only the believer, not an enthusiast, not a thinker, but simply and sorely the believer who is related to the Absolute Paradox"(CUP, p.540).

"All lovers have the 'how' of love in common, the particular person must supply the name of his beloved. But with aspect to believing (sensu strictissimo) it holds good that this 'how' is appropriate only to one as its object [the Absolute Paradox]"(CUP, p.542)

Only the Absolute Paradox that God became an individual man under the Emperor Augustus, is the proper object of the how of the Christian. And, according to Climacus, this Absolute Paradox is different from nonsense. In the case of nonsense we cannot believe against the understanding. Only the Absolute Paradox is the object which must be believed against the understanding:

" ... In relation to Christianity he [the Christian] believes against the understanding and in this case also uses understanding to make sure that he believes against the understanding. Nonsense therefore he cannot believe against the understanding, for precisely the understanding will discern that it is nonsense and will prevent him from believing it; but he makes so much use of the understanding that he becomes aware of the incomprehensible, and then he holds to this, believing against the understanding"(CUP, p.504).[1]

To sum up the first reason why Kierkegaard emphasizes the Absolute Paradox: Kierkegaard tries to make it clear that revelation takes place in time as an historical fact. So to be a Christian means to accept this historical fact and follow Jesus Christ. In a word, Kierkegaard emphasizes the paradoxicality of revelation to emphasize the difficulty of becoming a Christian. But he does not want to make it difficult above the degree which Christianity itself demands. That is to say, Christianity itself declares that it is difficult to become a Christian. To become a Christian is not something natural. For, to the man who is in sin what is natural is to be in sin and to assert the historical

1. Cf. H.R.Mackintosh, op.cit., p.225: "Paradox in Kierkegaard, it must be remembered, is far from being nonsense. It is indeed part of faith to hold that for God the Paradox is resolved." Henry E. Allison also suggest that "Climacus endeavors to distinguish between Christian faith and superstition or aestheticism, which may be regarded as a kind of nonsense," even though his [Allison's] conclusion is that "such efforts seem to have a partial success"("Christianity and Nonsense," pp.449,460.)

like the others, talks in such a way about himself! What wonder, indeed, that people are offended, that they separated themselves from him and went each to his own affairs, deeply offended, and many of the disciples with them. And so in this passage we have the sorrowful word, "Blessed is he who is not offended in me, so there follows one like it when Christ says to the Twelve, "Will ye also go away?" Alas..... how difficult it is to become a believer. He suffers in this instance also"(TC, pp.100f.).

Therefore, according to Anti-Climacus, the possibility of offense, which is related to the difficulty of becoming a believer or a disciple, was present "every instant when He (the God-Man), this individual man, spoke or acted in a way suggesting the qualification God." Hence, "with every word suggestive of the qualification God, with every act that bears this suggestion, the possibility of the offense is presented"(TC, pp.103f.). Without noticing this possibility of the offense, there is no way to become a Christian. This is the main reason why Kierkegaard attacks the state-church, in which to become a Christian is natural, so that there is no possibility of noticing the possibility of the offense. The point which Kierkegaard asserts is that to become a Christian is not a natural thing to natural man. One must notice the offense.

This point is closely related to Kierkegaard's understanding of Jesus Christ's use of indirect-communication. Basically, there are two levels of indirect-communication which Jesus Christ uses. The one is related to the content of communication: the fact that Jesus Christ himself is God the Son. Usually Jesus Christ communicates this indirectly; he just "points to the miracles(the lame walk, the blind see, etc.) and to the doctrine itself (the Gospel is preached to the poor) --- and thereupon, strangely enough, He adds 'Blessed is he whosoever is not offended in me'(TC, p.97). However, the form of indirect-communication itself is also God's revelation. And such an indirect-communication is explained in some cases by an obvious assertion that suggests Jesus's identification with God(TC, pp.133f.). And in this obvious assertion the difference between Christianity and any other religion clearly

appears. Kierkegaard, for example, says:

"All other religions are oblique; the founder steps aside and introduces another who speaks; therefore, they themselves belong under the religion ---- Christianity alone is direct address"(SKJP, I, 427).

And again: "Yes, indeed, Christ said quite directly that He was the Only Begotten of the Father ... the utterance is quite direct"(TC, p.135).

What, then, is the indirect-communication of the second kind (or, the second level)? Kierkegaard says:

"When one says directly, 'I am God; the Father and I are one,' that is direct-communication. But when he who says it is an individual man, quite like other men, then this communication is not just perfectly direct, for it is not just perfectly clear and direct that an individual man should be God --- although what he says is perfectly direct. By reason of the communicator, the communication contains a contradiction, it becomes indirect-communication, it puts to thee a choice, whether thou wilt believe Him or not"(TC, p.134, my emphasis).

Therefore, the indirect-communication of the second level is not different from the fact that the communicator is the God-man. For Kierkegaard, as far as the content which is to be communicated is concerned, it can be communicated directly. In fact, if there were not this direct communication that He is the God-man, there would be no possibility of offense and the Absolute Paradox. Because an individual man who is in our time and history asserts and suggests that he is God, there is indirect communication.

So the man who is confronted directly or indirectly with the assertion that the historical Jesus is the God-man stands before the possibility of the offense. The situation in which it is difficult to become a believer, for Kierkegaard, is the opportunity to be a believer. And according to Kierkegaard, there is no particular time in which it is easy to be a believer. Without abandoning one's reason before the Absolute Paradox, there is no possibility of being a Christian. Therefore, to be a Christian is not easier for the direct-contemporary; nor for the man who belongs to the later generation, for "the very fact that He lived, is infinitely more important than all consequences

of His life"(TC, p.123. Cf. p.26).

The second possibility of essential offense is the lowliness of the one who claims to be God('C', TC, p.105). Those who were directly contemporary with Jesus said: "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary, and his brethren... and his sisters, are they not all with us? Whence hath this man all these things?"(TC, p.105)[1] In fact this kind of possibility of offense is the result of a close observation of the historical Jesus. Therefore, basically it is also related to the fact that an individual man is God. The difference between 'B' and 'C' can be found in the following quotation.

"In this case [C] one is not offended by the claim that He is God, but by the observation that God is this man ('Behold what a man!'), whether one is now about to believe that He is God, or is merely pondering reflectively over this infinite self-contradiction that God should be such a man. In the foregoing section [B] the man who was about to be offended, who was brought to a halt by the possibility of offense, said, 'An individual man like us wants to be God.' Here [C] the man who is brought to a halt by the possibility of offense says, "Supposing for an instant that thou art God, what folly and madness it is that thou art this lowly, poor, impotent man"(TC, p.105).

What we can deduce from Anti-Climacus' discussion of the possibility of offense is that the possibility of offense is the result of the fact that God became an individual man to be the Revealer and Redeemer, so that He said of Himself that He was God and acted in such way as to suggest this. Both for the direct contemporary and for the one who is not a direct contemporary, the possibility of offense is related to the historical fact of revelation. And the history in which the historical Jesus spoke and acted is history which is not different from the history in which we live. This is one of the reasons why Kierkegaard emphasizes and calls the historical revelation the Absolute Paradox.

1. Cf. Matt. 13:55, Mk 6:3, Jn 7:17f., Matt. 26:31,33 (Mk 14:27,29).

Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, those who do not have a right relationship with the Absolute Paradox by faith are offended by the Absolute Paradox. Kierkegaard is not afraid to assert the historicity of the revelation. What is important for Kierkegaard is the historical Jesus and his life (the life which he actually lived in time)(TC, p.26). Hence, for Kierkegaard, the Christ-event took place in the history which is our history. History in this sense has not a problem for Kierkegaard. But, if one tries to interpret history, as did Hegelian theologians, in the light of the consequences of the life of Jesus, then as far as Kierkegaard is concerned, Jesus Christ cannot be said to be found in history [meaning by history here interpreted history]. For such an interpreted history takes away the possibility of offense. And to take away the possibility of offense is to take away the Absolute Paradox. But, in fact, such an attempt to take away the possibility of offense itself is an act of offense.

Those who do not accept the Absolute Paradox, the historical fact that God became an individual man, are offended by this fact. And those who try to understand and interpret this fact by their reason are also offended by this fact. To place God's revelation in a special realm or a special history can also be seen as an attempt to take away the possibility of offense in the light of our discussion of Kierkegaard's understanding of offense. For, if God's revelation is in a special history or in a special realm, one can be a Christian without believing the fact that God became an individual man in a time which is not different from that in which we live. And in that case, God's revelation is always beyond our time and our history. So there is no Absolute Paradox in the real sense of the word.

Up to now we have considered Kierkegaard's assertion of the paradoxicality of revelation. From our consideration we can draw the following conclusions.

First, for Kierkegaard, the Absolute Paradox is a special category for interpreting the revelation which took place in our time and history. This Paradox must not be confused with any other paradox, or logical contradictions in general. Kierkegaard, as we have seen, applies the term 'the Absolute Paradox' only to the historical event of revelation.

Secondly, the reason why Kierkegaard calls the revelation the Absolute Paradox lies in the fact that revelation took place in our time and history. As we have shown, without the historical fact, there is no Absolute Paradox. Only because God became an individual man in time and history, can this historical fact be called the Absolute Paradox.

Thirdly, the content of the Absolute Paradox consists in the fact that God became an individual man to be the Revealer and the Redeemer. Therefore, the Absolute Paradox is closely related to man's sin. For it is because of sin that the form of revelation is a special one. That is to say, if there were no sin, there would be a form of revelation different from that of the Absolute Paradox.

Fourthly, the Absolute Paradox demands not only that men give assent to it, but also that they live in accordance with it. That is to say, to follow Jesus Christ is the absolute demand of the Absolute Paradox.

From these points we can draw the final conclusion that the meaning which Kierkegaard gives to the term 'the Absolute Paradox' is different from that which Barth gives to it in the "Romans." For Kierkegaard, if God's revelation were actually not in time and history, or if God's revelation were beyond the things which are in time and history, which stand in relation to revelation,

then there would be no Absolute Paradox. Whereas, as we have seen, for the early Barth, if God's revelation were in time and history, or if God's revelation could be directly identified with what is in time and history, then there would be no Paradox. For, according to Barth, God's revelation only takes place in the eternal moment, which is not a moment in time.

This point can be supported by looking at the later Barth's assertion that in the resurrection, in which God reveals Himself directly in Jesus Christ, there is not a Paradox. Can this assertion be interpreted as meaning that, for the later Barth, before the resurrection Jesus is regarded as Paradox? If we carry through the logic of this assertion, then we must give an affirmative answer to this question. However, as we have seen, we do not find any direct comment on this problem in the later Barth's theology. He only suggests indirectly that the one who is described in the New Testament is Jesus Christ who is to be interpreted in the light of the resurrection. As we have seen, for Barth, the starting point for the apostle's description of Jesus is not Jesus before the resurrection, but the resurrection event which is in God's time.

Moreover, throughout the later Barth's theology we find a differentiation between God's revelation itself and what is in our time and our world in relation to it. Even though Barth in his later theology emphasizes that God's revelation takes place in time and history, the time and history in which God's revelation takes place are not our time and our history. According to Barth, time (God's time) and time (our time) are not identical. What is in our time and our history cannot be directly identified with God's revelation. It can be, or become, God's revelation when God acts. However, the time in which God acts is not our time, but God's time. Therefore, as we have seen, there is an eternal diastasis between what is in God's time and what is in our time. In a word, even in the later Barth's theology, we do not find the Kierkegaardian

sense of the Incarnation and God's revelation in our time and history. There is no Absolute Paradox; and nothing, which, even though it is not called such, in fact corresponds to the idea of the Absolute Paradox.

On the contrary, as we have seen, a kind of rationalization is attempted by the later Barth. Even though the later Barth differentiates between the rational in the ordinary sense and 'the rational' in theology, he himself affirms that what is rational, in any sense of the word, is only rational to our reason. This does not mean, of course, that the later Barth does not approve of the mystery of revelation. But he tries to understand it by reason. The distinction between God's revelation in God's time and what is in our time and our history, would be seen by Kierkegaard as an attempt to take away the Absolute Paradox. For this distinction gives rise to the possibility of a rational understanding of the structure of revelation. Thus there is no real similarity between Barth and Kierkegaard in their understanding of revelation, even in the later Barth's theology.

A considerable distance has been journeyed in viewing Kierkegaard and Barth on revelation. We have now come to an end of this study in which the following conclusions have been reached.

Even though the early Barth and Kierkegaard have in common some important terminology in their understanding of revelation (e.g., moment, paradox), the meaning which they give to these terms is very different. As we have seen, (1) for Barth the moment in which revelation takes place is the eternal moment which is not in time, whereas for Kierkegaard the moment of the Incarnation is a moment in time; (2) Therefore, for the early Barth, though it has a relation to the things which are in time and history, revelation which is given in the eternal moment is not in time and history; whereas for Kierkegaard because of the moment of the Incarnation the Revealer was in time and history, he was the God in time; (3) For the early Barth, Jesus Christ who is interpreted in the light of the resurrection, and who therefore is not in time and history is the Absolute Paradox, whereas for Kierkegaard Jesus who actually lived in our time and history is the Absolute Paradox.

These major differences are related to the difference between their dualisms. For the early Barth, the dualism of God and man, of the Ursprung and this world, of eternity and time, of Urgeschichte and Historie is an eternal and absolute dualism. Therefore, there is no room for the Absolute Paradox in Kierkegaard's sense of the God in time, the Eternal in time, the historical Jesus as the God-man.

Therefore, in so far as the later Barth emphasizes the historicity of revelation and the Incarnation, his later position on revelation is closer to Kierkegaard than his early position. However, we cannot but point out the following two points. First, even though in his later theology Barth emphasizes the Incarnation, in that (1) he interprets the Incarnation as the exaltation of humanity in general, (2) he sees the Incarnation in the light of the resurrection, and (3) the Incarnation, for him, is a necessary event in relation to the inner-life of God and to creation, the later Barth's understanding of the Incarnation is very different from that of Kierkegaard. Secondly, even though in his later theology Barth tries to emphasize the historicity of revelation and therefore seems to overcome his early absolute dualism, in the last analysis, the temporality and historicity of revelation is for Barth a different temporality and historicity from our temporality and historicity. Therefore, even though he says that God acts in time and history, it is hard to understand his saying that he is speaking of the fact that God acts in our time and our history. Even in his later theology, Barth still sustains his absolute dualism between God and man, God's time and our time, God's history(Christ-history) and our history. In this respect, his understanding of revelation cannot be identified with, nor regarded as similar to that of Kierkegaard. As we have seen, for Kierkegaard the dualism between God and man, eternity and time can be overcome by Jesus Christ who was in our time and our history. This is the reason why Jesus Christ is called the Absolute Paradox.

We can thus conclude that even though Barth was influenced by Kierkegaard throughout his academic life, his understanding of revelation is considerably different from that of Kierkegaard.

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